From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Vaishali Thakkar <vaishali.thakkar@suse.com>,
Ketan Chaturvedi <Ketan.Chaturvedi@amd.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 8/8] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 16:48:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250819234833.3080255-9-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250819234833.3080255-1-seanjc@google.com>
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Add support for Secure TSC, allowing userspace to configure the Secure TSC
feature for SNP guests. Use the SNP specification's desired TSC frequency
parameter during the SNP_LAUNCH_START command to set the mean TSC
frequency in KHz for Secure TSC enabled guests.
Always use kvm->arch.arch.default_tsc_khz as the TSC frequency that is
passed to SNP guests in the SNP_LAUNCH_START command. The default value
is the host TSC frequency. The userspace can optionally change the TSC
frequency via the KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ ioctl before calling the
SNP_LAUNCH_START ioctl.
Introduce the read-only MSR GUEST_TSC_FREQ (0xc0010134) that returns
guest's effective frequency in MHZ when Secure TSC is enabled for SNP
guests. Disable interception of this MSR when Secure TSC is enabled. Note
that GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR is accessible only to the guest and not from the
hypervisor context.
Co-developed-by: Ketan Chaturvedi <Ketan.Chaturvedi@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ketan Chaturvedi <Ketan.Chaturvedi@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
[sean: contain Secure TSC to sev.c]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index ffc27f676243..17f6c3fedeee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION BIT(3)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7d1d34e45310..fb45a96e0159 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
}
+static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
+
+ return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
+}
+
/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
{
@@ -415,6 +423,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
if (data->flags)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!snp_active)
+ valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2195,6 +2206,12 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
start.policy = params.policy;
+
+ if (snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(kvm)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz);
+ start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz;
+ }
+
memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
if (rc) {
@@ -3085,6 +3102,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -4452,6 +4472,9 @@ void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
+ svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, MSR_TYPE_R,
+ !snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm));
+
/*
* For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
* the host/guest supports its use.
@@ -4591,6 +4614,9 @@ int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return -ENOMEM;
svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+ vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
+
return 0;
}
--
2.51.0.rc1.167.g924127e9c0-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-19 23:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-19 23:48 [PATCH v11 0/8] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 1/8] KVM: SEV: Drop GHCB_VERSION_DEFAULT and open code it Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 2/8] KVM: SEV: Enforce minimum GHCB version requirement for SEV-SNP guests Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 3/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add SNP Secure TSC Sean Christopherson
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 4/8] KVM: SVM: Move SEV-ES VMSA allocation to a dedicated sev_vcpu_create() helper Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 9:00 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 5/8] KVM: SEV: Move init of SNP guest state into sev_init_vmcb() Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 9:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 6/8] KVM: SEV: Set RESET GHCB MSR value during sev_es_init_vmcb() Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 9:32 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-19 23:48 ` [PATCH v11 7/8] KVM: SEV: Fold sev_es_vcpu_reset() into sev_vcpu_create() Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 9:33 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-19 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-08-20 4:53 ` [PATCH v11 8/8] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-20 13:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-20 13:11 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-20 8:48 ` [PATCH v11 0/8] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-20 11:25 ` Huang, Kai
2025-08-20 11:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-08-20 15:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-25 5:37 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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