mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>,
	Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>,
	Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>,
	Cupertino Miranda <cupertino.miranda@oracle.com>,
	Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@gmail.com>,
	Dimitar Kanaliev <dimitar.kanaliev@siteground.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>, Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	George Guo <guodongtai@kylinos.cn>, WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>,
	Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>, Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 09/11] bpf: Return PTR_ERR from push_stack()
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 18:41:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250313174149.1113165-4-luis.gerhorst@fau.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313174149.1113165-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de>

Main reason is, that it will later allow us to fall back to a nospec for
certain errors in push_stack().

This changes the sanitization-case to returning -ENOMEM. However, this
is more fitting as -EFAULT would indicate a verifier-internal bug.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 683a76aceffa..610f9567af7c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2011,8 +2011,10 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	int err;
 
 	elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!elem)
-		goto err;
+	if (!elem) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto unrecoverable_err;
+	}
 
 	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
 	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
@@ -2022,12 +2024,19 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	env->stack_size++;
 	err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
 	if (err)
-		goto err;
+		goto unrecoverable_err;
 	elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
 	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
 		verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n",
 			env->stack_size);
-		goto err;
+		/* Do not return -EINVAL to prevent main loop from trying to
+		 * mitigate this using nospec if we are on a speculative path.
+		 * If it was tried anyway, we would encounter an -ENOMEM (from
+		 * which we can not recover) again shortly on the next
+		 * non-speculative path that has to be checked.
+		 */
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto unrecoverable_err;
 	}
 	if (elem->st.parent) {
 		++elem->st.parent->branches;
@@ -2042,12 +2051,14 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 */
 	}
 	return &elem->st;
-err:
+unrecoverable_err:
 	free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
 	env->cur_state = NULL;
 	/* pop all elements and return */
 	while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
-	return NULL;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(error_recoverable_with_nospec(err));
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
@@ -8856,8 +8867,8 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
 		prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx);
 		/* branch out active iter state */
 		queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false);
-		if (!queued_st)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (IS_ERR(queued_st))
+			return PTR_ERR(queued_st);
 
 		queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta);
 		queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
@@ -10440,8 +10451,8 @@ static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *ins
 	 * proceed with next instruction within current frame.
 	 */
 	callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false);
-	if (!callback_state)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (IS_ERR(callback_state))
+		return PTR_ERR(callback_state);
 
 	err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb,
 			       callback_state);
@@ -13892,7 +13903,7 @@ sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
 
 	branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
-	if (branch && insn) {
+	if (!IS_ERR(branch) && insn) {
 		regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
 		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
@@ -13920,7 +13931,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
-	bool ret;
+	struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
 	int err;
 
 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
@@ -13993,11 +14004,11 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		tmp = *dst_reg;
 		copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg);
 	}
-	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
-					env->insn_idx);
-	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
+	branch = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
+					   env->insn_idx);
+	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && !IS_ERR(branch))
 		*dst_reg = tmp;
-	return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
+	return IS_ERR(branch) ? REASON_STACK : 0;
 }
 
 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
@@ -16246,8 +16257,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 		/* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */
 		queued_st = push_stack(env, idx + 1, idx, false);
-		if (!queued_st)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (IS_ERR(queued_st))
+			return PTR_ERR(queued_st);
 
 		queued_st->may_goto_depth++;
 		if (prev_st)
@@ -16311,10 +16322,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
 		 * execution.
 		 */
-		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
-		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
-					       *insn_idx))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
+			struct bpf_verifier_state *branch = sanitize_speculative_path(
+				env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, *insn_idx);
+			if (IS_ERR(branch))
+				return PTR_ERR(branch);
+		}
 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
 			print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe);
 		*insn_idx += insn->off;
@@ -16324,11 +16337,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
 		 * simulation under speculative execution.
 		 */
-		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
-		    !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
-					       *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
-					       *insn_idx))
-			return -EFAULT;
+		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
+			struct bpf_verifier_state *branch = sanitize_speculative_path(
+				env, insn, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
+			if (IS_ERR(branch))
+				return PTR_ERR(branch);
+		}
 		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
 			print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe);
 		return 0;
@@ -16351,8 +16365,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
 				  false);
-	if (!other_branch)
-		return -EFAULT;
+	if (IS_ERR(other_branch))
+		return PTR_ERR(other_branch);
 	other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
 
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
-- 
2.48.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-13 17:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 17:21 [PATCH bpf-next 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn() Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-14 22:47   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-15 14:35     ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-15  8:06   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-13 17:29 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/11] bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-15  8:07   ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-13 17:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:38 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/11] bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/11] bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41   ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1 Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41   ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/11] bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:41   ` Luis Gerhorst [this message]
2025-03-17  9:19     ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/11] bpf: Return PTR_ERR from push_stack() Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-18  7:59       ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-13 17:53   ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/11] bpf: Fall back to nospec for spec path verification Luis Gerhorst
2025-03-19  2:40     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-03-19  9:06       ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-04-03 20:33         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-03-14 23:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 00/11] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using barriers Eduard Zingerman
2025-03-15 15:20   ` Luis Gerhorst

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20250313174149.1113165-4-luis.gerhorst@fau.de \
    --to=luis.gerhorst@fau.de \
    --cc=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu \
    --cc=cupertino.miranda@oracle.com \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=dimitar.kanaliev@siteground.com \
    --cc=dxu@dxuuu.xyz \
    --cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
    --cc=git@xen0n.name \
    --cc=guodongtai@kylinos.cn \
    --cc=haoluo@google.com \
    --cc=hbathini@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=henriette.herzog@rub.de \
    --cc=john.fastabend@gmail.com \
    --cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
    --cc=m.shachnai@gmail.com \
    --cc=maddy@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
    --cc=milan.stephan@fau.de \
    --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=mykolal@fb.com \
    --cc=naveen@kernel.org \
    --cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
    --cc=ott@cs.fau.de \
    --cc=puranjay@kernel.org \
    --cc=sdf@fomichev.me \
    --cc=shuah@kernel.org \
    --cc=shung-hsi.yu@suse.com \
    --cc=song@kernel.org \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=xukuohai@huaweicloud.com \
    --cc=yangtiezhu@loongson.cn \
    --cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®