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From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
	x86@kernel.org, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2020 17:22:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201019212247.GA2815942@rani.riverdale.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201019203345.GF3635@8bytes.org>

On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 10:33:45PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> Hi Arvind,
> 
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 01:00:08PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 05:11:19PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > > +
> > > +	/* Store value to memory and keep it in %r10 */
> > > +	movq	%r10, sev_check_data(%rip)
> > > +
> > 
> > Does there need to be a cache flush/invalidation between this and the
> > read below to avoid just reading back from cache, or will the hardware
> > take care of that?
> 
> No, a cache flush is not needed. When the C bit position is correct,
> then the data will be mapped encrypted with the old and the new
> page-table. If the C bit position is wrong, the access goes to a
> different physical address.

Ok.

> 
> > > +	/* Backup current %cr3 value to restore it later */
> > > +	movq	%cr3, %r11
> > > +
> > > +	/* Switch to new %cr3 - This might unmap the stack */
> > > +	movq	%rdi, %cr3
> > 
> > Does there need to be a TLB flush after this? When executed from the
> > main kernel's head code, CR4.PGE is enabled, and if the original page
> > mapping had the global bit set (the decompressor stub sets that in the
> > identity mapping), won't the read below still use the original encrypted
> > mapping if we don't explicitly flush it?
> 
> The check only really matters for the boot CPU, not for the secondary
> CPUs. IIRC at this point in boot CR4.PGE is still off.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> 	Joerg
> 

The boot cpu also enables CR4.PGE -- that code is shared between boot
and secondary cpus. The boot cpu jumps to the first "1" label below,
just before the call to sev_verify_cbit you're adding.

	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
	addq	$(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
1:

	/* Enable PAE mode, PGE and LA57 */
	movl	$(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
	testl	$1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip)
	jz	1f
	orl	$X86_CR4_LA57, %ecx
1:
#endif
	movq	%rcx, %cr4

	/* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
	movq	%rax, %cr3


  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-19 21:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-19 15:11 [PATCH 0/5] x86/sev-es: Mitigate some HV attack vectors Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 15:11 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status Joerg Roedel
2020-10-20  0:59   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-20  1:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-20  9:55     ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 15:11 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 15:11 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 17:00   ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 17:54     ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 20:39       ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 21:31         ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-20  8:59           ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-20 14:33             ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-20 15:44               ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 20:33     ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 21:22       ` Arvind Sankar [this message]
2020-10-20  9:41         ` Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 15:11 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table Joerg Roedel
2020-10-19 15:11 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory Joerg Roedel

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