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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	chao.gao@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 23:54:08 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260112235408.168200-17-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260112235408.168200-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

Now that KVM exposes the APX feature to guests on APX-capable systems,
extend the selftests to validate XCR0 configuration and state management.

Since APX repurposes the XSAVE area previously used by MPX in the
non-compacted format, add a check to ensure that MPX states are not set
when APX is enabled.

Also, load non-init APX state data in the guest so that XSTATE_BV[APX] is
set, allowing validation of APX state testing.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h     |  1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c  |  6 ++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c       | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
index 57d62a425109..6a1da26780ea 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct xstate {
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR		BIT_ULL(15)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG		BIT_ULL(17)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA	BIT_ULL(18)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_APX		BIT_ULL(19)
 
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512		(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK | \
 					 XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
index f2c7a1c297e3..2b7aa4cca011 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
@@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ static void __attribute__((__flatten__)) guest_code(void *arg)
 			asm volatile ("vmovupd %0, %%zmm16" :: "m" (buffer));
 		}
 
+		if (supported_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_APX) {
+			/* mov $0xcccccccc, %r16 */
+			asm volatile (".byte 0xd5, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xcc,"
+				      "0xcc, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00");
+		}
+
 		if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
 			uint64_t bounds[2] = { 10, 0xffffffffull };
 			uint64_t output[2] = { };
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
index d038c1571729..e3d3af5ab6f2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
@@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ do {									\
 		       __supported, (xfeatures));			\
 } while (0)
 
+/*
+ * Verify that mutually exclusive architectural features do not overlap.
+ * For example, APX and MPX must never be reported as supported together.
+ */
+#define ASSERT_XFEATURE_CONFLICT(supported_xcr0, xfeatures, conflicts)			\
+do {											\
+	uint64_t __supported = (supported_xcr0) & ((xfeatures) | (conflicts));		\
+											\
+	__GUEST_ASSERT((__supported & (xfeatures)) != (xfeatures) ||			\
+		       !(__supported & (conflicts)),					\
+		       "supported = 0x%lx, xfeatures = 0x%llx, conflicts = 0x%llx",	\
+		       __supported, (xfeatures), (conflicts));				\
+} while (0)
+
 static void guest_code(void)
 {
 	uint64_t initial_xcr0;
@@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ static void guest_code(void)
 	ASSERT_ALL_OR_NONE_XFEATURE(supported_xcr0,
 				    XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE);
 
+	/* Check APX by ensuring MPX is not exposed concurrently */
+	ASSERT_XFEATURE_CONFLICT(supported_xcr0,
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_APX,
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
 	vector = xsetbv_safe(0, XFEATURE_MASK_FP);
 	__GUEST_ASSERT(!vector,
 		       "Expected success on XSETBV(FP), got %s",
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-01-13  0:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-12 23:53 [PATCH v2 00/16] KVM: x86: Enable APX for guests Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] KVM: x86: Rename register accessors to be GPR-specific Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  1:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  1:32     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-09 23:28       ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-10  1:23       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 22:05         ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-10 23:12           ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] KVM: x86: Refactor GPR accessors to differentiate register access types Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  1:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  1:32     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] KVM: x86: Implement accessors for extended GPRs Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  1:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  1:32     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] KVM: VMX: Introduce unified instruction info structure Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  4:21   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  1:33     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-13  1:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] KVM: VMX: Refactor instruction information retrieval Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] KVM: VMX: Refactor GPR index retrieval from exit qualification Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  4:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-12 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] KVM: VMX: Support extended register index in exit handling Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] KVM: nVMX: Propagate the extended instruction info field Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] KVM: emulate: Support EGPR accessing and tracking Chang S. Bae
2026-03-05  4:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] KVM: emulate: Handle EGPR index and REX2-incompatible opcodes Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] KVM: emulate: Support REX2-prefixed opcode decode Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] KVM: emulate: Reject EVEX-prefixed instructions Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] KVM: x86: Guard valid XCR0.APX settings Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] KVM: x86: Expose APX foundational feature bit to guests Chang S. Bae
2026-01-19  5:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-20 18:07     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-01-20 20:50       ` Chang S. Bae
2026-01-21 19:59         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-01-12 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] KVM: x86: Expose APX sub-features " Chang S. Bae
2026-01-12 23:54 ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2026-03-05  4:28   ` [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  1:33     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-11 18:42       ` Paolo Bonzini

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