From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 8/9] x86/vmscape: Fix conflicting attack-vector controls with =force
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 22:20:46 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251201-vmscape-bhb-v6-8-d610dd515714@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251201-vmscape-bhb-v6-0-d610dd515714@linux.intel.com>
vmscape=force option currently defaults to AUTO mitigation. This is not
correct because attack-vector controls overrides a mitigation in AUTO mode.
This prevents a user from being able to force VMSCAPE mitigation when it
conflicts with attack-vector controls.
Kernel should deploy a forced mitigation irrespective of attack vectors.
Instead of AUTO, use VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON that wins over attack-vector
controls.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 61c3b4ae131f39fd716a54ba46d255844b1bb609..58cd26e4f4c385a10230912666c02dbb05e71cba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
enum vmscape_mitigations {
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+ VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER,
@@ -3205,6 +3206,7 @@ enum vmscape_mitigations {
static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+ /* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON] */
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER] = "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER] = "Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace",
@@ -3224,7 +3226,7 @@ static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
- vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+ vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
} else {
pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
}
@@ -3254,6 +3256,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
/*
* CPUs with BHI_CTRL(ADL and newer) can avoid the IBPB and use BHB
* clear sequence. These CPUs are only vulnerable to the BHI variant
@@ -3379,6 +3382,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
break;
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-02 6:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-02 6:18 [PATCH v6 0/9] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop() Pawan Gupta
2026-01-01 12:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-06 4:29 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:19 ` [PATCH v6 2/9] x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs Pawan Gupta
2025-12-10 12:31 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-12-10 13:35 ` David Laight
2025-12-10 15:42 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-12-14 18:38 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-14 19:02 ` David Laight
2025-12-15 18:01 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-15 21:05 ` David Laight
2025-12-14 17:16 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-01-24 19:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-05 0:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:19 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:19 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch() Pawan Gupta
2025-12-10 16:15 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-12-02 6:19 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:20 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush Pawan Gupta
2025-12-11 10:06 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-12-11 10:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-12-14 18:45 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-02 6:20 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-12-11 14:26 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-12-02 6:20 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2025-12-02 6:21 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
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