From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com,
jpoimboe@kernel.org, joao@overdrivepizza.com,
tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/cfi: Fix ret_from_fork indirect calls
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 20:33:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230621183356.GP38236@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230621181659.GB4253@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 08:16:59PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 21, 2023 at 11:08:46AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > Ah yeah, it should be direct-called only. I keep forgetting about the
> > endbr removal pass.
> >
> > > I can't seem to manage to have it clobber it's __cfi hash value. Ideally
> > > we'd have an attribute to force the thing to 0 or something.
> >
> > Doesn't objtool have logic to figure out this is only ever
> > direct-called?
>
> It does; let me also use that same thing to clobber the kCFI hashes for
> these functions.
Completely untested... gotta go put the kids to bed. I'll try later.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -778,6 +778,8 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+static void poison_hash(void *addr);
+
static void __init_or_module poison_endbr(void *addr, bool warn)
{
u32 endbr, poison = gen_endbr_poison();
@@ -802,6 +804,9 @@ static void __init_or_module poison_endb
/*
* Generated by: objtool --ibt
+ *
+ * Seal the functions for indirect calls by clobbering the ENDBR instructions
+ * and the kCFI hash value.
*/
void __init_or_module noinline apply_ibt_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end)
{
@@ -812,7 +817,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ibt
poison_endbr(addr, true);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FINEIBT))
- poison_endbr(addr - 16, false);
+ poison_hash(addr - 16);
}
}
@@ -1193,6 +1198,38 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
pr_err("Something went horribly wrong trying to rewrite the CFI implementation.\n");
}
+static inline void __poison_hash(void *addr)
+{
+ *(u32 *)hash = 0;
+}
+
+static void poison_hash(void *addr)
+{
+ switch (cfi_mode) {
+ case CFI_FINEIBT:
+ /*
+ * __cfi_\func:
+ * osp nopl (%rax)
+ * subl $0, %r10d
+ * jz 1f
+ * ud2
+ * 1: nop
+ */
+ poison_endbr(addr, false);
+ __poison_hash(addr + 7);
+ break;
+
+ case CFI_KCFI:
+ /*
+ * __cfi_\func:
+ * movl $0, %eax
+ * .skip 11, 0x90
+ */
+ __poison_hash(addr + 1);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
#else
static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,
@@ -1200,6 +1237,8 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
{
}
+static void poison_hash(void *addr) { }
+
#endif
void apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-21 18:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-15 19:35 [PATCH 0/2] x86/cfi: Fix FineIBT Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-15 19:35 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/cfi: Fix ret_from_fork indirect calls Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-20 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2023-06-21 8:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-06-21 18:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 18:33 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2023-06-21 20:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 21:07 ` Brian Gerst
2023-06-15 19:35 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/fineibt: Poison ENDBR at +0 Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2023-06-21 0:04 ` Sami Tolvanen
2023-06-21 8:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 8:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 8:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-21 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-07-10 8:13 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-16 23:24 ` [PATCH 0/2] x86/cfi: Fix FineIBT Sami Tolvanen
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