From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org, cve@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52685: pstore: ram_core: fix possible overflow in persistent_ram_init_ecc()
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 15:09:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024061823-employer-stylist-2505@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202406171413.DE595AF@keescook>
On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 02:17:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 28, 2024 at 09:01:13PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Mon, May 27, 2024 at 08:32:54PM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
> > > Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> writes:
> > >
> > > > Description
> > > > ===========
> > > >
> > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > > >
> > > > pstore: ram_core: fix possible overflow in persistent_ram_init_ecc()
> > > >
> > > > In persistent_ram_init_ecc(), on 64-bit arches DIV_ROUND_UP() will return
> > > > 64-bit value since persistent_ram_zone::buffer_size has type size_t which
> > > > is derived from the 64-bit *unsigned long*, while the ecc_blocks variable
> > > > this value gets assigned to has (always 32-bit) *int* type. Even if that
> > > > value fits into *int* type, an overflow is still possible when calculating
> > > > the size_t typed ecc_total variable further below since there's no cast to
> > > > any 64-bit type before multiplication. Declaring the ecc_blocks variable
> > > > as *size_t* should fix this mess...
> > > >
> > > > Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static
> > > > analysis tool.
> > >
> > > Hi Greg,
> > >
> > > [Cc'ing Kees, who is listed as the pstore maintainer]
> > >
> > > I want to dispute this CVE. The overflow is in the module
> > > initialization path, and can only happen at boot time or if the module
> > > is loaded with specific parameters or due to specific acpi/device tree
> > > data. Either way, it would require root privileges to trigger.
> >
> > Normally root privileges isn't the issue, as many containers allow root
> > to do things (including loading modules, crazy systems...)
> >
> > Anyway, I'll defer to Kees as to if this should be revoked or not.
>
> It's a module parameter or device tree value that is at most INT_MAX or
> UINT_MAX respectively. Also, it is bounds checked against the buffer
> itself:
> if (ecc_total >= prz->buffer_size) {
>
> So even if it wrapped around and got "too small", there's no damage to
> be had here.
>
> The worst case is that the ramoops info goes missing because pstore
> refuses to do anything with the bad value, but pstore can be disabled
> way more easily than that, by design.
>
> So, no, I don't think this is CVE worthy. I took the patch because it's
> reasonable to try to get the math right and provide better error
> reporting.
Now rejected, thanks.
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-18 13:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024051752-CVE-2023-52685-64c5@gregkh>
2024-05-28 0:32 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2024-05-28 19:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-06-17 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-18 13:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2024061823-employer-stylist-2505@gregkh \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=cve@kernel.org \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=krisman@suse.de \
--cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®