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From: "Harry Yoo (Oracle)" <harry@kernel.org>
To: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	 Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	 Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
	Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>, Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>,
	 Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm/slab: handle allow_spin in slab_free_hook() instead of open coding
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 22:11:39 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260624-kmalloc-nolock-fixes-v1-2-fdf4d17351dd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260624-kmalloc-nolock-fixes-v1-0-fdf4d17351dd@kernel.org>

kfree_nolock() deliberately skips slab free hooks that should not be
called in unknown context. However, there is one more place that
needs the same thing: memcg_alloc_abort_single().

Instead of open coding slab_free_hook(), let it handle the allow_spin
parameter. This is required to correctly handle allocation failures due
to memcg.

There are two functional changes from this.

First, memcg_alloc_abort_single() -> slab_free_hook() path no longer
calls free hooks that acquire spinlocks if !allow_spin.

Second, kfree_nolock() now follows init_on_free which has been ignored.

Besides that, no functional change intended.

Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) <harry@kernel.org>
---
 mm/slub.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 32672a92581b..85760c8ff2e2 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -2611,41 +2611,52 @@ struct rcu_delayed_free {
  * - memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook()
  * - alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook()
  *
+ * slab_free_hook() assumes that memcg_slab_free_hook() and
+ * alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook() are already invoked.
+ *
  * Free hooks that must handle missing corresponding alloc hooks:
  * - kmemleak_free_recursive()
  * - kfence_free()
  *
- * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call:
+ * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call
+ * when spinning is allowed:
  * - debug_check_no_locks_freed()
  * - debug_check_no_obj_freed()
  * - __kcsan_check_access()
  */
 static __always_inline
 bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
-		    bool after_rcu_delay)
+		    bool after_rcu_delay, bool allow_spin)
 {
 	/* Are the object contents still accessible? */
 	bool still_accessible = (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) && !after_rcu_delay;
 
-	kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
 	kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
 
-	debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
-
-	if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
-		debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
-
-	/* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
-	if (!still_accessible)
-		__kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
-				     KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
-
-	if (kfence_free(x))
-		return false;
+	if (likely(allow_spin)) {
+		/* These hooks acquire spinlocks */
+		kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
+		debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
+		if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
+			debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
+		/* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
+		if (!still_accessible)
+			__kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
+					     KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
+		if (kfence_free(x))
+			return false;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we
 	 * modify the object.
+	 *
+	 * If KASAN finds a bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() which
+	 * will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically unsafe from
+	 * NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. The sequence of
+	 * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
+	 * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
+	 *  is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
 	 */
 	if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
 		return false;
@@ -2654,6 +2665,7 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
 	if (still_accessible) {
 		struct rcu_delayed_free *delayed_free;
 
+		VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_spin);
 		delayed_free = kmalloc_obj(*delayed_free, GFP_NOWAIT);
 		if (delayed_free) {
 			/*
@@ -2701,8 +2713,11 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
 		set_orig_size(s, x, orig_size);
 
 	}
-	/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
-	return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, false);
+	/*
+	 * KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse.
+	 * Skip quarantine when spinning is not allowed as it uses a spinlock.
+	 */
+	return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, !allow_spin);
 }
 
 static __fastpath_inline
@@ -2714,9 +2729,10 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail,
 	void *next = *head;
 	void *old_tail = *tail;
 	bool init;
+	bool allow_spin = true;
 
 	if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
-		slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false);
+		slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false, allow_spin);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -2731,7 +2747,7 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail,
 		next = get_freepointer(s, object);
 
 		/* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
-		if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false))) {
+		if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin))) {
 			/* Move object to the new freelist */
 			set_freepointer(s, object, *head);
 			*head = object;
@@ -2954,7 +2970,7 @@ static bool __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare(struct kmem_cache *s,
 		memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin);
 		alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1);
 
-		if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true))) {
+		if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true, allow_spin))) {
 			p[i] = p[--sheaf->size];
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -6225,7 +6241,7 @@ static void free_to_pcs_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, void **p)
 		memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin);
 		alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1);
 
-		if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false))) {
+		if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false, allow_spin))) {
 			p[i] = p[--size];
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -6401,11 +6417,12 @@ void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
 	       unsigned long addr)
 {
 	bool allow_spin = true;
+	bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
 
 	memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1, allow_spin);
 	alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
 
-	if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false)))
+	if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin)))
 		return;
 
 	if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) &&
@@ -6422,10 +6439,12 @@ static noinline
 void memcg_alloc_abort_single(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 {
 	struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object);
+	bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
+	bool allow_spin = true;
 
 	alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
 
-	if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false)))
+	if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin)))
 		__slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _RET_IP_);
 }
 #endif
@@ -6456,6 +6475,8 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
 	void *object = delayed_free->object;
 	struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object);
 	struct kmem_cache *s;
+	bool allow_spin = true;
+	bool init;
 
 	kfree(delayed_free);
 
@@ -6469,8 +6490,9 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
 	if (WARN_ON(!(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)))
 		return;
 
+	init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
 	/* resume freeing */
-	if (slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), true)) {
+	if (slab_free_hook(s, object, init, true, allow_spin)) {
 		__slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _THIS_IP_);
 		stat(s, FREE_SLOWPATH);
 	}
@@ -6742,6 +6764,7 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
 	struct kmem_cache *s;
 	void *x = (void *)object;
 	bool allow_spin = false;
+	bool init;
 
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(object)))
 		return;
@@ -6756,33 +6779,10 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
 
 	memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1, allow_spin);
 	alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1);
-	/*
-	 * Unlike slab_free() do NOT call the following:
-	 * kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
-	 * debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
-	 * debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
-	 * __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size, ..);
-	 * kfence_free(x);
-	 * since they take spinlocks or not safe from any context.
-	 */
-	kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
-	/*
-	 * If KASAN finds a kernel bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free()
-	 * which will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically
-	 * unsafe from NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug.
-	 * The sequence of
-	 * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
-	 *  -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
-	 * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
-	 */
-	if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
+
+	init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
+	if (!slab_free_hook(s, x, init, false, allow_spin))
 		return;
-	/*
-	 * memcg, kasan_slab_pre_free are done for 'x'.
-	 * The only thing left is kasan_poison without quarantine,
-	 * since kasan quarantine takes locks and not supported from NMI.
-	 */
-	kasan_slab_free(s, x, false, false, /* skip quarantine */true);
 
 	if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) &&
 			likely(free_to_pcs(s, x, allow_spin)))

-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-24 13:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-24 13:11 [PATCH RFC 0/4] memcg,slab: kmalloc_nolock() fixes Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 1/4] mm/memcontrol: do not drain objcg stock when spinning is not allowed Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 14:30   ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` Harry Yoo (Oracle) [this message]
2026-06-26 14:41   ` [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm/slab: handle allow_spin in slab_free_hook() instead of open coding Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 3/4] mm/slab: fix a deadlock in memcg_alloc_abort_single() Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 14:57   ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 4/4] mm/slab: serialize defer_free_barrier() Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 15:00   ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 16:30 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] memcg,slab: kmalloc_nolock() fixes Alexei Starovoitov
2026-06-24 20:19   ` Harry Yoo
2026-06-26 15:09     ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-26  6:04 ` Harry Yoo
2026-06-26 15:10   ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)

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