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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
	tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 11:46:04 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e0a91991-9648-5c3e-62dc-342c9d8ed957@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220225193059.6zn6owzpbggxfqqv@black.fi.intel.com>

On 2/25/22 11:30, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:36:02AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 2/24/22 07:56, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) are delivered to TDX guests due to
>>> specific guest actions which may happen in either user space or the
>>> kernel:
>>>
>>>  * Specific instructions (WBINVD, for example)
>>>  * Specific MSR accesses
>>>  * Specific CPUID leaf accesses
>>>  * Access to unmapped pages (EPT violation)
>>
>> Considering that you're talking partly about userspace, it would be nice
>> to talk about what "unmapped" really means here.
> 
> I'm not sure what you want to see here. Doesn't EPT violation describe it?
> 
> It can happen to userspace too, but we don't expect it to be use used and
> SIGSEGV the process if it happens.

How about just:

 * Access to specific guest physical addresses

That makes it clear that we're not really talking about userspace
unmapped pages.

...
>>> +	 * module also treats virtual NMIs as inhibited if the #VE valid flag is
>>> +	 * set, e.g. so that NMI=>#VE will not result in a #DF.
>>> +	 */
>>
>> Are we missing anything valuable if we just trim the comment down to
>> something like:
>>
>> 	/*
>> 	 * Called during #VE handling to retrieve the #VE info from the
>> 	 * TDX module.
>>  	 *
>> 	 * This should called done early in #VE handling.  A "nested"
>> 	 * #VE which occurs before this will raise a #DF and is not
>> 	 * recoverable.
>> 	 */
> 
> This variant of the comment lost information about #VE-valid flag and
> doesn't describe how NMI is inhibited.

IMNHO, the "#VE valid" flag is a super-fine implementation detail.  I'd
personally deal with that in Documentation or the changelog instead of a
comment.

>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
>>> +
>>> +#define VE_FAULT_STR "VE fault"
>>> +
>>> +static void ve_raise_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>>> +{
>>> +	if (user_mode(regs)) {
>>> +		gp_user_force_sig_segv(regs, X86_TRAP_VE, error_code, VE_FAULT_STR);
>>> +		return;
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	if (gp_try_fixup_and_notify(regs, X86_TRAP_VE, error_code, VE_FAULT_STR))
>>> +		return;
>>> +
>>> +	die_addr(VE_FAULT_STR, regs, error_code, 0);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/*
>>> + * Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) are delivered to TDX guests due to
>>> + * specific guest actions which may happen in either user space or the
>>> + * kernel:
>>> + *
>>> + *  * Specific instructions (WBINVD, for example)
>>> + *  * Specific MSR accesses
>>> + *  * Specific CPUID leaf accesses
>>> + *  * Access to unmapped pages (EPT violation)
>>> + *
>>> + * In the settings that Linux will run in, virtualization exceptions are
>>> + * never generated on accesses to normal, TD-private memory that has been
>>> + * accepted.
>>
>> This actually makes a lot more sense as a code comment than changelog.
>> It would be really nice to circle back here and actually refer to the
>> functions that accept memory.
> 
> We don't have such functions at this point in the patchset. Do you want
> the comment to be updated once we get them introduced?

Yes, please.  Supplement the comment when the functions are introduced
later.

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-25 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-24 15:56 [PATCHv4 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 01/30] x86/mm: Fix warning on build with X86_MEM_ENCRYPT=y Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:06   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27 22:01   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 16:20     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:40       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 16:51         ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 17:11           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-03-01  8:48             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 02/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:16   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 03/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 16:35   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25  0:41       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 10:39         ` Kai Huang
2022-02-25 15:46         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 16:12           ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 04/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 17:01   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:29     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 05/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 17:54   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 23:54     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25  0:51       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 06/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:36   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 19:30     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 19:46       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:42   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 18:52   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 19:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-02-24 19:36       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-26 21:35     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 19:04   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27  1:07     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:41       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 22:53         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 23:05           ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 23:31             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 23:37               ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 20:11   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25  2:23     ` David Laight
2022-02-25  3:10       ` David Laight
2022-03-02 13:42     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 20:44   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 21:24   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 15/30] x86/boot: Allow to hook up alternative " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:14   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-27 22:02   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28 16:33     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:44       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 16/30] x86/boot/compressed: Support TDX guest port I/O at decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:22   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 17/30] x86/tdx: Add port I/O emulation Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:43   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25  3:59   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28  1:16     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28  4:32       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 18/30] x86/tdx: Handle early boot port I/O Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 22:58   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 27/30] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush on TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-27 22:05   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-28  1:34     ` Dan Williams
2022-02-28 16:37       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-28 16:46         ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-28 17:02         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-24 15:56 ` [PATCHv4 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-25 17:42   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 17:54   ` Dave Hansen

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