From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v33 10/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:46:13 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310234632.16194-11-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310234632.16194-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a104ec0759c2..1814516509ec 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1277,9 +1277,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5edb16cb12e0..598e0de45b04 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2610,12 +2610,17 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsmblob blob;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
+ /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in
+ * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object
+ * labels associated with the ipc object. */
+ context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ffdd366d2098..815200684bcf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1999,10 +1999,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.31.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-10 23:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20220310234632.16194-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 00/29] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 01/29] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler
2022-03-11 10:48 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 02/29] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 03/29] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 04/29] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 05/29] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 07/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 08/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 09/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 11/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 12/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 13/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-03-11 7:52 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-11 9:16 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-12 4:50 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 14/29] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 15/29] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 16/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 17/29] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 18/29] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 19/29] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 20/29] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 21/29] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 22/29] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 23/29] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 24/29] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 25/29] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler
2022-03-15 23:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-16 0:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 26/29] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-03-15 23:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-16 0:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 27/29] Audit: Add record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2022-03-15 23:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-16 0:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-03-16 1:08 ` Paul Moore
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 28/29] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2022-03-10 23:46 ` [PATCH v33 29/29] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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