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From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
	john.allen@amd.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 23/27] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2024 23:47:29 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240219074733.122080-24-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240219074733.122080-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.

Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.

Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 14 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 41a4533f9989..ee8938818c8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
 static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 24e921c4e7e3..342b5b94c892 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4371,6 +4371,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
 		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+
+	/*
+	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+	 * 3 and 4 for details.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+	}
 }
 
 void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 281c3fe728c5..73a55d388dd9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);
 #endif
 
 static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
+u64 __read_mostly host_s_cet;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_s_cet);
 
 #define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)
 
@@ -9862,6 +9864,18 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+		/*
+		 * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+		 * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+		 * clobber the host values.  Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+		 * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(host_s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
 	if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
 		pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 9c19dfb5011d..656107e64c93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 extern u64 host_xcr0;
 extern u64 host_xss;
 extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
+extern u64 host_s_cet;
 
 extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-19  7:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-19  7:47 [PATCH v10 00/27] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 01/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 18:45   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-02 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2024-05-07 22:57       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-07 23:17         ` Dave Hansen
2024-05-08  1:19           ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 06/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 07/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 08/27] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 09/27] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr()* to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  5:58     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 10/27] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2024-02-20  3:04   ` Chao Gao
2024-02-20 13:23     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-01 20:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  7:26     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 11/27] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 12/27] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 13/27] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2024-02-20  8:51   ` Chao Gao
2024-05-01 20:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  7:30     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 14/27] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 15/27] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 16/27] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 17/27] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 22:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  8:31     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-07 17:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-08  7:00         ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 18/27] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 19/27] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 20/27] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-03-12 22:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-13  9:43     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-03-13 16:00       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 21/27] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 22:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  8:41     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 22/27] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  8:48     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 24/27] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-01 23:24     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-06  9:19     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-06 16:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-07  2:37         ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-06 17:05       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-06 23:33         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06 23:53           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-07 14:21             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-07 14:45               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-07 15:08                 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-07 15:33                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-16  7:13     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-16 14:39       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-16 15:36         ` Dave Hansen
2024-05-16 16:58           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17  8:27             ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-17  8:57         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-05-17 14:26           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20  9:43             ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-20 17:09               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 17:15                 ` Dave Hansen
2024-05-22  9:03                   ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-22 15:06                     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-23 10:07                       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-22  8:41                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-27  9:05                   ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:34   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  9:41     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-16  7:20       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-16 14:43         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-17  8:04           ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 25/27] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:19   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  9:19     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 26/27] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:23   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  9:25     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-02-19  7:47 ` [PATCH v10 27/27] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Yang Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:24   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  9:26     ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-03-06 14:44 ` [PATCH v10 00/27] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
2024-05-01 23:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-06  9:31   ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-11-05 18:25     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-06  1:45       ` Yang, Weijiang
2024-11-06  3:20         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-06 16:32           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-07  2:05             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-12  0:33             ` Chao Gao
2024-11-12 20:03               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-13 10:53                 ` Chao Gao

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