From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
john.allen@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2023 09:46:15 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230421134615.62539-22-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421134615.62539-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Add MSR access interfaces for supervisor shadow stack, i.e.,
MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2} and MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, meanwhile pass through
them to {L1,L2} guests when {L0,L1} KVM supports supervisor shadow
stack.
Note, currently supervisor shadow stack is not supported on Intel
platforms, i.e., VMX always clears CPUID(EAX=07H,ECX=1).EDX.[bit 18].
The main purpose of this patch is to facilitate AMD folks to enable
supervisor shadow stack for their platforms.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 6 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 12 +++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index b1658c0de847..019a16b25b88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -232,4 +232,10 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_pv_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features & (1u << kvm_feature);
}
+static __always_inline bool kvm_cet_kernel_shstk_supported(void)
+{
+ return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) &&
+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index bf690827bfee..aaaae92dc9f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -670,6 +670,18 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+ nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+ nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+ nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
+ nested_vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vmx, msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
+ MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+
kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &vmx->nested.msr_bitmap_map, false);
vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 6eab3e452bbb..074b618f1a07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -713,6 +713,9 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
return true;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP:
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ return true;
}
r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
@@ -1962,8 +1965,11 @@ static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
static bool cet_is_msr_accessible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct msr_data *msr)
{
+ u64 mask;
+
if (!kvm_cet_user_supported() &&
- !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ !(kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT) ||
+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)))
return false;
if (msr->host_initiated)
@@ -1973,15 +1979,27 @@ static bool cet_is_msr_accessible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
return false;
+ if (msr->index == MSR_IA32_U_CET)
+ return true;
+
if (msr->index == MSR_IA32_S_CET)
- return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+ return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) ||
+ kvm_cet_kernel_shstk_supported();
- if ((msr->index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP ||
- msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) &&
+ if (msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
+ return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+
+ if (msr->index == MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB)
+ return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ kvm_cet_kernel_shstk_supported();
+
+ if (msr->index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
return false;
- return true;
+ mask = (msr->index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP) ? XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER :
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
+ return !!(kvm_caps.supported_xss & mask);
}
/*
@@ -2135,6 +2153,12 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
else
kvm_get_xsave_msr(msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP:
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ if (!cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ kvm_get_xsave_msr(msr_info);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
break;
@@ -2471,6 +2495,12 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
else
kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP:
+ case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+ if (!cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
+ return 1;
+ kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
return 1;
@@ -7774,6 +7804,14 @@ static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
incpt |= !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
+
+ incpt = !is_cet_state_supported(vcpu, XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
+ incpt |= !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
}
static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -7844,7 +7882,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
- if (kvm_cet_user_supported() || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ if (kvm_cet_user_supported() || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT) ||
+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(vcpu);
}
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-21 16:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-21 13:45 [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-04-24 1:38 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24 6:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-27 3:46 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-27 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-04-28 6:09 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04 3:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04 5:36 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04 6:59 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05 2:18 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 2:22 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 7:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05 5:01 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 7:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 1:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2023-05-03 17:06 ` [PATCH v2 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 1:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 1:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04 4:17 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Mike Rapoport
2023-04-23 5:37 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-24 18:22 ` John Allen
2023-04-22 13:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-04-23 6:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-23 8:30 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24 6:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
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