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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "Gong Ruiqi" <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>,
	"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 7/20] selinux: services: update type for umber of class  permissions
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 18:01:18 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <703e95374a9a0d25186e7ac472f143d7.paul@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230706132337.15924-7-cgzones@googlemail.com>

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On Jul  6, 2023 Gong Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> wrote:
> 
> Security classes have only up to 32 permissions, hence using an u16 is
> sufficient (while improving padding).

Can you explain the improved padding comment?  It looks like you are
only changing the iterator's type so the struct should remain
unchanged, and FWIW, it looks like security_class_wrapping allocates
space for 33 permission strings.

> Also use a fixed sized cast in a bit shift to work correctly on
> architectures where sizeof(unsigned int) != sizeof(u32).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++---
>  security/selinux/ss/services.h | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 78946b71c1c1..3275cfe2c8f7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
>  			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
>  {
>  	u16 i, j;
> -	unsigned k;
>  	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
>  
>  	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
> @@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
>  	while (map[j].name) {
>  		const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
>  		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
> +		u16 k;
>  
>  		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
>  		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
> @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
>  {
>  	if (tclass < map->size) {
>  		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
> -		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
> +		u16 i, n = mapping->num_perms;
>  		u32 result;
>  
>  		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
> @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
>  		 * should audit that denial
>  		 */
>  		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
> -			result |= 1<<i;
> +			result |= 1<<((u32)i);
>  		avd->auditdeny = result;
>  	}
>  }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> index 8a9b85f44b66..b6f99353301e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
>  /* Mapping for a single class */
>  struct selinux_mapping {
>  	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
> -	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
> +	u16 num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
>  	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.40.1

--
paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-18 22:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-06 13:23 [RFC PATCH 01/20] selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry() Christian Göttsche
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] selinux: avtab: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 2/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] selinux: avoid avtab overflows Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 3/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] selinux: ebitmap: use u32 as bit type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 4/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] selinux: hashtab: use identical iterator type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 5/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] selinux: mls: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 6/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] selinux: services: update type for umber of class permissions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-07  2:27   ` Gong Ruiqi
2023-07-18 22:01   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2023-07-19  1:45     ` [PATCH RFC 7/20] " Gong Ruiqi
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] selinux: services: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 8/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] selinux: status: consistently use u32 as sequence number type Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC 9/20] " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] selinux: netif: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] selinux: avc: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] selinux: hooks: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] selinux: selinuxfs: " Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] selinux: use consistent type for AV rule specifier Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] selinux: policydb: implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] selinux: symtab: implicit conversion Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] selinux: services: implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] selinux: nlmsgtab: implicit conversion Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] selinux: status: avoid implicit conversions regarding enforcing status Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-06 13:23 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] selinux: selinuxfs: avoid implicit conversions Christian Göttsche
2023-07-18 22:01   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-07-18 22:01 ` [PATCH RFC 1/20] selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry() Paul Moore

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