[PATCH net] sctp: fix possible out-of-bounds read in SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES

[PATCH net] sctp: fix possible out-of-bounds read in SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES

[luoqing]

From: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>

While processing SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES in
sctp_process_param(), the length field is subtracted from
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) and stored in a __u16 variable. If the
length is less than sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) (4 bytes), the unsigned
subtraction underflows, resulting in a value near 0xFFFF. The subsequent
for() loop then iterates far beyond the parameter boundaries, causing an
out-of-bounds read.

sctp_verify_param() performs no length validation for this parameter
type, so a malformed parameter with insufficient length can reach
sctp_process_param() through the INIT/INIT-ACK/COOKIE-ECHO processing
path.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 236e25abc7a4..ebf791969454 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2169,12 +2169,19 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
 	case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
-	case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
 	case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
 		break;
+
+	case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
+		if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
+			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+						     chunk, err_chunk);
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		}
+		break;
 	case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
 		if (ntohs(param.p->length) != sizeof(*param.aind)) {
 			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
@@ -2600,6 +2607,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 			asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
 
 		/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
+		if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
+			break;
+
 		sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
 		if (sat)
 			sat /= sizeof(__u16);
-- 
2.25.1

Re: [PATCH net] sctp: fix possible out-of-bounds read in SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES

[Xin Long]

On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 5:23 AM luoqing <l1138897701@163.com> wrote:
>
> From: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
>
> While processing SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES in
> sctp_process_param(), the length field is subtracted from
> sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) and stored in a __u16 variable. If the
> length is less than sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) (4 bytes), the unsigned
> subtraction underflows, resulting in a value near 0xFFFF. The subsequent
> for() loop then iterates far beyond the parameter boundaries, causing an
> out-of-bounds read.
>
> sctp_verify_param() performs no length validation for this parameter
> type, so a malformed parameter with insufficient length can reach
> sctp_process_param() through the INIT/INIT-ACK/COOKIE-ECHO processing
> path.
>
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
> ---
>  net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> index 236e25abc7a4..ebf791969454 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> @@ -2169,12 +2169,19 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_verify_param(struct net *net,
>         case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
> -       case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
>         case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
>                 break;
> +
> +       case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
> +               if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
> +                       sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
> +                                                    chunk, err_chunk);
> +                       retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
> +               }
> +               break;
>         case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
>                 if (ntohs(param.p->length) != sizeof(*param.aind)) {
>                         sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
> @@ -2600,6 +2607,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>                         asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
>
>                 /* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
> +               if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
> +                       break;
> +
>                 sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
>                 if (sat)
>                         sat /= sizeof(__u16);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
This is not necessary. Please check sctp_walk_params(),
and I think it's already validated this for all params:

  ntohs(pos.p->length) >= sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)

Thanks.