mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	kai.huang@intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	reinette.chatre@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com,
	tony.lindgren@intel.com, binbin.wu@linux.intel.com,
	dmatlack@google.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, nik.borisov@suse.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] SEPT SEAMCALL retry proposal
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2024 19:51:39 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241121115139.26338-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241112073327.21979-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>

This SEPT SEAMCALL retry proposal aims to remove patch
"[HACK] KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT"
[1] at the tail of v2 series "TDX MMU Part 2".

==brief history==

In the v1 series 'TDX MMU Part 2', there were several discussions regarding
the necessity of retrying SEPT-related SEAMCALLs up to 16 times within the
SEAMCALL wrapper tdx_seamcall_sept().

The lock status of each SEAMCALL relevant to KVM was analyzed in [2].

The conclusion was that 16 retries was necessary because
- tdh_vp_enter() contends with tdh_mem*() when 0-stepping is suspected.

  When the TDX module detects that EPT violations are caused by the same
  RIP as in the last tdh_vp_enter() for 6 consecutive times, tdh_vp_enter()
  will take SEPT tree lock and contend with tdh_mem*().

- tdg_mem_page_accept() can contend with other tdh_mem*().


Sean provided several good suggestions[3], including:
- Implement retries within TDX code when the TDP MMU returns
  RET_PF_RETRY_FOZEN (for RET_PF_RETRY and frozen SPTE) to avoid triggering
  0-step mitigation.
- It's not necessary for tdg_mem_page_accept() to contend with tdh_mem*()
  inside TDX module.
- Use a method similar to KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS to kick off vCPUs and
  prevent tdh_vp_enter() during page uninstallation.

Yan later found out that only retry RET_PF_RETRY_FOZEN within TDX code is
insufficient to prevent 0-step mitigation [4].

Rick and Yan then consulted TDX module team with findings that:
- The threshold of zero-step mitigation is counted per vCPU.
  It's of value 6 because

    "There can be at most 2 mapping faults on instruction fetch
     (x86 macro-instructions length is at most 15 bytes) when the
     instruction crosses page boundary; then there can be at most 2
     mapping faults for each memory operand, when the operand crosses
     page boundary. For most of x86 macro-instructions, there are up to 2
     memory operands and each one of them is small, which brings us to
     maximum 2+2*2 = 6 legal mapping faults."
  
- Besides tdg_mem_page_accept(),  tdg_mem_page_attr_rd/wr() can also 
  contend with SEAMCALLs tdh_mem*().

So, we decided to make a proposal to tolerate 0-step mitigation.

==proposal details==

The proposal discusses SEPT-related and TLB-flush-related SEAMCALLs
together which are required for page installation and uninstallation.

These SEAMCALLs can be divided into three groups:
Group 1: tdh_mem_page_add().
         The SEAMCALL is invoked only during TD build time and therefore
         KVM has ensured that no contention will occur.

         Proposal: (as in patch 1)
         Just return error when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY is found.

Group 2: tdh_mem_sept_add(), tdh_mem_page_aug().
         These two SEAMCALLs are invoked for page installation. 
         They return TDX_OPERAND_BUSY when contending with tdh_vp_enter()
	 (due to 0-step mitigation) or TDCALLs tdg_mem_page_accept(),
	 tdg_mem_page_attr_rd/wr().

         Proposal: (as in patch 1)
         - Return -EBUSY in KVM for TDX_OPERAND_BUSY to cause RET_PF_RETRY
           to be returned in kvm_mmu_do_page_fault()/kvm_mmu_page_fault().
         
         - Inside TDX's EPT violation handler, retry on RET_PF_RETRY as
           long as there are no pending signals/interrupts.

         The retry inside TDX aims to reduce the count of tdh_vp_enter()
         before resolving EPT violations in the local vCPU, thereby
         minimizing contentions with other vCPUs. However, it can't
         completely eliminate 0-step mitigation as it exits when there're
         pending signals/interrupts and does not (and cannot) remove the
         tdh_vp_enter() caused by KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT.

         Resources    SHARED  users      EXCLUSIVE users
         ------------------------------------------------------------
         SEPT tree  tdh_mem_sept_add     tdh_vp_enter(0-step mitigation)
                    tdh_mem_page_aug
         ------------------------------------------------------------
         SEPT entry                      tdh_mem_sept_add (Host lock)
                                         tdh_mem_page_aug (Host lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_accept (Guest lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_attr_rd (Guest lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_attr_wr (Guest lock)

Group 3: tdh_mem_range_block(), tdh_mem_track(), tdh_mem_page_remove().
         These three SEAMCALLs are invoked for page uninstallation, with
         KVM mmu_lock held for writing.

         Resources     SHARED users      EXCLUSIVE users
         ------------------------------------------------------------
         TDCS epoch    tdh_vp_enter      tdh_mem_track
         ------------------------------------------------------------
         SEPT tree  tdh_mem_page_remove  tdh_vp_enter (0-step mitigation)
                                         tdh_mem_range_block   
         ------------------------------------------------------------
         SEPT entry                      tdh_mem_range_block (Host lock)
                                         tdh_mem_page_remove (Host lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_accept (Guest lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_attr_rd (Guest lock)
                                         tdg_mem_page_attr_wr (Guest lock)

         Proposal: (as in patch 2)
         - Upon detection of TDX_OPERAND_BUSY, retry each SEAMCALL only
           once.
         - During the retry, kick off all vCPUs and prevent any vCPU from
           entering to avoid potential contentions.

         This is because tdh_vp_enter() and TDCALLs are not protected by
         KVM mmu_lock, and remove_external_spte() in KVM must not fail.



SEAMCALL                Lock Type        Resource 
-----------------------------Group 1--------------------------------
tdh_mem_page_add        EXCLUSIVE        TDR
                        NO_LOCK          TDCS
                        NO_LOCK          SEPT tree
                        EXCLUSIVE        page to add

----------------------------Group 2--------------------------------
tdh_mem_sept_add        SHARED           TDR
                        SHARED           TDCS
                        SHARED           SEPT tree
                        HOST,EXCLUSIVE   SEPT entry to modify
                        EXCLUSIVE        page to add


tdh_mem_page_aug        SHARED           TDR
                        SHARED           TDCS
                        SHARED           SEPT tree
                        HOST,EXCLUSIVE   SEPT entry to modify
                        EXCLUSIVE        page to aug

----------------------------Group 3--------------------------------
tdh_mem_range_block     SHARED           TDR
                        SHARED           TDCS
                        EXCLUSIVE        SEPT tree
                        HOST,EXCLUSIVE   SEPT entry to modify

tdh_mem_track           SHARED           TDR
                        SHARED           TDCS
                        EXCLUSIVE        TDCS epoch

tdh_mem_page_remove     SHARED           TDR
                        SHARED           TDCS
                        SHARED           SEPT tree
                        HOST,EXCLUSIVE   SEPT entry to modify
                        EXCLUSIVE        page to remove


[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241112073909.22326-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZuP5eNXFCljzRgWo@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZuR09EqzU1WbQYGd@google.com
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/Zw%2FKElXSOf1xqLE7@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com

Yan Zhao (2):
  KVM: TDX: Retry in TDX when installing TD private/sept pages
  KVM: TDX: Kick off vCPUs when SEAMCALL is busy during TD page removal

 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-11-21 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-12  7:33 [PATCH v2 00/24] TDX MMU Part 2 Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/24] KVM: x86/mmu: Implement memslot deletion for TDX Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/24] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Add a helper function to walk down the TDP MMU Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:35 ` [PATCH v2 03/24] KVM: x86/mmu: Do not enable page track for TD guest Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/24] KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/24] KVM: VMX: Teach EPT violation helper about private mem Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:35 ` [PATCH v2 06/24] KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 07/24] KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 08/24] KVM: TDX: Set gfn_direct_bits to shared bit Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 09/24] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper tdh_mem_sept_add() to add SEPT pages Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 10/24] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrappers to add TD private pages Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 11/24] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrappers to manage TDX TLB tracking Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:36 ` [PATCH v2 12/24] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrappers to remove a TD private page Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/24] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrappers for TD measurement of initial contents Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/24] KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/24] KVM: x86/mmu: Add setter for shadow_mmio_value Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:37 ` [PATCH v2 16/24] KVM: TDX: Set per-VM shadow_mmio_value to 0 Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:37 ` [PATCH v2 17/24] KVM: TDX: Handle TLB tracking for TDX Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 18/24] KVM: TDX: Implement hooks to propagate changes of TDP MMU mirror page table Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 19/24] KVM: TDX: Implement hook to get max mapping level of private pages Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 20/24] KVM: x86/mmu: Export kvm_tdp_map_page() Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 21/24] KVM: TDX: Add an ioctl to create initial guest memory Yan Zhao
2024-11-27 18:08   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-11-28  2:20     ` Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 22/24] KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization Yan Zhao
2024-12-24 14:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-01-07  7:44     ` Yan Zhao
2025-01-07 14:02       ` Paolo Bonzini
2025-01-08  2:18         ` Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:38 ` [PATCH v2 23/24] KVM: TDX: Handle vCPU dissociation Yan Zhao
2024-11-12  7:39 ` [PATCH v2 24/24] [HACK] KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT Yan Zhao
2024-11-21 11:51 ` Yan Zhao [this message]
2024-11-21 11:56   ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] KVM: TDX: Retry in TDX when installing TD private/sept pages Yan Zhao
2024-11-21 11:57   ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Kick off vCPUs when SEAMCALL is busy during TD page removal Yan Zhao
2024-11-26  0:47     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-26  6:39       ` Yan Zhao
2024-12-17 23:29     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-18  5:45       ` Yan Zhao
2024-12-18 16:10         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-19  1:52           ` Yan Zhao
2024-12-19  2:39             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-19  3:03               ` Yan Zhao
2024-11-26  0:46   ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] SEPT SEAMCALL retry proposal Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-11-26  6:24     ` Yan Zhao
2024-12-13  1:01   ` Yan Zhao
2024-12-17 17:00   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-12-17 23:18     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-10 18:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/24] TDX MMU Part 2 Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-24 14:33 ` Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20241121115139.26338-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com \
    --to=yan.y.zhao@intel.com \
    --cc=adrian.hunter@intel.com \
    --cc=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dmatlack@google.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@gmail.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=reinette.chatre@intel.com \
    --cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tony.lindgren@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®