From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, hpa@zytor.com,
julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, luto@amacapital.net,
mingo@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com,
valentin.schneider@arm.com, brgerst@gmail.com, luto@kernel.org,
bp@alien8.de, dvlasenk@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
dvyukov@google.com, rostedt@goodmis.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/20] objtool: Add UACCESS validation
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 15:02:09 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190308210209.usq2rpedccz25va5@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190307115200.697533978@infradead.org>
On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 12:45:29PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
> @@ -369,7 +369,19 @@ int arch_decode_instruction(struct elf *
>
> case 0x0f:
>
> - if (op2 >= 0x80 && op2 <= 0x8f) {
> + if (op2 == 0x01) {
> +
> + if (modrm == 0xca) {
> +
> + *type = INSN_CLAC;
> +
> + } else if (modrm == 0xcb) {
> +
> + *type = INSN_STAC;
> +
> + }
Style nit, no need for all those brackets and newlines.
> --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> @@ -442,6 +442,81 @@ static void add_ignores(struct objtool_f
> }
> }
>
> +static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> + /* KASAN */
A short comment would be good here, something describing why a function
might be added to the list.
> + "memset_orig", /* XXX why not memset_erms */
> + "__memset",
> + "kasan_poison_shadow",
> + "kasan_unpoison_shadow",
> + "__asan_poison_stack_memory",
> + "__asan_unpoison_stack_memory",
> + "kasan_report",
> + "check_memory_region",
> + /* KASAN out-of-line */
> + "__asan_loadN_noabort",
> + "__asan_load1_noabort",
> + "__asan_load2_noabort",
> + "__asan_load4_noabort",
> + "__asan_load8_noabort",
> + "__asan_load16_noabort",
> + "__asan_storeN_noabort",
> + "__asan_store1_noabort",
> + "__asan_store2_noabort",
> + "__asan_store4_noabort",
> + "__asan_store8_noabort",
> + "__asan_store16_noabort",
> + /* KASAN in-line */
> + "__asan_report_load_n_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_load1_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_load2_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_load4_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_load8_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_load16_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store_n_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store1_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store2_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store4_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store8_noabort",
> + "__asan_report_store16_noabort",
> + /* KCOV */
> + "write_comp_data",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4",
> + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8",
> + /* UBSAN */
> + "ubsan_type_mismatch_common",
> + "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch",
> + "__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1",
> + /* misc */
> + "csum_partial_copy_generic",
> + "__memcpy_mcsafe",
> + "ftrace_likely_update", /* CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING */
> + NULL
> +};
> +
> +static void add_uaccess_safe(struct objtool_file *file)
> +{
> + struct symbol *func;
> + const char **name;
> +
> + if (!uaccess)
> + return;
> +
> + for (name = uaccess_safe_builtin; *name; name++) {
> + func = find_symbol_by_name(file->elf, *name);
> + if (!func)
> + continue;
This won't work if the function name changes due to IPA optimizations.
I assume these are all global functions so maybe it's fine?
> @@ -1914,6 +2008,16 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
> switch (insn->type) {
>
> case INSN_RETURN:
> + if (state.uaccess && !func_uaccess_safe(func)) {
> + WARN_FUNC("return with UACCESS enabled", sec, insn->offset);
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + if (!state.uaccess && func_uaccess_safe(func)) {
> + WARN_FUNC("return with UACCESS disabled from a UACCESS-safe function", sec, insn->offset);
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> if (func && has_modified_stack_frame(&state)) {
> WARN_FUNC("return with modified stack frame",
> sec, insn->offset);
> @@ -1929,17 +2033,32 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
> return 0;
>
> case INSN_CALL:
> - if (is_fentry_call(insn))
> - break;
> + case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC:
> +do_call:
> + if (state.uaccess && !func_uaccess_safe(insn->call_dest)) {
> + WARN_FUNC("call to %s() with UACCESS enabled",
> + sec, insn->offset, insn_dest_name(insn));
> + return 1;
> + }
>
> - ret = dead_end_function(file, insn->call_dest);
> - if (ret == 1)
> + if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL ||
> + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC)
> return 0;
> - if (ret == -1)
> - return 1;
>
> - /* fallthrough */
> - case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC:
> + if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL)
> + break;
> +
> + if (insn->type == INSN_CALL) {
> + if (is_fentry_call(insn))
> + break;
> +
> + ret = dead_end_function(file, insn->call_dest);
> + if (ret == 1)
> + return 0;
> + if (ret == -1)
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> if (!no_fp && func && !has_valid_stack_frame(&state)) {
> WARN_FUNC("call without frame pointer save/setup",
> sec, insn->offset);
> @@ -1956,6 +2075,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
> sec, insn->offset);
> return 1;
> }
> + goto do_call;
> +
These gotos make my head spin. Again I would much prefer a small amount
of code duplication over this.
> +++ b/tools/objtool/special.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
> #define ALT_NEW_LEN_OFFSET 11
>
> #define X86_FEATURE_POPCNT (4*32+23)
> +#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP (9*32+20)
>
> struct special_entry {
> const char *sec;
> @@ -107,8 +108,15 @@ static int get_alt_entry(struct elf *elf
> * It has been requested that we don't validate the !POPCNT
> * feature path which is a "very very small percentage of
> * machines".
> + *
> + * Also, unconditionally enable SMAP; this avoids seeing paths
> + * that pass through the STAC alternative and through the CLAC
> + * NOPs.
Why is this a problem?
> + *
> + * XXX: We could do this for all binary NOP/single-INSN
> + * alternatives.
Same question here.
> */
> - if (feature == X86_FEATURE_POPCNT)
> + if (feature == X86_FEATURE_POPCNT || feature == X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
> alt->skip_orig = true;
> }
>
>
>
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-08 21:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-07 11:45 [PATCH 00/20] objtool: UACCESS validation v3 Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 01/20] x86/ia32: Fix ia32_restore_sigcontext AC leak Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 02/20] i915,uaccess: Fix redundant CLAC Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 03/20] x86/uaccess: Move copy_user_handle_tail into asm Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 18:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 19:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 19:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-10 13:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 04/20] x86/uaccess: Fix up the fixup Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 05/20] x86/uaccess/xen: Suppress SMAP warnings Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 12:22 ` Juergen Gross
2019-03-07 12:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 12:36 ` Juergen Gross
2019-03-08 19:00 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 19:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-10 13:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-11 17:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 19:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 06/20] x86/uaccess: Always inline user_access_begin() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 07/20] x86/uaccess: Always inline force_valid_ss() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 13:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 18:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-07 18:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 19:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 08/20] x86/uaccess: Introduce user_access_{save,restore}() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 09/20] x86/uaccess,kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 10/20] x86/uaccess,ubsan: Fix UBSAN " Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 11/20] x86/uaccess,ftrace: Fix ftrace_likely_update() " Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 12/20] objtool: Set insn->func for alternatives Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 19:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 19:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 13/20] objtool: Hande function aliases Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 19:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 20:00 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 14/20] objtool: Rewrite add_ignores() Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 19:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 15/20] objtool: Add --backtrace support Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 19:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 16/20] objtool: Rewrite alt->skip_orig Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 20:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 21:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 22:27 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 17/20] objtool: Fix sibling call detection Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 20:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 18/20] objtool: Add UACCESS validation Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 16:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 17:10 ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 17:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 18:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 18:51 ` hpa
2019-03-07 19:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 15:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 15:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 20:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 20:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 15:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 15:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 20:15 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-03-07 20:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 20:40 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2019-03-07 20:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 21:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-03-08 21:31 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 21:54 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-10 13:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-11 18:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 19/20] objtool: uaccess PUSHF/POPF support Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 21:11 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-10 13:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 11:45 ` [PATCH 20/20] objtool: Add Direction Flag validation Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 21:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-08 21:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-08 21:56 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-10 13:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-11 18:00 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 12:03 ` [PATCH 00/20] objtool: UACCESS validation v3 Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 12:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 13:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 16:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 16:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 17:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 17:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 17:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 17:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 18:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-10 13:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-19 10:08 ` [PATCH] compiler.h, tracing: Remove CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES Ingo Molnar
2019-04-19 13:04 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-07 17:04 ` [PATCH 00/20] objtool: UACCESS validation v3 hpa
2019-03-07 17:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 17:29 ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 17:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 17:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-03-07 17:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-03 8:21 ` [tip:core/objtool] tracing: Improve "if" macro code generation tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2019-03-07 16:31 ` [PATCH 00/20] objtool: UACCESS validation v3 Linus Torvalds
2019-03-07 17:14 ` hpa
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