From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 22:57:19 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241114064001.v6ogsiaptrh6oixc@desk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241105215455.359471-12-david.kaplan@amd.com>
On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 03:54:31PM -0600, David Kaplan wrote:
> static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
> {
> - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
> + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
> spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
> +{
> + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
We probably don't need to repeat this check, is this okay:
if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE)
> return;
> - }
>
> if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-14 6:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-05 21:54 [PATCH v2 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-14 2:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 17:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 3:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:01 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-10 15:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 4:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:21 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:57 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2024-11-14 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 15:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 23:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-12 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:48 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-06 18:56 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-02 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-06 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-06 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 3:58 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:05 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 15:31 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 16:00 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 16:19 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-14 9:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 16:15 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-22 16:36 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 17:23 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-20 0:14 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:42 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-01-03 15:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 15:29 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-03 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241114064001.v6ogsiaptrh6oixc@desk \
--to=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®