From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>,
"john.allen@amd.com" <john.allen@amd.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "sean.j.christopherson@intel.com" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP
Date: Wed, 3 May 2023 17:08:02 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <50366bbd8ff5adf164644dd406ea7337c174ec22.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421134615.62539-15-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
On Fri, 2023-04-21 at 09:46 -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Introduce a host-only synthetic MSR, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, so that the
> VMM
> can read/write the guest's SSP, e.g. to migrate CET state. Use a
> synthetic
> MSR, e.g. as opposed to a VCPU_REG_, as GUEST_SSP is subject to the
> same
> consistency checks as the PL*_SSP MSRs, i.e. can share code.
It seems this is exposed to the guest? I'm thinking maybe it should not
be. IA32_PL0_SSP comes with some extra checks, so MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP
seems a bit powerful. I think the guest doesn't need it either.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-03 17:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-21 13:45 [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:45 ` [PATCH v2 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-04-24 1:38 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24 6:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-27 3:46 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-27 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-04-28 6:09 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04 3:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04 5:36 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-04 6:59 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05 2:18 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 2:22 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 7:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-05-05 5:01 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-05 7:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2023-05-04 1:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable supervisor IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 13:46 ` [PATCH v2 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 1:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-03 17:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 1:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-04 4:17 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-04 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-21 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Mike Rapoport
2023-04-23 5:37 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-24 18:22 ` John Allen
2023-04-22 13:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-04-23 6:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-04-23 8:30 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-24 6:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
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