* [PATCH v3] ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list
@ 2025-11-17 11:42 Deepanshu Kartikey
2025-11-19 15:36 ` Heming Zhao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Deepanshu Kartikey @ 2025-11-17 11:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mark, jlbec, joseph.qi, ocfs2-devel, linux-kernel
Cc: Deepanshu Kartikey, syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9, Heming Zhao
Add comprehensive validation of inline xattr metadata in
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() to prevent out-of-bounds access and
use-after-free bugs when processing corrupted inline xattrs.
The patch adds two critical validations:
1. Validates i_xattr_inline_size before use:
- Ensures it does not exceed block size
- Ensures it is at least large enough for xattr header
- Prevents pointer arithmetic with corrupted size values that could
point outside the inode block
2. Validates xattr entry count (xh_count):
- Calculates maximum entries that can fit in the inline space
- Rejects counts that exceed this limit
- Prevents out-of-bounds array access in subsequent code
Without these checks, a corrupted filesystem with invalid inline xattr
metadata can cause the code to access memory beyond the allocated space.
For example:
- A corrupted i_xattr_inline_size of 0 would cause header pointer
calculation to point past the end of the block
- A corrupted xh_count of 20041 with inline_size of 256 would cause
array access beyond the 7 entries that actually fit, leading to
use-after-free when accessing freed memory pages
The validation uses the correct inline_size (from di->i_xattr_inline_size)
rather than block size, ensuring accurate bounds checking for inline
xattrs specifically.
Reported-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab0ad25088673470d2d9
Tested-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251111073831.2027072-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/ [v1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117063217.5690-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v2]
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Moved validation from ocfs2_xattr_list_entries() to
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() to use correct inline size calculation
(suggested by Heming Zhao)
- Added validation of i_xattr_inline_size before use
- Added validation of xattr entry count against inline space
- Changed return value to -EFSCORRUPTED for consistency
---
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index d70a20d29e3e..98fd4f3f2d2d 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -971,13 +971,39 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode,
struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
int ret = 0;
+ u16 xattr_count;
+ size_t max_entries;
+ u16 inline_size;
if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL))
return ret;
+ inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+ /* Validate inline size is reasonable */
+ if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
+ inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) {
+ ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
+ "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n",
+ inline_size,
+ (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *)
- ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
- le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size));
+ ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size);
+
+ xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count);
+ max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) /
+ sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry);
+
+ if (xattr_count > max_entries) {
+ ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
+ "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n",
+ xattr_count, max_entries,
+ (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
ret = ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(inode, header, buffer, buffer_size);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list
2025-11-17 11:42 [PATCH v3] ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list Deepanshu Kartikey
@ 2025-11-19 15:36 ` Heming Zhao
2025-11-20 1:36 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Heming Zhao @ 2025-11-19 15:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Deepanshu Kartikey
Cc: mark, jlbec, joseph.qi, ocfs2-devel, linux-kernel,
syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9
On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 05:12:24PM +0530, Deepanshu Kartikey wrote:
> Add comprehensive validation of inline xattr metadata in
> ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() to prevent out-of-bounds access and
> use-after-free bugs when processing corrupted inline xattrs.
>
> The patch adds two critical validations:
>
> 1. Validates i_xattr_inline_size before use:
> - Ensures it does not exceed block size
> - Ensures it is at least large enough for xattr header
> - Prevents pointer arithmetic with corrupted size values that could
> point outside the inode block
>
> 2. Validates xattr entry count (xh_count):
> - Calculates maximum entries that can fit in the inline space
> - Rejects counts that exceed this limit
> - Prevents out-of-bounds array access in subsequent code
>
> Without these checks, a corrupted filesystem with invalid inline xattr
> metadata can cause the code to access memory beyond the allocated space.
> For example:
> - A corrupted i_xattr_inline_size of 0 would cause header pointer
> calculation to point past the end of the block
> - A corrupted xh_count of 20041 with inline_size of 256 would cause
> array access beyond the 7 entries that actually fit, leading to
> use-after-free when accessing freed memory pages
The following patch code is LGTM, but I can't understand the meaning of above
xh_cont:20041. Please show more details for the value 20041.
In my view,
the sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header) is 16 (by: 2+2+2+2+(4+2+2)+0)
the sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry) is 16 (by: 4+2+1+1+8).
when the inline_size is 256.
the max number of entries for inline mode: (256-16) / 16 = 15.
therefore, the xh_count of 22 (by: 15+7) corresponds to a value that is 7
entries beyond the boundary.
Thanks,
Heming
>
> The validation uses the correct inline_size (from di->i_xattr_inline_size)
> rather than block size, ensuring accurate bounds checking for inline
> xattrs specifically.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab0ad25088673470d2d9
> Tested-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Suggested-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251111073831.2027072-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/ [v1]
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117063217.5690-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v2]
> Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changes in v3:
> - Moved validation from ocfs2_xattr_list_entries() to
> ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() to use correct inline size calculation
> (suggested by Heming Zhao)
> - Added validation of i_xattr_inline_size before use
> - Added validation of xattr entry count against inline space
> - Changed return value to -EFSCORRUPTED for consistency
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> index d70a20d29e3e..98fd4f3f2d2d 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> @@ -971,13 +971,39 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode,
> struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
> struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
> int ret = 0;
> + u16 xattr_count;
> + size_t max_entries;
> + u16 inline_size;
>
> if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL))
> return ret;
>
> + inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size);
> +
> + /* Validate inline size is reasonable */
> + if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
> + inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) {
> + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
> + "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n",
> + inline_size,
> + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + }
> +
> header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *)
> - ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
> - le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size));
> + ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size);
> +
> + xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count);
> + max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) /
> + sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry);
> +
> + if (xattr_count > max_entries) {
> + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
> + "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n",
> + xattr_count, max_entries,
> + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + }
>
> ret = ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(inode, header, buffer, buffer_size);
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list
2025-11-19 15:36 ` Heming Zhao
@ 2025-11-20 1:36 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Deepanshu Kartikey @ 2025-11-20 1:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heming Zhao
Cc: mark, jlbec, joseph.qi, ocfs2-devel, linux-kernel,
syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9
On Wed, Nov 19, 2025 at 9:06 PM Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> wrote:
> The following patch code is LGTM, but I can't understand the meaning of above
> xh_cont:20041. Please show more details for the value 20041.
The value 20041 is the actual corrupted xh_count from the syzbot
reproducer's filesystem image.
> In my view,
> the sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header) is 16 (by: 2+2+2+2+(4+2+2)+0)
> the sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry) is 16 (by: 4+2+1+1+8).
> when the inline_size is 256.
> the max number of entries for inline mode: (256-16) / 16 = 15.
> therefore, the xh_count of 22 (by: 15+7) corresponds to a value that is 7
> entries beyond the boundary.
You're absolutely right! I made an error in my commit message - the
max is 15 entries, not 7.
I'll send v4 with the corrected example using xh_count of 22 as you
suggested, which is clearer than the raw syzbot value of 20041.
Thanks for catching this!
Deepanshu
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2025-11-17 11:42 [PATCH v3] ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list Deepanshu Kartikey
2025-11-19 15:36 ` Heming Zhao
2025-11-20 1:36 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
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