* [PATCH v2] mailbox: Prevent out-of-bounds access in of_mbox_index_xlate()
@ 2025-09-18 12:55 Joonwon Kang
2025-09-18 23:26 ` Jassi Brar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Joonwon Kang @ 2025-09-18 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: peng.fan, jassisinghbrar; +Cc: linux-kernel, Joonwon Kang
Although it is guided that `#mbox-cells` must be at least 1, there are
many instances of `#mbox-cells = <0>;` in the device tree. If that is
the case and the corresponding mailbox controller does not provide
`of_xlate` function pointer, `of_mbox_index_xlate()` will be used by
default and out-of-bounds accesses could occur due to lack of bounds
check in that function.
Below is a problematic control flow when `#mbox-cells = <0>;`.
```
static struct mbox_chan *
of_mbox_index_xlate(struct mbox_controller *mbox,
const struct of_phandle_args *sp)
{
int ind = sp->args[0]; // (4)
if (ind >= mbox->num_chans) // (5)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return &mbox->chans[ind]; // (6)
}
struct mbox_chan *mbox_request_channel(struct mbox_client *cl, int index)
{
struct of_phandle_args spec; // (1)
if (of_parse_phandle_with_args(dev->of_node, "mboxes", // (2)
"#mbox-cells", index, &spec)) {
...
}
list_for_each_entry(mbox, &mbox_cons, node)
if (mbox->dev->of_node == spec.np) {
chan = mbox->of_xlate(mbox, &spec); // (3)
if (!IS_ERR(chan))
break;
}
...
ret = __mbox_bind_client(chan, cl); // (7)
...
}
static int __mbox_bind_client(struct mbox_chan *chan,
struct mbox_client *cl)
{
if (chan->cl || ...) { // (8)
}
```
(1) `spec.args[]` is filled with arbitrary leftover values in the stack.
Let's say that `spec.args[0] == 0xffffffff`.
(2) Since `#mbox-cells = <0>;`, `spec.args_count` is assigned 0 and
`spec.args[]` are untouched.
(3) Since the controller does not provide `of_xlate`,
`of_mbox_index_xlate()` is used instead.
(4) `idx` is assigned -1 due to the value of `spec.args[0]`.
(5) Since `mbox->num_chans >= 0` and `idx == -1`, this condition does
not filter out this case.
(6) Out-of-bounds address is returned. Depending on what was left in
`spec.args[0]`, it could be an arbitrary(but confined to a specific
range) address.
(7) A function is called with the out-of-bounds address.
(8) The out-of-bounds address is accessed.
This commit prevents the issue by checking the array bounds.
Signed-off-by: Joonwon Kang <joonwonkang@google.com>
---
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c
index 5cd8ae222073..5bccdf27d6ab 100644
--- a/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c
+++ b/drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ of_mbox_index_xlate(struct mbox_controller *mbox,
{
int ind = sp->args[0];
- if (ind >= mbox->num_chans)
+ if (sp->args_count < 1 || ind >= mbox->num_chans)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return &mbox->chans[ind];
--
2.51.0.384.g4c02a37b29-goog
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] mailbox: Prevent out-of-bounds access in of_mbox_index_xlate()
2025-09-18 12:55 [PATCH v2] mailbox: Prevent out-of-bounds access in of_mbox_index_xlate() Joonwon Kang
@ 2025-09-18 23:26 ` Jassi Brar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jassi Brar @ 2025-09-18 23:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joonwon Kang; +Cc: peng.fan, linux-kernel
On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 7:55 AM Joonwon Kang <joonwonkang@google.com> wrote:
>
> Although it is guided that `#mbox-cells` must be at least 1, there are
> many instances of `#mbox-cells = <0>;` in the device tree. If that is
> the case and the corresponding mailbox controller does not provide
> `of_xlate` function pointer, `of_mbox_index_xlate()` will be used by
> default and out-of-bounds accesses could occur due to lack of bounds
> check in that function.
>
OK, so we want of_mbox_index_xlate() to refuse if the channel's index
is not available, which
will be the case when #mbox-cells=<0> in dt and sp->args_count=0 here.
Fair enough.
I think the following details are unnecessary, maybe drop it.
Thanks
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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