* [PATCH v2 0/2] libceph: validate OSD sparse-read extent maps (+KUnit)
@ 2026-07-14 11:51 Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation Michael Bommarito
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Michael Bommarito @ 2026-07-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ilya Dryomov; +Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable
Patch 1 is the fix from v1 (unchanged), now carrying Viacheslav Dubeyko's
Reviewed-by. Patch 2 adds the KUnit coverage he asked for.
osd_sparse_read() checks that the sparse-read data length matches the summed
extent lengths but never checks that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic
and stays inside the original request range, so a malformed authenticated
OSD reply can advance the message-data cursor past the request buffer and
hit the BUG_ON(!*length) in ceph_msg_data_next(). Patch 1 rejects such maps
before advancing the cursor.
The KUnit suite in patch 2 drives the real osd_sparse_read() state machine
over a synthesized reply (no OSD, no network). Confirmed before/after on
v7.2-rc3: without patch 1 the out-of-range case faults in
ceph_msg_data_next() while the in-range control passes (1 pass, 1 fail);
with patch 1 both pass.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/ceph-devel/20260710022837.libceph-sparse-v1@bommarito/
Michael Bommarito (2):
libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance
libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation
net/ceph/Kconfig | 12 +++
net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 34 +++++++++
3 files changed, 192 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/2] libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance
2026-07-14 11:51 [PATCH v2 0/2] libceph: validate OSD sparse-read extent maps (+KUnit) Michael Bommarito
@ 2026-07-14 11:51 ` Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation Michael Bommarito
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Michael Bommarito @ 2026-07-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ilya Dryomov; +Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable
net/ceph/osd_client.c:osd_sparse_read() validates that the sparse-read
data length matches the summed extent lengths, but it does not validate
that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic and lies inside the original
request range. A malformed authenticated OSD reply can advertise a
far-forward nonzero extent offset with a matching data length and make
the client advance the message-data cursor beyond the request buffer.
This reaches the BUG_ON(!*length) assertion in ceph_msg_data_next() from
the client receive path.
Impact: A malicious or compromised authenticated Ceph OSD peer can crash
a kernel Ceph client via a malformed sparse-read reply.
Reject sparse extent maps that overflow, move backwards, overlap, or
extend outside the original sparse-read request before advancing the
cursor.
Fixes: f628d7999727 ("libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
---
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
index 2ff00070c1810..76ba3abdad9b1 100644
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -5799,6 +5800,31 @@ static inline void convert_extent_map(struct ceph_sparse_read *sr)
}
#endif
+static bool sparse_extent_map_valid(struct ceph_sparse_read *sr)
+{
+ u64 req_end, pos;
+ int i;
+
+ if (check_add_overflow(sr->sr_req_off, sr->sr_req_len, &req_end))
+ return false;
+
+ pos = sr->sr_req_off;
+ for (i = 0; i < sr->sr_count; i++) {
+ struct ceph_sparse_extent *ext = &sr->sr_extent[i];
+ u64 end;
+
+ if (ext->off < pos)
+ return false;
+ if (check_add_overflow(ext->off, ext->len, &end))
+ return false;
+ if (end > req_end)
+ return false;
+ pos = end;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con,
struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor,
char **pbuf)
@@ -5856,6 +5882,10 @@ static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con,
case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_PRE:
/* Convert sr_datalen to host-endian */
sr->sr_datalen = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)sr->sr_datalen);
+ if (!sparse_extent_map_valid(sr)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("invalid sparse extent map\n");
+ return -EREMOTEIO;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
len += sr->sr_extent[i].len;
if (sr->sr_datalen != len) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation
2026-07-14 11:51 [PATCH v2 0/2] libceph: validate OSD sparse-read extent maps (+KUnit) Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance Michael Bommarito
@ 2026-07-14 11:51 ` Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 17:43 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Michael Bommarito @ 2026-07-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ilya Dryomov; +Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable
Add KUnit coverage for the sparse-read extent-map validation added by the
previous patch. The tests drive the real osd_sparse_read() state machine
over a synthesized OSD reply (no OSD or network): an in-range single
extent is accepted and advances the cursor, and an extent whose offset
lies outside the original request range is rejected with -EREMOTEIO before
the message-data cursor is advanced.
The suite is included from osd_client.c so it can exercise the static
sparse-read parser and cursor-advance helpers without exporting test-only
symbols, guarded by CONFIG_CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
---
net/ceph/Kconfig | 12 +++
net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 4 +
3 files changed, 162 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
diff --git a/net/ceph/Kconfig b/net/ceph/Kconfig
index 7e2528cde4b94..6b78fe4a0f8a4 100644
--- a/net/ceph/Kconfig
+++ b/net/ceph/Kconfig
@@ -45,3 +45,15 @@ config CEPH_LIB_USE_DNS_RESOLVER
Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.rst
If unsure, say N.
+
+config CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST
+ bool "KUnit tests for the Ceph core library" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ depends on CEPH_LIB && KUNIT
+ default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+ help
+ This builds KUnit coverage for selected Ceph core-library parser
+ and state-machine helpers. The tests exercise internal libceph
+ behavior with synthesized state and are intended for developer
+ validation rather than production systems.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c b/net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..713f24675f68f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * KUnit coverage for net/ceph/osd_client.c internals.
+ *
+ * Included from osd_client.c so the test can drive the real static sparse-read
+ * parser and cursor-advance helper without exporting test-only symbols.
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+
+struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test {
+ struct ceph_osd osd;
+ struct ceph_connection con;
+ struct ceph_msg *msg;
+ struct ceph_msg_data_cursor cursor;
+ struct ceph_osd_request *req;
+ struct page **pages;
+ struct page *page;
+};
+
+static int ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_init(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx);
+
+ ctx->req = kunit_kzalloc(test, struct_size(ctx->req, r_ops, 1),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->req);
+
+ ctx->pages = kunit_kcalloc(test, 1, sizeof(*ctx->pages), GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->pages);
+
+ ctx->page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->page);
+ ctx->pages[0] = ctx->page;
+
+ ctx->msg = ceph_msg_new2(CEPH_MSG_OSD_OPREPLY, 0, 1, GFP_KERNEL, true);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->msg);
+
+ osd_init(&ctx->osd);
+ ctx->osd.o_sparse_op_idx = -1;
+ ceph_init_sparse_read(&ctx->osd.o_sparse_read);
+
+ request_init(ctx->req);
+ ctx->req->r_tid = 1;
+ ctx->req->r_num_ops = 1;
+ osd_req_op_extent_init(ctx->req, 0, CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ,
+ 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ctx->req->r_ops[0].op, CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ);
+
+ insert_request(&ctx->osd.o_requests, ctx->req);
+
+ ctx->msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(ctx->req->r_tid);
+ ceph_msg_data_add_pages(ctx->msg, ctx->pages, PAGE_SIZE, 0, false);
+ ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&ctx->cursor, ctx->msg, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ ctx->con.private = &ctx->osd;
+ ctx->con.in_msg = ctx->msg;
+
+ test->priv = ctx;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_exit(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+
+ if (ctx->req && !RB_EMPTY_NODE(&ctx->req->r_node))
+ erase_request(&ctx->osd.o_requests, ctx->req);
+ ceph_init_sparse_read(&ctx->osd.o_sparse_read);
+ if (ctx->msg)
+ ceph_msg_put(ctx->msg);
+ if (ctx->page)
+ __free_page(ctx->page);
+}
+
+static int ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(struct kunit *test,
+ u64 off, u64 len, u32 datalen)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
+ struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &ctx->osd.o_sparse_read;
+ char *buf = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(sr->sr_count));
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)&sr->sr_count);
+
+ sr->sr_count = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(1);
+ ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(*sr->sr_extent));
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, sr->sr_extent);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)sr->sr_extent);
+
+ sr->sr_extent[0].off = (__force u64)cpu_to_le64(off);
+ sr->sr_extent[0].len = (__force u64)cpu_to_le64(len);
+ ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(sr->sr_datalen));
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)&sr->sr_datalen);
+
+ sr->sr_datalen = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(datalen);
+ return osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
+}
+
+static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_in_range_extent(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
+ struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &ctx->osd.o_sparse_read;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(test, 0, 16, 16);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ret, 16);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, sr->sr_pos, 16);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ctx->cursor.sr_resid, 16);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ctx->cursor.resid, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_rejects_out_of_range_extent(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(test, PAGE_SIZE + 16, 16, 16);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ret, -EREMOTEIO);
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_cases[] = {
+ KUNIT_CASE(ceph_osd_sparse_read_in_range_extent),
+ KUNIT_CASE(ceph_osd_sparse_read_rejects_out_of_range_extent),
+ {}
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_suite = {
+ .name = "ceph_osd_sparse_read",
+ .init = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_init,
+ .exit = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_exit,
+ .test_cases = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_suite);
diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
index 76ba3abdad9b1..b9ab9608ec88e 100644
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -5951,3 +5951,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_operations osd_con_ops = {
.handle_auth_done = osd_handle_auth_done,
.handle_auth_bad_method = osd_handle_auth_bad_method,
};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST
+#include "osd_client-kunit.c"
+#endif
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation Michael Bommarito
@ 2026-07-14 17:43 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Viacheslav Dubeyko @ 2026-07-14 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Bommarito, Ilya Dryomov; +Cc: ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable
On Tue, 2026-07-14 at 07:51 -0400, Michael Bommarito wrote:
> Add KUnit coverage for the sparse-read extent-map validation added by
> the
> previous patch. The tests drive the real osd_sparse_read() state
> machine
> over a synthesized OSD reply (no OSD or network): an in-range single
> extent is accepted and advances the cursor, and an extent whose
> offset
> lies outside the original request range is rejected with -EREMOTEIO
> before
> the message-data cursor is advanced.
>
> The suite is included from osd_client.c so it can exercise the static
> sparse-read parser and cursor-advance helpers without exporting test-
> only
> symbols, guarded by CONFIG_CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST.
>
> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
> Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
> ---
> net/ceph/Kconfig | 12 +++
> net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c | 146
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> net/ceph/osd_client.c | 4 +
> 3 files changed, 162 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
>
> diff --git a/net/ceph/Kconfig b/net/ceph/Kconfig
> index 7e2528cde4b94..6b78fe4a0f8a4 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/Kconfig
> +++ b/net/ceph/Kconfig
> @@ -45,3 +45,15 @@ config CEPH_LIB_USE_DNS_RESOLVER
> Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.rst
>
> If unsure, say N.
> +
> +config CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST
> + bool "KUnit tests for the Ceph core library" if
> !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
> + depends on CEPH_LIB && KUNIT
> + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
> + help
> + This builds KUnit coverage for selected Ceph core-library
> parser
> + and state-machine helpers. The tests exercise internal
> libceph
> + behavior with synthesized state and are intended for
> developer
> + validation rather than production systems.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c b/net/ceph/osd_client-
> kunit.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..713f24675f68f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client-kunit.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * KUnit coverage for net/ceph/osd_client.c internals.
> + *
> + * Included from osd_client.c so the test can drive the real static
> sparse-read
> + * parser and cursor-advance helper without exporting test-only
> symbols.
> + */
> +
> +#include <kunit/test.h>
> +
> +struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test {
> + struct ceph_osd osd;
> + struct ceph_connection con;
> + struct ceph_msg *msg;
> + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor cursor;
> + struct ceph_osd_request *req;
> + struct page **pages;
> + struct page *page;
> +};
> +
> +static int ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_init(struct kunit *test)
> +{
> + struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx;
> +
> + ctx = kunit_kzalloc(test, sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx);
> +
> + ctx->req = kunit_kzalloc(test, struct_size(ctx->req, r_ops,
> 1),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->req);
> +
> + ctx->pages = kunit_kcalloc(test, 1, sizeof(*ctx->pages),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->pages);
> +
> + ctx->page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->page);
> + ctx->pages[0] = ctx->page;
> +
> + ctx->msg = ceph_msg_new2(CEPH_MSG_OSD_OPREPLY, 0, 1,
> GFP_KERNEL, true);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, ctx->msg);
> +
> + osd_init(&ctx->osd);
> + ctx->osd.o_sparse_op_idx = -1;
> + ceph_init_sparse_read(&ctx->osd.o_sparse_read);
> +
> + request_init(ctx->req);
> + ctx->req->r_tid = 1;
> + ctx->req->r_num_ops = 1;
> + osd_req_op_extent_init(ctx->req, 0, CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ,
> + 0, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ctx->req->r_ops[0].op,
> CEPH_OSD_OP_SPARSE_READ);
> +
> + insert_request(&ctx->osd.o_requests, ctx->req);
> +
> + ctx->msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(ctx->req->r_tid);
> + ceph_msg_data_add_pages(ctx->msg, ctx->pages, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
> false);
> + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&ctx->cursor, ctx->msg,
> PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + ctx->con.private = &ctx->osd;
> + ctx->con.in_msg = ctx->msg;
> +
> + test->priv = ctx;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_exit(struct kunit *test)
> +{
> + struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
> +
> + if (!ctx)
> + return;
> +
> + if (ctx->req && !RB_EMPTY_NODE(&ctx->req->r_node))
> + erase_request(&ctx->osd.o_requests, ctx->req);
> + ceph_init_sparse_read(&ctx->osd.o_sparse_read);
> + if (ctx->msg)
> + ceph_msg_put(ctx->msg);
> + if (ctx->page)
> + __free_page(ctx->page);
> +}
> +
> +static int ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(struct kunit *test,
> + u64 off, u64 len,
> u32 datalen)
> +{
> + struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
> + struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &ctx->osd.o_sparse_read;
> + char *buf = NULL;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(sr->sr_count));
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)&sr->sr_count);
> +
> + sr->sr_count = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(1);
> + ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(*sr->sr_extent));
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(test, sr->sr_extent);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)sr->sr_extent);
> +
> + sr->sr_extent[0].off = (__force u64)cpu_to_le64(off);
> + sr->sr_extent[0].len = (__force u64)cpu_to_le64(len);
> + ret = osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, ret, (int)sizeof(sr->sr_datalen));
> + KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, buf, (char *)&sr->sr_datalen);
> +
> + sr->sr_datalen = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(datalen);
> + return osd_sparse_read(&ctx->con, &ctx->cursor, &buf);
> +}
> +
> +static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_in_range_extent(struct kunit *test)
> +{
> + struct ceph_osd_sparse_read_test *ctx = test->priv;
> + struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &ctx->osd.o_sparse_read;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(test, 0, 16, 16);
> +
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ret, 16);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, sr->sr_pos, 16);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ctx->cursor.sr_resid, 16);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ctx->cursor.resid, PAGE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +static void ceph_osd_sparse_read_rejects_out_of_range_extent(struct
> kunit *test)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = ceph_osd_sparse_read_feed_one_extent(test, PAGE_SIZE +
> 16, 16, 16);
> +
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ret, -EREMOTEIO);
> +}
> +
> +static struct kunit_case ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_cases[] = {
> + KUNIT_CASE(ceph_osd_sparse_read_in_range_extent),
> + KUNIT_CASE(ceph_osd_sparse_read_rejects_out_of_range_extent)
> ,
> + {}
> +};
> +
> +static struct kunit_suite ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_suite = {
> + .name = "ceph_osd_sparse_read",
> + .init = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_init,
> + .exit = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_exit,
> + .test_cases = ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_cases,
> +};
> +
> +kunit_test_suite(ceph_osd_sparse_read_test_suite);
> diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
> index 76ba3abdad9b1..b9ab9608ec88e 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
> @@ -5951,3 +5951,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_operations
> osd_con_ops = {
> .handle_auth_done = osd_handle_auth_done,
> .handle_auth_bad_method = osd_handle_auth_bad_method,
> };
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_LIB_KUNIT_TEST
> +#include "osd_client-kunit.c"
> +#endif
Usually, KUnit test requires .kunitconfig file and I don't see it.
Because, there are several ways to run Kunit tests: (1) python script,
(2) running kernel module.
The osd_client-kunit.c should contains:
MODULE_LICENSE()
MODULE_AUTHOR()
MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
MODULE_IMPORT_NS("EXPORTED_FOR_KUNIT_TESTING");
The tested function needs to be properly exported:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(<function_name>);
Thanks,
Slava.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-07-14 17:43 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-07-14 11:51 [PATCH v2 0/2] libceph: validate OSD sparse-read extent maps (+KUnit) Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 11:51 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] libceph: add KUnit coverage for OSD sparse-read extent validation Michael Bommarito
2026-07-14 17:43 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
Powered by JetHome