From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:37 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-18-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241105215455.359471-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure l1tf to use select/apply functions to create consistent
vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for l1tf.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index ea4b87b44455..49da4636ce5a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@ void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *info);
enum l1tf_mitigations {
L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a3bbb0831845..98ef1cbc9e2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
retbleed_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
ssb_apply_mitigation();
+ l1tf_apply_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
taa_apply_mitigation();
mmio_apply_mitigation();
@@ -2533,7 +2535,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
#endif
@@ -2580,23 +2582,36 @@ static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+ else
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void)
{
u64 half_pa;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
- if (cpu_mitigations_off())
- l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
- else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
- l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
-
override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ return;
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
break;
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 81ed596e4454..fe99022d14c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
@@ -7634,6 +7635,7 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-05 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-05 21:54 [PATCH v2 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-14 2:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 17:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 3:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:01 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-10 15:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 4:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:21 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:57 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 15:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 23:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-12 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:48 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-06 18:56 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-02 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-06 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-06 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 3:58 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:05 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 15:31 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 16:00 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 16:19 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-14 9:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 16:15 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-22 16:36 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 17:23 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-20 0:14 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:42 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-01-03 15:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 15:29 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-03 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
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