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From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>,
	Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>,
	Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>,
	Cupertino Miranda <cupertino.miranda@oracle.com>,
	Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@gmail.com>,
	Dimitar Kanaliev <dimitar.kanaliev@siteground.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>, Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	George Guo <guodongtai@kylinos.cn>, WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>,
	Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>, Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 08/11] bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:41:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250313174149.1113165-3-luis.gerhorst@fau.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313174149.1113165-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de>

Insert a nospec before the access to prevent it from ever using an index
that is subject to speculative scalar-confusion.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8093a5bac4d1..683a76aceffa 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7858,6 +7858,11 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
+}
+
 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
  * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
  * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are
@@ -7897,18 +7902,18 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
 		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
 	} else {
-		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+		/* Variable offset requires a nospec for unprivileged mode for
 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
 		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
 		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
 		 */
 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
-			char tn_buf[48];
-
-			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
-				regno, tn_buf);
-			return -EACCES;
+			/* Allow the access, but prevent it from using a
+			 * speculative offset using a nospec before the
+			 * dereference op.
+			 */
+			cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(cur_aux(env)->alu_state);
 		}
 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
 		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
@@ -11096,11 +11101,6 @@ static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	return -ENOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
-	return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
-}
-
 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
-- 
2.48.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-13 17:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 17:21 [PATCH bpf-next 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn() Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-14 22:47   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-15 14:35     ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-15  8:06   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-13 17:29 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-15  8:07   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-13 17:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:38 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/11] bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41   ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1 Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41   ` Luis Gerhorst [this message]
2025-03-13 17:41   ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/11] bpf: Return PTR_ERR from push_stack() Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-17  9:19     ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-18  7:59       ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:53   ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for spec path verification Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-19  2:40     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-03-19  9:06       ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-04-03 20:33         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-03-14 23:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-15 15:20   ` Luis Gerhorst

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