mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH] random: remove "nordrand" flag in favor of "random.trust_cpu"
Date: Thu,  7 Jul 2022 02:00:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220707000021.504308-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)

The decision of whether or not to trust RDRAND is controlled by the
"random.trust_cpu" boot time parameter or the CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
compile time default. The "nordrand" flag was added during the early
days of RDRAND, when there were worries that merely using its values
could compromise the RNG. However, these days, RDRAND values are not
used directly but always go through the RNG's hash function, making
"nordrand" no longer useful.

Rather, the correct switch is "random.trust_cpu", which not only handles
the relevant trust issue directly, but also is general to multiple CPU
types, not just x86.

However, x86 RDRAND does have a history of being occassionally
problematic. Prior, when the kernel would notice something strange, it'd
warn in dmesg and suggest enabling "nordrand". We can improve on that by
making the test a little bit better and then taking the step of
automatically disabling "nordrand" if we detect it's problematic.

Also extend the basic sanity test to RDSEED in addition to RDRAND, and
disable both if either one fails.

Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
This patch builds on top of v4 of "random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM":
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220706143521.459565-1-Jason@zx2c4.com/

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  5 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c                  | 73 +++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2522b11e593f..a1dc4dbf74f6 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3733,11 +3733,6 @@
 	noreplace-smp	[X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions
 			with UP alternatives
 
-	nordrand	[X86] Disable kernel use of the RDRAND and
-			RDSEED instructions even if they are supported
-			by the processor.  RDRAND and RDSEED are still
-			available to user space applications.
-
 	noresume	[SWSUSP] Disables resume and restores original swap
 			space.
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 0c0b09796ced..216fc2f53cbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static void clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * The nordrand option can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for
+	 * The self test can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for
 	 * RDRAND support using the CPUID function directly.
 	 */
 	if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) || rdrand_force)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
index 8f216669ecb8..6f4b196fe97d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
@@ -11,54 +11,51 @@
 #include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
-static int __init x86_rdrand_setup(char *s)
-{
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);
-
 /*
  * RDRAND has Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) that runs on every invocation.
- * Run the instruction a few times as a sanity check.
- * If it fails, it is simple to disable RDRAND here.
+ * Run the instruction a few times as a sanity check. Also make sure
+ * it's not outputting the same value over and over, which has happened
+ * as a result of past CPU bugs.
+ *
+ * If it fails, it is simple to disable RDRAND and RDSEED here.
  */
-#define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8
 
 void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-	unsigned int changed = 0;
-	unsigned long tmp, prev;
-	int i;
-
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND))
-		return;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS; i++) {
-		if (!rdrand_long(&tmp)) {
-			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
-			pr_warn_once("rdrand: disabled\n");
-			return;
+	enum { SAMPLES = 8, MIN_CHANGE = 5 };
+	unsigned long sample, prev;
+	bool failure = false;
+	size_t i, changed;
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
+		for (changed = 0, i = 0; i < SAMPLES; ++i) {
+			if (!rdrand_long(&sample)) {
+				failure = true;
+				break;
+			}
+			changed += i && sample != prev;
+			prev = sample;
 		}
+		if (changed < MIN_CHANGE)
+			failure = true;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Stupid sanity-check whether RDRAND does *actually* generate
-	 * some at least random-looking data.
-	 */
-	prev = tmp;
-	for (i = 0; i < SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS; i++) {
-		if (rdrand_long(&tmp)) {
-			if (prev != tmp)
-				changed++;
-
-			prev = tmp;
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) {
+		for (changed = 0, i = 0; i < SAMPLES; ++i) {
+			if (!rdseed_long(&sample)) {
+				failure = true;
+				break;
+			}
+			changed += i && sample != prev;
+			prev = sample;
 		}
+		if (changed < MIN_CHANGE)
+			failure = true;
 	}
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!changed))
-		pr_emerg(
-"RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\"");
-
+	if (failure) {
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
+		pr_emerg("RDRAND and RDSEED are not reliable on this platform; disabling.\n");
+	}
 }
-- 
2.35.1


             reply	other threads:[~2022-07-07  0:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-07  0:00 Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-07-07  0:12 ` Randy Dunlap
2022-07-07  0:14   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-09 10:43     ` [PATCH random v2] x86/rdrand: Remove " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-09 11:30       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-17 11:38       ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220707000021.504308-1-Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --to=jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®