From: "Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" <vbabka@kernel.org>
To: "Harry Yoo (Oracle)" <harry@kernel.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>, Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm/slab: handle allow_spin in slab_free_hook() instead of open coding
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 16:41:22 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <91776136-ecaf-4687-be63-a2c074435462@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260624-kmalloc-nolock-fixes-v1-2-fdf4d17351dd@kernel.org>
On 6/24/26 15:11, Harry Yoo (Oracle) wrote:
> kfree_nolock() deliberately skips slab free hooks that should not be
> called in unknown context. However, there is one more place that
> needs the same thing: memcg_alloc_abort_single().
>
> Instead of open coding slab_free_hook(), let it handle the allow_spin
> parameter. This is required to correctly handle allocation failures due
> to memcg.
>
> There are two functional changes from this.
>
> First, memcg_alloc_abort_single() -> slab_free_hook() path no longer
> calls free hooks that acquire spinlocks if !allow_spin.
>
> Second, kfree_nolock() now follows init_on_free which has been ignored.
>
> Besides that, no functional change intended.
>
> Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) <harry@kernel.org>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
> 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 32672a92581b..85760c8ff2e2 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -2611,41 +2611,52 @@ struct rcu_delayed_free {
> * - memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook()
> * - alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook()
> *
> + * slab_free_hook() assumes that memcg_slab_free_hook() and
> + * alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook() are already invoked.
> + *
> * Free hooks that must handle missing corresponding alloc hooks:
> * - kmemleak_free_recursive()
> * - kfence_free()
> *
> - * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call:
> + * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call
> + * when spinning is allowed:
> * - debug_check_no_locks_freed()
> * - debug_check_no_obj_freed()
> * - __kcsan_check_access()
> */
> static __always_inline
> bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
> - bool after_rcu_delay)
> + bool after_rcu_delay, bool allow_spin)
> {
> /* Are the object contents still accessible? */
> bool still_accessible = (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) && !after_rcu_delay;
>
> - kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
> kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
>
> - debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
> -
> - if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
> - debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
> -
> - /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
> - if (!still_accessible)
> - __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
> - KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
> -
> - if (kfence_free(x))
> - return false;
> + if (likely(allow_spin)) {
> + /* These hooks acquire spinlocks */
> + kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
> + debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
This line shouldn't be here?
> + if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
> + debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
> + /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
> + if (!still_accessible)
> + __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
> + KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
> + if (kfence_free(x))
> + return false;
The whole block now misses free space lines that it had.
> + }
>
> /*
> * Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we
> * modify the object.
> + *
> + * If KASAN finds a bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() which
> + * will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically unsafe from
> + * NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. The sequence of
> + * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
> + * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
> + * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
> */
> if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
> return false;
> @@ -2654,6 +2665,7 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
> if (still_accessible) {
> struct rcu_delayed_free *delayed_free;
>
> + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_spin);
> delayed_free = kmalloc_obj(*delayed_free, GFP_NOWAIT);
> if (delayed_free) {
> /*
> @@ -2701,8 +2713,11 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
> set_orig_size(s, x, orig_size);
>
> }
> - /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
> - return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, false);
> + /*
> + * KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse.
> + * Skip quarantine when spinning is not allowed as it uses a spinlock.
> + */
> + return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, !allow_spin);
> }
>
> static __fastpath_inline
> @@ -2714,9 +2729,10 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail,
> void *next = *head;
> void *old_tail = *tail;
> bool init;
> + bool allow_spin = true;
>
> if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
> - slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false);
> + slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false, allow_spin);
> return false;
> }
>
> @@ -2731,7 +2747,7 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail,
> next = get_freepointer(s, object);
>
> /* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false))) {
> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin))) {
> /* Move object to the new freelist */
> set_freepointer(s, object, *head);
> *head = object;
> @@ -2954,7 +2970,7 @@ static bool __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare(struct kmem_cache *s,
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin);
> alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1);
>
> - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true))) {
> + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true, allow_spin))) {
> p[i] = p[--sheaf->size];
> continue;
> }
> @@ -6225,7 +6241,7 @@ static void free_to_pcs_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, void **p)
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin);
> alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1);
>
> - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false))) {
> + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false, allow_spin))) {
> p[i] = p[--size];
> continue;
> }
> @@ -6401,11 +6417,12 @@ void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object,
> unsigned long addr)
> {
> bool allow_spin = true;
> + bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
>
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1, allow_spin);
> alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>
> - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false)))
> + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin)))
> return;
>
> if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) &&
> @@ -6422,10 +6439,12 @@ static noinline
> void memcg_alloc_abort_single(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> {
> struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object);
> + bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
> + bool allow_spin = true;
>
> alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1);
>
> - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false)))
> + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin)))
> __slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _RET_IP_);
> }
> #endif
> @@ -6456,6 +6475,8 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
> void *object = delayed_free->object;
> struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object);
> struct kmem_cache *s;
> + bool allow_spin = true;
> + bool init;
>
> kfree(delayed_free);
>
> @@ -6469,8 +6490,9 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
> if (WARN_ON(!(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)))
> return;
>
> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
> /* resume freeing */
> - if (slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), true)) {
> + if (slab_free_hook(s, object, init, true, allow_spin)) {
> __slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _THIS_IP_);
> stat(s, FREE_SLOWPATH);
> }
> @@ -6742,6 +6764,7 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
> struct kmem_cache *s;
> void *x = (void *)object;
> bool allow_spin = false;
> + bool init;
>
> if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(object)))
> return;
> @@ -6756,33 +6779,10 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
>
> memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1, allow_spin);
> alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1);
> - /*
> - * Unlike slab_free() do NOT call the following:
> - * kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
> - * debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
> - * debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
> - * __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size, ..);
> - * kfence_free(x);
> - * since they take spinlocks or not safe from any context.
> - */
> - kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
> - /*
> - * If KASAN finds a kernel bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free()
> - * which will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically
> - * unsafe from NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug.
> - * The sequence of
> - * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI
> - * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
> - * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
> - */
> - if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
> +
> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s);
> + if (!slab_free_hook(s, x, init, false, allow_spin))
> return;
> - /*
> - * memcg, kasan_slab_pre_free are done for 'x'.
> - * The only thing left is kasan_poison without quarantine,
> - * since kasan quarantine takes locks and not supported from NMI.
> - */
> - kasan_slab_free(s, x, false, false, /* skip quarantine */true);
>
> if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) &&
> likely(free_to_pcs(s, x, allow_spin)))
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-26 14:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-24 13:11 [PATCH RFC 0/4] memcg,slab: kmalloc_nolock() fixes Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 1/4] mm/memcontrol: do not drain objcg stock when spinning is not allowed Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 14:30 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm/slab: handle allow_spin in slab_free_hook() instead of open coding Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 14:41 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) [this message]
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 3/4] mm/slab: fix a deadlock in memcg_alloc_abort_single() Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 14:57 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 13:11 ` [PATCH RFC 4/4] mm/slab: serialize defer_free_barrier() Harry Yoo (Oracle)
2026-06-26 15:00 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-24 16:30 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] memcg,slab: kmalloc_nolock() fixes Alexei Starovoitov
2026-06-24 20:19 ` Harry Yoo
2026-06-26 15:09 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-06-26 6:04 ` Harry Yoo
2026-06-26 15:10 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
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