From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 06/20] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:36:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250821223630.984383-7-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250821223630.984383-1-xin@zytor.com>
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
On a userspace MSR filter change, set FRED MSR intercepts.
8 FRED MSRs, i.e., MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP[123], MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP[123] and MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, are all safe to
be passthrough, because they all have a pair of corresponding host
and guest VMCS fields.
Both MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0 are dedicated for
userspace event delivery only, IOW they are NOT used in any kernel
event delivery and the execution of ERETS. Thus KVM can run safely
with guest values in the two MSRs. As a result, save and restore of
their guest values are deferred until vCPU context switch and their
host values are restored upon host returning to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
---
Changes in v5:
* Skip execution of vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr() if FRED is
not available or enabled (Sean).
* Use 'intercept' as the variable name to indicate whether MSR
interception should be enabled (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 42e179f19c23..8e81230be7af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4128,6 +4128,43 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
+static void vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ bool intercept = !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
+ if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+ return;
+
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+
+ /*
+ * MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (aka MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0) are
+ * designated for event delivery while executing in userspace. Since
+ * KVM operates exclusively in kernel mode (the CPL is always 0 after
+ * any VM exit), KVM can safely retain and operate with the guest-defined
+ * values for MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP.
+ *
+ * Therefore, interception of MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 and MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP
+ * is not required.
+ *
+ * Note, save and restore of MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP belong to CET supervisor
+ * context management. However the FRED SSP MSRs, including
+ * MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, are supported by any processor that enumerates FRED.
+ * If such a processor does not support CET, FRED transitions will not
+ * use the MSRs, but the MSRs would still be accessible using MSR-access
+ * instructions (e.g., RDMSR, WRMSR).
+ */
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
+}
+
void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
bool intercept;
@@ -4194,6 +4231,8 @@ void vmx_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
}
+ vmx_set_intercept_for_fred_msr(vcpu);
+
/*
* x2APIC and LBR MSR intercepts are modified on-demand and cannot be
* filtered by userspace.
--
2.50.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-21 22:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-21 22:36 [PATCH v6 00/20] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 01/20] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 02/20] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 03/20] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 04/20] x86/cea: Export an API to get per CPU exception stacks for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-27 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-27 22:18 ` Xin Li
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 05/20] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-08-25 2:51 ` [PATCH v6 06/20] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li
2025-08-26 18:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-26 21:59 ` Xin Li
2025-08-26 22:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-27 22:24 ` Xin Li
2025-08-27 22:43 ` Xin Li
2025-08-28 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-26 18:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-08-26 22:03 ` Xin Li
2025-08-26 22:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 07/20] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 08/20] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 09/20] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 10/20] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 11/20] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 12/20] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 13/20] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 14/20] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 15/20] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 16/20] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 17/20] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 18/20] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 19/20] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 20/20] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
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