From: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huaweicloud.com>,
"GONG, Ruiqi" <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 08/20] selinux: services: avoid implicit conversions
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:23 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230706132337.15924-8-cgzones@googlemail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230706132337.15924-1-cgzones@googlemail.com>
Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
member.
Declare the read-only class string parameter of
security_get_permissions() const.
Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
destination.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 ++--
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 7 ++++---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 665c4e5bae99..0f93fd019bb4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -312,9 +312,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
u32 *peer_sid);
int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
- char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+ char ***classes, u32 *nclasses);
int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
- char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+ const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms);
int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index bad1f6b685fd..16036633ddd3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1797,7 +1797,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
char *objclass, int classvalue,
struct dentry *dir)
{
- int i, rc, nperms;
+ u32 i, nperms;
+ int rc;
char **perms;
rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
@@ -1867,8 +1868,8 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
struct dentry *class_dir,
unsigned long *last_class_ino)
{
-
- int rc, nclasses, i;
+ u32 i, nclasses;
+ int rc;
char **classes;
rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3275cfe2c8f7..2e2b17b00298 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2822,7 +2822,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
{
struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
- int len;
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
@@ -2844,7 +2843,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
return -ENOENT;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
- len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
(strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
break;
@@ -3332,7 +3331,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct class_datum *datum = d;
char *name = k, **classes = args;
- int value = datum->value - 1;
+ u32 value = datum->value - 1;
classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!classes[value])
@@ -3342,7 +3341,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
}
int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
- char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+ char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
int rc;
@@ -3358,8 +3357,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
*classes);
if (rc) {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ for (u32 i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
kfree((*classes)[i]);
kfree(*classes);
}
@@ -3372,7 +3370,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct perm_datum *datum = d;
char *name = k, **perms = args;
- int value = datum->value - 1;
+ u32 value = datum->value - 1;
perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!perms[value])
@@ -3382,10 +3380,10 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
}
int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
- char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+ const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
- int rc, i;
+ int rc;
struct class_datum *match;
policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3420,7 +3418,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
return rc;
err:
- for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+ for (u32 i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
kfree((*perms)[i]);
kfree(*perms);
return rc;
@@ -3600,9 +3598,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ for (u32 i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
--
2.40.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-06 13:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-06 13:23 [RFC PATCH 01/20] selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry() Christian Göttsche
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] selinux: avtab: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 2/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] selinux: avoid avtab overflows Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 3/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] selinux: ebitmap: use u32 as bit type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 4/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] selinux: hashtab: use identical iterator type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 5/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] selinux: mls: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 6/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] selinux: services: update type for umber of class permissions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-07 2:27 ` Gong Ruiqi
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 7/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-19 1:45 ` Gong Ruiqi
2023-07-06 13:23 ` Christian Göttsche [this message]
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 8/20] selinux: services: avoid implicit conversions Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] selinux: status: consistently use u32 as sequence number type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 9/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] selinux: netif: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] selinux: avc: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] selinux: hooks: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] selinux: selinuxfs: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] selinux: use consistent type for AV rule specifier Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] selinux: policydb: implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] selinux: symtab: implicit conversion Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] selinux: services: implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] selinux: nlmsgtab: implicit conversion Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] selinux: status: avoid implicit conversions regarding enforcing status Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] selinux: selinuxfs: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 1/20] selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry() Paul Moore
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