mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 14:35:17 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191114203517.su2roiygk4htkpc3@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191114201258.GA18745@guptapadev.amr>

On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 12:12:58PM -0800, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 02:33:50PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
> > For MDS vulnerable processors with TSX support, enabling either MDS
> > or TAA mitigations will enable the use of VERW to flush internal
> > processor buffers at the right code path. IOW, they are either both
> > mitigated or both not mitigated. However, if the command line options
> > are inconsistent, the vulnerabilites sysfs files may not report the
> > mitigation status correctly.
> > 
> > For example, with only the "mds=off" option:
> > 
> >   vulnerabilities/mds:Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
> >   vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
> > 
> > The mds vulnerabilities file has wrong status in this case.
> > 
> > Change taa_select_mitigation() to sync up the two mitigation status
> > and have them turned off if both "mds=off" and "tsx_async_abort=off"
> > are present.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> >  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index 4c7b0fa15a19..418d41c1fd0d 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -304,8 +304,12 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
> >  		return;
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
> > -	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
> > +	/*
> > +	 * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
> > +	 * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
> > +	    mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
> >  		goto out;
> >  
> >  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
> > @@ -339,6 +343,15 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
> >  	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
> >  		cpu_smt_disable(false);
> >  
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
> > +	 * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
> > +	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
> > +		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> > +		mds_select_mitigation();
> 
> This will cause a confusing print in dmesg from previous and this call
> to mds_select_mitigation().
> 
> 	"MDS: Vulnerable"
> 	"MDS: Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
> 
> Maybe delay MDS mitigation print till TAA is evaluated.

Since they're so intertwined it might make sense to just combine the two
mitigations into a single function.

-- 
Josh


  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-14 20:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-13 19:33 Waiman Long
2019-11-14 17:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-14 17:53   ` Waiman Long
2019-11-14 18:48     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-14 19:11       ` Waiman Long
2019-11-14 20:12 ` Pawan Gupta
2019-11-14 20:35   ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-11-14 21:48     ` Waiman Long
2019-11-14 21:58   ` Waiman Long
2019-11-14 22:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-15 14:40       ` Waiman Long
2019-11-14 23:03     ` Thomas Gleixner

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20191114203517.su2roiygk4htkpc3@treble \
    --to=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longman@redhat.com \
    --cc=mgross@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®