mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 20/24] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 18:08:59 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240621123903.2411843-21-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240621123903.2411843-1-nikunj@amd.com>

The hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure TSC
is enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP
instructions are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure
TSC is enabled, terminate guest execution.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
index 71de53194089..c2a9e2ada659 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,16 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
 	bool rdtscp = (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP);
 	enum es_result ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * RDTSC and RDTSCP should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
+	 * enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
+	 * This file is included from kernel/sev.c and boot/compressed/sev.c,
+	 * use sev_status here as cc_platform_has() is not available when
+	 * compiling boot/compressed/sev.c.
+	 */
+	if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+		return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+
 	ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, 0, 0);
 	if (ret != ES_OK)
 		return ret;
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-06-21 12:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-21 12:38 [PATCH v10 00/24] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/24] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/24] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/24] virt: sev-guest: Simplify VMPCK and sequence number assignments Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-25 17:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-28  4:25     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-28  5:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-28  3:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-01 10:45     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-07-01 12:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/24] virt: sev-guest: Take mutex in snp_send_guest_request() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-28  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/24] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP guest messaging init/exit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/24] x86/sev: Move core SEV guest driver routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/24] x86/sev: Replace dev_[err,alert] with pr_[err,alert] Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/24] x86/sev: Make snp_issue_guest_request() static Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/24] x86/sev: Make sev-guest driver functional again Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/24] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/24] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/24] x86/sev: Drop sev_guest_platform_data structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/24] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/24] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/24] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 21/24] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 22/24] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 23/24] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 24/24] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240621123903.2411843-21-nikunj@amd.com \
    --to=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®