From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
joro@8bytes.org, knsathya@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 01/30] x86/mm: Fix warning on build with X86_MEM_ENCRYPT=y
Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 08:40:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220228164007.nfrg7xvrl4blzzrm@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220228162056.gul22bjr4w6zjslq@black.fi.intel.com>
On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 07:20:56PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 27, 2022 at 02:01:30PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 06:56:01PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > So far, AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is the only user of X86_MEM_ENCRYPT. TDX will be
> > > the second. It will make mem_encrypt.c build without AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT,
> > > which triggers a warning:
> > >
> > > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c:69:13: warning: no previous prototype for
> > > function 'mem_encrypt_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
> > >
> > > Fix it by moving mem_encrypt_init() declaration outside of #ifdef
> > > CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > > Fixes: 20f07a044a76 ("x86/sev: Move common memory encryption code to mem_encrypt.c")
> > > Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> >
> > The patch title, warning, and "Fixes" tag tend to give the impression
> > this is fixing a real user-visible bug. But the bug is theoretical, as
> > it's not possible to enable X86_MEM_ENCRYPT without AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT,
> > until patch 27.
> >
> > IMO it would be preferable to just squash this change with patch 27.
> >
> > Having it as a separate patch is also fine, but it shouldn't be
> > described as a fix or use the Fixes tag. It's more of a preparatory
> > patch.
>
> maintainer-tip.rst seems disagree with you:
>
> A Fixes tag should be added even for changes which do not need to be
> backported to stable kernels, i.e. when addressing a recently introduced
> issue which only affects tip or the current head of mainline.
>
> I will leave it as is.
How does that disagree with me?
The "Fixes" tag is for bug fixes. If it's not possible to trigger the
warning and there's no user impact, it's not a bug.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-28 16:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-24 15:56 [PATCHv4 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 01/30] x86/mm: Fix warning on build with X86_MEM_ENCRYPT=y Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:06 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27 22:01 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 16:20 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2022-02-28 16:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 17:11 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-01 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 02/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 03/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:35 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 0:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 10:39 ` Kai Huang
2022-02-25 15:46 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 04/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 17:01 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 05/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 17:54 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 0:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 06/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:36 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 19:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 19:46 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:52 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 19:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-02-24 19:36 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-26 21:35 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 19:04 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27 1:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:41 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 22:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 23:05 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 23:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 20:11 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 2:23 ` David Laight
2022-02-25 3:10 ` David Laight
2022-03-02 13:42 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 20:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 21:24 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 15/30] x86/boot: Allow to hook up alternative " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27 22:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 16:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 16/30] x86/boot/compressed: Support TDX guest port I/O at decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 17/30] x86/tdx: Add port I/O emulation Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:43 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 3:59 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 1:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 4:32 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 18/30] x86/tdx: Handle early boot port I/O Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:58 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 27/30] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush on TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-27 22:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2022-02-28 16:37 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:46 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 17:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 17:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 17:54 ` Dave Hansen
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