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From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de>,
	Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Maciej Wieczor-Retman <m.wieczorretman@pm.me>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 15:35:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260219233600.154313-5-sohil.mehta@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260219233600.154313-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>

The EMULATE mode of vsyscall maps the vsyscall page with a high kernel
address directly into user address space. Reading the vsyscall page in
EMULATE mode would cause LASS to trigger a #GP.

Fixing the LASS violation in EMULATE mode would require complex
instruction decoding because the resulting #GP does not include any
useful error information, and the vsyscall address is not readily
available in the RIP.

The EMULATE mode has been deprecated since 2022 and can only be enabled
using the command line parameter vsyscall=emulate. See commit
bf00745e7791 ("x86/vsyscall: Remove CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE") for
details. At this point, no one is expected to be using this insecure
mode. The rare usages that need it obviously do not care about security.

Disable LASS when EMULATE mode is requested to avoid breaking legacy
user software. Also, update the vsyscall documentation to reflect this.
LASS will only be supported if vsyscall mode is set to XONLY (default)
or NONE.

Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
Eventually, the plan is to get rid of the EMULATE mode altogether. Linus
and AndyL seem to be okay with such a change. However, those changes are
beyond the scope of this series.
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++-
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c           | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9e3ae4071c4b..28aaebd9ca49 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -8283,7 +8283,9 @@ Kernel parameters
 
 			emulate     Vsyscalls turn into traps and are emulated
 			            reasonably safely.  The vsyscall page is
-				    readable.
+				    readable.  This disables the Linear
+				    Address Space Separation (LASS) security
+				    feature and makes the system less secure.
 
 			xonly       [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.  The vsyscall
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index b34c8763d5e9..e0faa4ca0382 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
 		else
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LASS) && vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) {
+			cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_LASS);
+			setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LASS);
+			pr_warn_once("x86/cpu: Disabling LASS due to vsyscall=emulate\n");
+		}
+
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-19 23:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-19 23:35 [PATCH 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with vsyscall emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-02-19 23:35 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code Sohil Mehta
2026-02-19 23:35 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in the #GP handler Sohil Mehta
2026-02-19 23:35 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Sohil Mehta
2026-03-03 15:51   ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-03 21:20     ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-03 22:35       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05  0:10         ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05  1:45           ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-05  6:31             ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-03-05  7:56               ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-05  6:32           ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-02-19 23:35 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-03-03 16:33   ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Dave Hansen
2026-02-19 23:36 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/cpu: Remove LASS restriction on vsyscall emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-03-03 16:37   ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-03 16:27 ` [PATCH 0/5] x86: Enable LASS support with " Dave Hansen

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