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From: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
	Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
	William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
	zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>,
	Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Subject: [PATCH v36 06/13] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 21:34:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5549894.MhkbZ0Pkbq@positron.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3073852.aeNJFYEL58@positron.chronox.de>

This patch allows several DRBG functions to be called by the LRNG kernel
code paths outside the drbg.c file.

CC: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
 crypto/drbg.c         | 16 ++++++++++------
 include/crypto/drbg.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 3132967a1749..58b1de903def 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
  * the SHA256 / AES 256 over other ciphers. Thus, the favored
  * DRBGs are the latest entries in this array.
  */
-static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
+const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
 	{
 		.flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH128,
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
 	},
 #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
 };
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_cores);
 
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg);
 
@@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg);
  * Return: normalized strength in *bytes* value or 32 as default
  *	   to counter programming errors
  */
-static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
+unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
 {
 	switch (flags & DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK) {
 	case DRBG_STRENGTH128:
@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
 		return 32;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_sec_strength);
 
 /*
  * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
@@ -1214,7 +1216,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 }
 
 /* Free all substructures in a DRBG state without the DRBG state structure */
-static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	if (!drbg)
 		return;
@@ -1235,12 +1237,13 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 		drbg->fips_primed = false;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_dealloc_state);
 
 /*
  * Allocate all sub-structures for a DRBG state.
  * The DRBG state structure must already be allocated.
  */
-static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 	unsigned int sb_size = 0;
@@ -1321,6 +1324,7 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
 	return ret;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_alloc_state);
 
 /*************************************************************************
  * DRBG interface functions
@@ -1890,8 +1894,7 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg,
  *
  * return: flags
  */
-static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name,
-					 int *coreref, bool *pr)
+void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name, int *coreref, bool *pr)
 {
 	int i = 0;
 	size_t start = 0;
@@ -1918,6 +1921,7 @@ static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name,
 		}
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_convert_tfm_core);
 
 static int drbg_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index c4165126937e..71d53e028e6d 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -278,4 +278,11 @@ enum drbg_prefixes {
 	DRBG_PREFIX3
 };
 
+extern int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+extern void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+extern void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name, int *coreref,
+				  bool *pr);
+extern const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[];
+extern unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags);
+
 #endif /* _DRBG_H */
-- 
2.26.2





  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-19 19:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-21  7:58 [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 01/41] random: remove dead code in credit_entropy_bits() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 02/41] random: remove dead code for nbits < 0 " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 03/41] random: prune dead assignment to entropy_bits " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 04/41] random: drop 'reserved' parameter from extract_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 05/41] random: don't reset entropy to zero on overflow Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 06/41] random: factor the exponential approximation in credit_entropy_bits() out Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 07/41] random: let pool_entropy_delta() take nbits in units of 2^-ENTROPY_SHIFT Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 08/41] random: introduce __credit_entropy_bits_fast() for hot paths Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 09/41] random: protect ->entropy_count with the pool spinlock Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 10/41] random: implement support for delayed entropy dispatching Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 11/41] random: convert add_timer_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 12/41] random: convert add_interrupt_randomness() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 13/41] random: convert try_to_generate_entropy() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 14/41] random: drop __credit_entropy_bits_fast() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 15/41] random: convert add_hwgenerator_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 16/41] random: convert random_ioctl() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 17/41] random: drop credit_entropy_bits() and credit_entropy_bits_safe() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 18/41] random: move arch_get_random_seed() calls in crng_reseed() into own loop Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 19/41] random: reintroduce arch_has_random() + arch_has_random_seed() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 20/41] random: provide min_crng_reseed_pool_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 21/41] random: don't invoke arch_get_random_long() from add_interrupt_randomness() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 22/41] random: introduce arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 23/41] random: don't award entropy to non-SP800-90B arch RNGs in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 24/41] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 25/41] random: probe cycle counter resolution at initialization Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 26/41] random: implement support for evaluating larger fast_pool entropies Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 27/41] random: increase per-IRQ event entropy estimate if in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 28/41] random: don't award entropy to disk + input events " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 29/41] random: move definition of struct queued_entropy and related API upwards Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 30/41] random: add a queued_entropy instance to struct fast_pool Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 31/41] random: introduce struct health_test + health_test_reset() placeholders Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 32/41] random: introduce health test stub and wire it up Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 33/41] random: make health_test_process() maintain the get_cycles() delta Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 34/41] random: implement the "Adaptive Proportion" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 35/41] random: improve the APT's statistical power Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 36/41] random: optimize the APT's presearch Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 37/41] random: implement the "Repetition Count" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 38/41] random: enable NIST SP800-90B startup tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 39/41] random: make the startup tests include muliple APT invocations Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 40/41] random: trigger startup health test on any failure of the health tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 41/41] random: lower per-IRQ entropy estimate upon health test failure Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  8:09 ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-09-21  8:40 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-09-22 13:23   ` Torsten Duwe
2020-09-22 16:21     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-09-22 17:48       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 12:38 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:15   ` Willy Tarreau
2020-10-02 13:33     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:05       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:56     ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-16 17:26       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-19 19:28         ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:30           ` [PATCH v36 01/13] Linux Random Number Generator Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:31           ` [PATCH v36 02/13] LRNG - allocate one DRNG instance per NUMA node Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32           ` [PATCH v36 03/13] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32           ` [PATCH v36 04/13] LRNG - add switchable DRNG support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:33           ` [PATCH v36 05/13] LRNG - add common generic hash support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:34           ` Stephan Müller [this message]
2020-10-19 19:34           ` [PATCH v36 07/13] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35           ` [PATCH v36 08/13] LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35           ` [PATCH v36 09/13] crypto: provide access to a static Jitter RNG state Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:36           ` [PATCH v36 10/13] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37           ` [PATCH v36 11/13] LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37           ` [PATCH v36 12/13] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:38           ` [PATCH v36 13/13] LRNG - add power-on and runtime self-tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-28 17:51           ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Torsten Duwe
2020-10-28 18:07             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-11-02 13:44               ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-04 14:26                 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2020-11-17 14:01                 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-10 10:22           ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-02 13:35   ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 14:04     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:34       ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 15:13         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 15:39           ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 16:30             ` Randy Dunlap
2020-10-02 18:14             ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-02 19:09               ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-07  4:24   ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-07  5:52     ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-07 10:38     ` Nicolai Stange

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