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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	 tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	 dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@kernel.org,  peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com,
	 hch@infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 06/20] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 15:17:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aK4yXT9y5YHeEWkb@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c45a7c91-e393-4f71-8b22-aef6486aaa9e@zytor.com>

On Tue, Aug 26, 2025, Xin Li wrote:
> 
> > > Hi Sean,
> > > 
> > > I'd like to bring up an issue concerning MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP.
> > > 
> > > The FRED spec claims:
> > > 
> > > The FRED SSP MSRs are supported by any processor that enumerates
> > > CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX.FRED[bit 17] as 1. If such a processor does not
> > > support CET, FRED transitions will not use the MSRs (because shadow stacks
> > > are not enabled), but the MSRs would still be accessible using MSR-access
> > > instructions (e.g., RDMSR, WRMSR).
> > > 
> > > It means KVM needs to handle MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP even when FRED is supported
> > > but CET is not.  And this can be broken down into two subtasks:
> > > 
> > > 1) Allow such a guest to access MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP w/o triggering #GP.  And
> > > this behavior is already implemented in patch 8 of this series.
> > > 
> > > 2) Save and restore MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP in both KVM and Qemu for such a guest.
> > 
> > What novel work needs to be done in KVM?  For QEMU, I assume it's just adding an
> > "or FRED" somewhere.  For KVM, I'm missing what additional work would be required
> > that wouldn't be naturally covered by patch 8 (assuming patch 8 is bug-free).
> 
> Extra patches:
> 
> 1) A patch to save/restore guest MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (i.e., FRED SSP0), as
> what we have done for RSP0, following is the patch on top of the patch
> saving/restoring RSP0:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 449a5e02c7de..0bf684342a71 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -1294,8 +1294,13 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> 
>  	wrmsrq(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
> 
> -	if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> +	if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
>  		wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
> +
> +		/* XSAVES/XRSTORS do not cover SSP MSRs */

Eww.  I'm with Andrew, fix the SDM.  This is silly.

> +		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +			wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0, vmx->msr_guest_fred_ssp0);

FWIW, if we can't get an SDM change, don't bother with RDMSR/WRMSRNS, just
configure KVM to intercept accesses.  Then in kvm_set_msr_common(), pivot on
X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, e.g.

	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
			WARN_ON_ONCE(msr != MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0);
			vcpu->arch.fred_rsp0_fallback = data;
			break;
		}

		kvm_set_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
		break;

and

	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
			WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_info->index != MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP0);
			vcpu->arch.fred_rsp0_fallback = msr_info->data;
			break;
		}

		kvm_get_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
		break;

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-26 22:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-21 22:36 [PATCH v6 00/20] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 01/20] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 02/20] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 03/20] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 04/20] x86/cea: Export an API to get per CPU exception stacks for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-27 17:33   ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-27 22:18     ` Xin Li
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 05/20] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 06/20] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-25  2:51   ` Xin Li
2025-08-26 18:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-26 21:59       ` Xin Li
2025-08-26 22:17         ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-08-27 22:24           ` Xin Li
2025-08-27 22:43             ` Xin Li
2025-08-28 23:32               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-26 18:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2025-08-26 22:03       ` Xin Li
2025-08-26 22:20         ` Andrew Cooper
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 07/20] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 08/20] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 09/20] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 10/20] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 11/20] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 12/20] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 13/20] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 14/20] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 15/20] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 16/20] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 17/20] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 18/20] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 19/20] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-21 22:36 ` [PATCH v6 20/20] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)

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