From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] devmem: Block mmap access when read/write access is restricted
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 19:32:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202504101926.0F8FB73@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <174433455090.924142.10859114556652046264.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com>
On Thu, Apr 10, 2025 at 06:22:30PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Back in 2022 Kees noted that he is able to mmap System RAM below 1MB
> even with CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y [1]. That is allowed for x86 legacy
> compatibility reasons for userspace that wants to read BIOS data
> resident at that address. However, the expectation is that when
> devmem_is_allowed() returns 2 that the access is redirected to return
> zeroes.
>
> That happens for the read()/write() case, but by code inspection for
> mmap(), there is no restriction.
>
> Now, the confidential x86 VM (CVM) use case wants to depend on
> "devmem_is_allowed() == 2" guaranteeing that no mapping to potentially
> encrypted memory is established [2]. The options to enable that are
> teach mmap_mem() to meet the "zeroed buffer" implication of
> devmem_is_allowed() returning "2", or return -EPERM for that case.
>
> Return -EPERM on the hope that userspace does not actually depend on the
> legacy behavior of being able to reliably map the first 1MB of memory on
> x86. I.e. that all legacy cases are using read()/write() to safely read
> zeroes. If that turns out not to be true then either a "map zeroes"
> scheme can be added, or the CVM case can return 3 from
> devmem_is_allowed() to hide the CVM restriction from legacy
> environments.
>
> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/CAPcyv4iVt=peUAk1qx_EfKn7aGJM=XwRUpJftBhkUgQEti2bJA@mail.gmail.com [1]
> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/fd683daa-d953-48ca-8c5d-6f4688ad442c@intel.com [2]
> Suggested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/io.h | 7 ++++++-
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/io.h b/include/linux/io.h
> index 0642c7ee41db..564934f7e70d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/io.h
> +++ b/include/linux/io.h
> @@ -191,7 +191,12 @@ static inline int range_is_allowed(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size)
> u64 cursor = from;
>
> while (cursor < to) {
> - if (!devmem_is_allowed(pfn))
> + /*
> + * Any restricted access is treated as "no access", i.e.
> + * handle devmem_is_allowed() returning "2" to indicate
> + * restricted access.
> + */
> + if (devmem_is_allowed(pfn) != 1)
> return 0;
> cursor += PAGE_SIZE;
> pfn++;
Looking through the 16 page of Debian Code Search results for
`open("/dev/mem")`, I find a LOT of mmap() use. Some random examples:
https://sources.debian.org/src/i810switch/0.6.5-7.1/i810switch.c/?hl=413#L402
https://sources.debian.org/src/radeontop/1.4-2/detect.c/?hl=91#L88
https://sources.debian.org/src/libdebian-installer/0.125/src/system/subarch-x86-linux.c/?hl=113#L93
Which includes this gem of a comment, implying that it uses mmap
_specifically to bypass the devmem restrictions_:
/* Please note that we don't use mmap() for performance reasons here,
* but to workaround problems many people encountered when trying
* to read from /dev/mem using regular read() calls.
*/
I don't think we can just fail the mmap. :(
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-11 2:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-11 1:22 [PATCH v2 0/3] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs Dan Williams
2025-04-11 1:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/devmem: Remove duplicate range_is_allowed() definition Dan Williams
2025-04-14 18:17 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-16 21:25 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-17 7:28 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-17 18:27 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-19 9:09 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-11 1:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] devmem: Block mmap access when read/write access is restricted Dan Williams
2025-04-11 2:32 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-04-11 4:59 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-11 15:38 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 21:48 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-11 1:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/devmem: Restrict /dev/mem access for potentially unaccepted memory by default Dan Williams
2025-04-14 18:22 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-16 21:30 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-14 10:56 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs Nikolay Borisov
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