From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
<David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
<naveen.rao@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC v2 04/17] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 14:35:12 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250226090525.231882-5-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250226090525.231882-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Initialize the APIC ID in the Secure AVIC APIC backing page with
the APIC_ID msr value read from Hypervisor. Maintain a hashmap to
check and report same APIC_ID value returned by Hypervisor for two
different vCPUs.
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
Changes since v1:
- Do not read APIC_ID from CPUID. Read APIC_ID from Hv and check for
duplicates.
- Add a more user-friendly log message on detecting duplicate APIC
IDs.
arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
index ba904f241d34..505ef2d29311 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <linux/align.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/llist.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
@@ -19,6 +21,16 @@
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, apic_backing_page);
+struct apic_id_node {
+ struct llist_node node;
+ u32 apic_id;
+ int cpu;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct apic_id_node, apic_id_node);
+
+static struct llist_head *apic_id_map;
+
static int x2apic_savic_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id)
{
return x2apic_enabled() && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC);
@@ -180,6 +192,44 @@ static void x2apic_savic_send_IPI_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, in
__send_IPI_mask(mask, vector, APIC_DEST_ALLBUT);
}
+static void init_backing_page(void *backing_page)
+{
+ struct apic_id_node *next_node, *this_cpu_node;
+ unsigned int apic_map_slot;
+ u32 apic_id;
+ int cpu;
+
+ /*
+ * Before Secure AVIC is enabled, APIC msr reads are
+ * intercepted. APIC_ID msr read returns the value
+ * from hv.
+ */
+ apic_id = native_apic_msr_read(APIC_ID);
+ set_reg(backing_page, APIC_ID, apic_id);
+
+ if (!apic_id_map)
+ return;
+
+ cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ this_cpu_node = &per_cpu(apic_id_node, cpu);
+ this_cpu_node->apic_id = apic_id;
+ this_cpu_node->cpu = cpu;
+ /*
+ * In common case, apic_ids for CPUs are sequentially numbered.
+ * So, each CPU should hash to a different slot in the apic id
+ * map.
+ */
+ apic_map_slot = apic_id % nr_cpu_ids;
+ llist_add(&this_cpu_node->node, &apic_id_map[apic_map_slot]);
+ /* Each CPU checks only its next nodes for duplicates. */
+ llist_for_each_entry(next_node, this_cpu_node->node.next, node) {
+ if (WARN_ONCE(next_node->apic_id == apic_id,
+ "Duplicate APIC %u for cpu %d and cpu %d. IPI handling will suffer!",
+ apic_id, cpu, next_node->cpu))
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
static void x2apic_savic_setup(void)
{
void *backing_page;
@@ -193,6 +243,7 @@ static void x2apic_savic_setup(void)
if (!backing_page)
snp_abort();
this_cpu_write(apic_backing_page, backing_page);
+ init_backing_page(backing_page);
gpa = __pa(backing_page);
/*
@@ -212,6 +263,8 @@ static void x2apic_savic_setup(void)
static int x2apic_savic_probe(void)
{
+ int i;
+
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC))
return 0;
@@ -220,6 +273,12 @@ static int x2apic_savic_probe(void)
snp_abort();
}
+ apic_id_map = kvmalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(*apic_id_map), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (apic_id_map)
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_cpu_ids; i++)
+ init_llist_head(&apic_id_map[i]);
+
pr_info("Secure AVIC Enabled\n");
return 1;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-26 9:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-26 9:05 [RFC v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC Guest Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 01/17] x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-20 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 3:44 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 16:09 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-01 5:12 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-02 9:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-02 10:34 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-07 13:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-07 16:17 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 12:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 12:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:25 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:49 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 16:32 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-03-21 17:00 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 03/17] x86/apic: Populate .read()/.write() callbacks of Secure AVIC driver Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 14:00 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-03-21 13:52 ` [RFC v2 04/17] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 15:11 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 05/17] x86/apic: Add update_vector callback " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 14:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 15:35 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-25 12:10 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 10:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 11:17 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 12:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:30 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 06/17] x86/apic: Add support to send IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:06 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:25 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 07/17] x86/apic: Support LAPIC timer " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 08/17] x86/sev: Initialize VGIF for secondary VCPUs " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 09/17] x86/apic: Add support to send NMI IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 10/17] x86/apic: Allow NMI to be injected from hypervisor " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 11/17] x86/sev: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 12/17] x86/apic: Read and write LVT* APIC registers from HV for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 13/17] x86/apic: Handle EOI writes " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 17:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 10:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 14:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 16:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 14/17] x86/apic: Add kexec support for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:35 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-02 2:40 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 15/17] x86/apic: Enable Secure AVIC in Control MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 16/17] x86/sev: Prevent SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR interception for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26 9:05 ` [RFC v2 17/17] x86/sev: Indicate SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
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