From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
"Willy Tarreau" <w@1wt.eu>,
"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
"Vito Caputo" <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Ray Strode" <rstrode@redhat.com>,
"William Jon McCann" <mccann@jhu.edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Lennart Poettering" <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
"Peter Matthias" <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>,
"Marcelo Henrique Cerri" <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>,
"Roman Drahtmueller" <draht@schaltsekun.de>,
"Neil Horman" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Julia Lawall" <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lavr" <andy.lavr@gmail.com>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>,
"Torsten Duwe" <duwe@suse.de>, "Petr Tesarik" <ptesarik@suse.cz>,
"Nicolai Stange" <nstange@suse.de>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 19/41] random: reintroduce arch_has_random() + arch_has_random_seed()
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 09:58:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200921075857.4424-20-nstange@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de>
A future patch will introduce support for making up for a certain amount
of lacking entropy in crng_reseed() by means of arch_get_random_long()
or arch_get_random_seed_long() respectively.
However, before even the tiniest bit of precious entropy is withdrawn from
the input_pool, it should be checked if whether the current arch even
has support for these.
Reintroduce arch_has_random() + arch_has_random_seed() and implement
them for arm64, powerpc, s390 and x86 as appropriate (yeah, I know this
should go in separate commits, but this is part of a RFC series).
Note that this more or less reverts commits
647f50d5d9d9 ("linux/random.h: Remove arch_has_random,
arch_has_random_seed")
cbac004995a0 ("powerpc: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed")
5e054c820f59 ("s390: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed")
5f2ed7f5b99b ("x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 12 +++++++++++-
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 18 ++++++++++++++----
include/linux/random.h | 8 ++++++++
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 44209f6146aa..055d18713db7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -26,17 +26,13 @@ static inline bool __arm64_rndr(unsigned long *v)
return ok;
}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
{
return false;
}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
{
/*
* Only support the generic interface after we have detected
@@ -44,7 +40,22 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
* cpufeature code and with potential scheduling between CPUs
* with and without the feature.
*/
- if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RNG))
+ return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_RNG);
+}
+
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+{
+ if (!arch_has_random_seed())
return false;
return __arm64_rndr(v);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 9a53e29680f4..47c2d74e7244 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -6,6 +6,16 @@
#include <asm/machdep.h>
+static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+{
+ return ppc_md.get_random_seed;
+}
+
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
@@ -18,7 +28,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
+ if (arch_has_random_seed())
return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v);
return false;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
index de61ce562052..18973845634c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;
bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);
+static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+{
+ return static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available);
+}
+
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
@@ -33,7 +43,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
+ if (arch_has_random_seed()) {
return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
}
return false;
@@ -41,7 +51,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
+ if (arch_has_random_seed()) {
return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
}
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
index ebc248e49549..030f46c9e310 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -70,24 +70,34 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+{
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+{
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
+}
+
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+ return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+ return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+ return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+ return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
}
extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index f45b8be3e3c4..d4653422a0c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -120,6 +120,14 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
+static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-21 8:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-21 7:58 [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 01/41] random: remove dead code in credit_entropy_bits() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 02/41] random: remove dead code for nbits < 0 " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 03/41] random: prune dead assignment to entropy_bits " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 04/41] random: drop 'reserved' parameter from extract_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 05/41] random: don't reset entropy to zero on overflow Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 06/41] random: factor the exponential approximation in credit_entropy_bits() out Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 07/41] random: let pool_entropy_delta() take nbits in units of 2^-ENTROPY_SHIFT Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 08/41] random: introduce __credit_entropy_bits_fast() for hot paths Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 09/41] random: protect ->entropy_count with the pool spinlock Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 10/41] random: implement support for delayed entropy dispatching Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 11/41] random: convert add_timer_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 12/41] random: convert add_interrupt_randomness() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 13/41] random: convert try_to_generate_entropy() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 14/41] random: drop __credit_entropy_bits_fast() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 15/41] random: convert add_hwgenerator_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 16/41] random: convert random_ioctl() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 17/41] random: drop credit_entropy_bits() and credit_entropy_bits_safe() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 18/41] random: move arch_get_random_seed() calls in crng_reseed() into own loop Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 20/41] random: provide min_crng_reseed_pool_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 21/41] random: don't invoke arch_get_random_long() from add_interrupt_randomness() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 22/41] random: introduce arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 23/41] random: don't award entropy to non-SP800-90B arch RNGs in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 24/41] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 25/41] random: probe cycle counter resolution at initialization Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 26/41] random: implement support for evaluating larger fast_pool entropies Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 27/41] random: increase per-IRQ event entropy estimate if in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 28/41] random: don't award entropy to disk + input events " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 29/41] random: move definition of struct queued_entropy and related API upwards Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 30/41] random: add a queued_entropy instance to struct fast_pool Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 31/41] random: introduce struct health_test + health_test_reset() placeholders Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 32/41] random: introduce health test stub and wire it up Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 33/41] random: make health_test_process() maintain the get_cycles() delta Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 34/41] random: implement the "Adaptive Proportion" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 35/41] random: improve the APT's statistical power Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 36/41] random: optimize the APT's presearch Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 37/41] random: implement the "Repetition Count" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 38/41] random: enable NIST SP800-90B startup tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 39/41] random: make the startup tests include muliple APT invocations Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 40/41] random: trigger startup health test on any failure of the health tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 41/41] random: lower per-IRQ entropy estimate upon health test failure Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 8:09 ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-09-21 8:40 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-09-22 13:23 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-09-22 16:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-09-22 17:48 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 12:38 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-10-02 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:05 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:56 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-16 17:26 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-19 19:28 ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:30 ` [PATCH v36 01/13] Linux Random Number Generator Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:31 ` [PATCH v36 02/13] LRNG - allocate one DRNG instance per NUMA node Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32 ` [PATCH v36 03/13] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32 ` [PATCH v36 04/13] LRNG - add switchable DRNG support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:33 ` [PATCH v36 05/13] LRNG - add common generic hash support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:34 ` [PATCH v36 06/13] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:34 ` [PATCH v36 07/13] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35 ` [PATCH v36 08/13] LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35 ` [PATCH v36 09/13] crypto: provide access to a static Jitter RNG state Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:36 ` [PATCH v36 10/13] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37 ` [PATCH v36 11/13] LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37 ` [PATCH v36 12/13] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:38 ` [PATCH v36 13/13] LRNG - add power-on and runtime self-tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-28 17:51 ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Torsten Duwe
2020-10-28 18:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-11-02 13:44 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-04 14:26 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2020-11-17 14:01 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-10 10:22 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-02 13:35 ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 14:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:34 ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 15:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 15:39 ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 16:30 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-10-02 18:14 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-02 19:09 ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-07 4:24 ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-07 5:52 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-07 10:38 ` Nicolai Stange
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