* Re: CVE-2024-47722: xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking [not found] <2024102103-CVE-2024-47722-dc6e@gregkh> @ 2024-10-21 12:35 ` Juergen Gross 2024-10-21 12:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread From: Juergen Gross @ 2024-10-21 12:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: cve, linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman [-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1191 bytes --] On 21.10.24 14:16, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > Description > =========== > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking > > When running as a Xen PV dom0 the kernel is loaded by the hypervisor > using a different memory map than that of the host. In order to > minimize the required changes in the kernel, the kernel adapts its > memory map to that of the host. In order to do that it is checking > for conflicts of its load address with the host memory map. > > Unfortunately the tested memory range does not include the .brk > area, which might result in crashes or memory corruption when this > area does conflict with the memory map of the host. > > Fix the test by using the _end label instead of __bss_stop. > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-47722 to this issue. I fail to see how an unprivileged user could cause any harm here. This bug is affecting the guest only, so only the guest admin can cause harm to the guest at will via a special kernel. IMHO nothing CVE-worthy here. So I'd like to ask for this CVE being revoked. Juergen [-- Attachment #1.1.2: OpenPGP public key --] [-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 3743 bytes --] [-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 495 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: CVE-2024-47722: xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking 2024-10-21 12:35 ` CVE-2024-47722: xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking Juergen Gross @ 2024-10-21 12:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2024-10-21 12:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Juergen Gross; +Cc: cve, linux-kernel On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 02:35:16PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote: > On 21.10.24 14:16, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > Description > > =========== > > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > > > xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking > > > > When running as a Xen PV dom0 the kernel is loaded by the hypervisor > > using a different memory map than that of the host. In order to > > minimize the required changes in the kernel, the kernel adapts its > > memory map to that of the host. In order to do that it is checking > > for conflicts of its load address with the host memory map. > > > > Unfortunately the tested memory range does not include the .brk > > area, which might result in crashes or memory corruption when this > > area does conflict with the memory map of the host. > > > > Fix the test by using the _end label instead of __bss_stop. > > > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-47722 to this issue. > > I fail to see how an unprivileged user could cause any harm here. > > This bug is affecting the guest only, so only the guest admin can cause > harm to the guest at will via a special kernel. IMHO nothing CVE-worthy > here. Ah, I thought this could affect the host, sorry about that. > So I'd like to ask for this CVE being revoked. Now revoked! thanks for the review. greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2024-10-21 12:35 ` CVE-2024-47722: xen: use correct end address of kernel for conflict checking Juergen Gross
2024-10-21 12:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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