From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
<David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
<naveen.rao@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC v2 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 14:35:10 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250226090525.231882-3-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250226090525.231882-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
With Secure AVIC, the APIC backing page is owned and managed by guest.
Allocate and initialize APIC backing page for all guest CPUs.
The NPT entry for the vCPU's APIC backing page must always be present
when the vCPU is running in order for Secure AVIC to function. A
VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot be resumed if
the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not present. Notify GPA of
the vCPU's APIC backing page to the hypervisor by using the
SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC GHCB protocol event. Before executing VMRUN,
the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure the APIC backing
page is mapped in NPT.
Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
Changes since v1:
- Updated commit log.
- Allocate APIC backing page for each CPU as a separate PAGE_SIZE
allocation with GFP_KERNEL flag.
- Update the GPA registeration API as per the latest GHCB spec updates
for Secure AVIC GHCB protocol event (yet to be published).
Corresponding KVM support is here:
https://github.com/AMDESE/linux-kvm/commit/5fbf231861207edf73bb31742f75e22cae18607b
- Remove savic_setup_done variable.
- Removed initialization of LVT* regs in backing page from Hv values.
These regs will reads/writes will be propagated to Hv in subsequent
patches.
- Move savic_ghcb_msr_read() definition to a later patch where it will
be first used.
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 82492efc5d94..300bc8f6eb6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1504,6 +1504,38 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Register GPA of the Secure AVIC backing page.
+ *
+ * @apic_id: APIC ID of the vCPU. Use -1ULL for the current vCPU
+ * doing the call.
+ * @gpa : GPA of the Secure AVIC backing page.
+ */
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 apic_id, u64 gpa)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, apic_id);
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, gpa);
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC,
+ SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_REGISTER_GPA, 0);
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static void snp_register_per_cpu_ghcb(void)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index f21ff1932699..3f70aa2f3aba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ struct apic {
/* Probe, setup and smpboot functions */
int (*probe)(void);
+ void (*setup)(void);
int (*acpi_madt_oem_check)(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id);
void (*init_apic_ldr)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 1581246491b5..626588386cf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void);
void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void);
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 apic_id, u64 gpa);
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -526,6 +527,8 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
+static inline enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 apic_id,
+ u64 gpa) { return ES_UNSUPPORTED; }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 1814b413fd57..0bb70c5988bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL 0x80000018
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC 0x8000001a
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_REGISTER_GPA 0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_UNREGISTER_GPA 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index e893dc6f11c1..1c0b5f14435e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1504,6 +1504,8 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void)
return;
}
+ if (apic->setup)
+ apic->setup();
/*
* If this comes from kexec/kcrash the APIC might be enabled in
* SPIV. Soft disable it before doing further initialization.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
index c3a4d387c63f..c444161d81b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
@@ -9,12 +9,15 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include "local.h"
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, apic_backing_page);
+
static int x2apic_savic_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id)
{
return x2apic_enabled() && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC);
@@ -61,6 +64,36 @@ static void x2apic_savic_send_IPI_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, in
__send_IPI_mask(mask, vector, APIC_DEST_ALLBUT);
}
+static void x2apic_savic_setup(void)
+{
+ void *backing_page;
+ enum es_result ret;
+ unsigned long gpa;
+
+ if (this_cpu_read(apic_backing_page))
+ return;
+
+ backing_page = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!backing_page)
+ snp_abort();
+ this_cpu_write(apic_backing_page, backing_page);
+ gpa = __pa(backing_page);
+
+ /*
+ * The NPT entry for the vCPU's APIC backing page must always be
+ * present when the vCPU is running in order for Secure AVIC to
+ * function. A VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot
+ * be resumed if the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not
+ * present. Notify GPA of the vCPU's APIC backing page to the
+ * hypervisor by calling savic_register_gpa(). Before executing
+ * VMRUN, the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure
+ * the APIC backing page is mapped in NPT.
+ */
+ ret = savic_register_gpa(-1ULL, gpa);
+ if (ret != ES_OK)
+ snp_abort();
+}
+
static int x2apic_savic_probe(void)
{
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC))
@@ -81,6 +114,7 @@ static struct apic apic_x2apic_savic __ro_after_init = {
.name = "secure avic x2apic",
.probe = x2apic_savic_probe,
.acpi_madt_oem_check = x2apic_savic_acpi_madt_oem_check,
+ .setup = x2apic_savic_setup,
.dest_mode_logical = false,
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-26 9:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-26 9:05 [RFC v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC Guest Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 01/17] x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-20 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 3:44 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 16:09 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-01 5:12 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-02 9:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-02 10:34 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-07 13:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-07 16:17 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 12:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 12:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:25 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-03-21 13:08 ` [RFC v2 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:49 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 16:32 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-03-21 17:00 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 03/17] x86/apic: Populate .read()/.write() callbacks of Secure AVIC driver Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 14:00 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 04/17] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 15:11 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 05/17] x86/apic: Add update_vector callback " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 14:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 15:35 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-25 12:10 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 10:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 11:17 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 12:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:30 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 06/17] x86/apic: Add support to send IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:06 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:25 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 07/17] x86/apic: Support LAPIC timer " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 08/17] x86/sev: Initialize VGIF for secondary VCPUs " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 09/17] x86/apic: Add support to send NMI IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 10/17] x86/apic: Allow NMI to be injected from hypervisor " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 11/17] x86/sev: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 12/17] x86/apic: Read and write LVT* APIC registers from HV for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 13/17] x86/apic: Handle EOI writes " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 17:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 10:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 14:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 16:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 14/17] x86/apic: Add kexec support for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:35 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-02 2:40 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 15/17] x86/apic: Enable Secure AVIC in Control MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 16/17] x86/sev: Prevent SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR interception for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 17/17] x86/sev: Indicate SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
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