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* [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err
@ 2026-09-12 15:43 Quanye Yang via B4 Relay
  2026-09-17  8:16 ` Simon Horman
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Quanye Yang via B4 Relay @ 2026-09-12 15:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima, David S. Miller,
	Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Matthieu Baerts (NGI0),
	Geliang Tang, Mat Martineau, Jiayuan Chen
  Cc: netdev, linux-kernel

From: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_recvmmsg / mptcp_recvmsg

read-write (marked) to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2619 on cpu 1:
 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:113 [inline]
 sock_error include/net/sock.h:2565 [inline]
 do_recvmmsg+0x50c/0x580 net/socket.c:3049
 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3144 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3167 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3160 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x161/0x180 net/socket.c:3160
 x64_sys_call+0x19c7/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2620 on cpu 0:
 tcp_recv_should_stop include/net/tcp.h:3086 [inline]
 mptcp_recvmsg+0x54d/0xd50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2466
 inet_recvmsg+0x204/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:894
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1151 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x140 net/socket.c:1173
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x14b/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2933
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x116/0x160 net/socket.c:2975
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3008 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3011 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0xeb/0x160 net/socket.c:3011
 x64_sys_call+0x1319/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:48
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

value changed: 0x0000006b -> 0x00000000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2620 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 7.2.0-g39d4f32c5d53 #76 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 26.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014

do_recvmmsg() and getsockopt(SO_ERROR) call sock_error() without the
socket lock. sock_error() clears sk_err with xchg(), which races with
unmarked loads of the same field.

KCSAN reported the unmarked peek in tcp_recv_should_stop(). The same
lockless writer races with the other plain sk_err reads on the
TCP/MPTCP send, recv and splice paths.

Annotate those peeks with READ_ONCE(). No extra ordering is needed:
the value is only used to decide whether I/O should stop. This does
not consume sk_err; the check-then-sock_error() TOCTOU on the no-data
paths is a separate issue.

Suggested-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8bbee583-6f21-4817-bfeb-2d60057380a3@linux.dev/
Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/632
Signed-off-by: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>
---
Changes in v3:
- drop the Fixes tag and retarget to net-next
- annotate the remaining unmarked sk_err peeks on the TCP/MPTCP
  send, recv and splice paths
- Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20260909-mptcp-sk-err-net-v2-1-5044abecac90@proton.me

Changes in v2:
- add Reported-by and Closes for the MPTCP syzkaller report
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908-mptcp-sk-err-net-v1-1-da71aaec9afd@proton.me
---
 include/net/tcp.h    | 3 ++-
 net/core/stream.c    | 2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c       | 6 +++---
 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c   | 7 +++----
 net/mptcp/protocol.c | 6 +++---
 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 5e5f5f9b89a3..6ee513bdb503 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -3093,7 +3093,8 @@ enum skb_drop_reason tcp_inbound_hash(struct sock *sk,
 
 static inline int tcp_recv_should_stop(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return sk->sk_err ||
+	/* sk_err can be cleared locklessly by sock_error(). */
+	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err) ||
 	       sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
 	       (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
 	       signal_pending(current);
diff --git a/net/core/stream.c b/net/core/stream.c
index 2d748581862d..5c0adc3077f0 100644
--- a/net/core/stream.c
+++ b/net/core/stream.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int sk_stream_wait_memory(struct sock *sk, long *timeo_p)
 	while (1) {
 		sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
 
-		if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
+		if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err) || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
 			goto do_error;
 		if (!*timeo_p)
 			goto do_eagain;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 1c867a302444..9e7fa7e39726 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ ssize_t tcp_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
 				break;
 			if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
 				break;
-			if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)) {
 				ret = sock_error(sk);
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ int tcp_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 	mss_now = tcp_send_mss(sk, &size_goal, flags);
 
 	err = -EPIPE;
-	if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
+	if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err) || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
 		goto do_error;
 
 	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
@@ -2760,7 +2760,7 @@ static int tcp_recvmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 			if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
 				break;
 
-			if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)) {
 				copied = sock_error(sk);
 				break;
 			}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
index 2e234d155b5e..a96323e65758 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(struct sock *sk,
 		if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
 			goto out;
 
-		if (sk->sk_err) {
+		if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)) {
 			copied = sock_error(sk);
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -553,10 +553,9 @@ static int tcp_bpf_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 		bool enospc = false;
 		u32 copy, osize;
 
-		if (sk->sk_err) {
-			err = -sk->sk_err;
+		err = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+		if (err)
 			goto out_err;
-		}
 
 		copy = msg_data_left(msg);
 		if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.c b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
index e1f08f71cdb1..7631fa582834 100644
--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
@@ -2028,7 +2028,7 @@ static int mptcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	}
 
 	ret = -EPIPE;
-	if (unlikely(sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)))
+	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err) || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)))
 		goto do_error;
 
 	pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ static int mptcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 			    !timeo)
 				break;
 		} else {
-			if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)) {
 				copied = sock_error(sk);
 				break;
 			}
@@ -4655,7 +4655,7 @@ static ssize_t mptcp_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
 				break;
 			if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
 				break;
-			if (sk->sk_err) {
+			if (READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)) {
 				ret = sock_error(sk);
 				break;
 			}

---
base-commit: 211f2a875f6f447745d80d5762d6d614503ac84a
change-id: 20260908-mptcp-sk-err-net-7ff88ef05044

Best regards,
--  
Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err
  2026-09-12 15:43 [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err Quanye Yang via B4 Relay
@ 2026-09-17  8:16 ` Simon Horman
  2026-09-17 10:04 ` Jiayuan Chen
  2026-09-17 11:44 ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Simon Horman @ 2026-09-17  8:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Quanye Yang
  Cc: Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima, David S. Miller,
	Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Matthieu Baerts (NGI0),
	Geliang Tang, Mat Martineau, Jiayuan Chen, netdev, linux-kernel

On Sat, Sep 12, 2026 at 11:43:34PM +0800, Quanye Yang wrote:
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_recvmmsg / mptcp_recvmsg
> 
> read-write (marked) to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2619 on cpu 1:
>  instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:113 [inline]
>  sock_error include/net/sock.h:2565 [inline]
>  do_recvmmsg+0x50c/0x580 net/socket.c:3049
>  __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3144 [inline]
>  __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3167 [inline]
>  __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3160 [inline]
>  __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x161/0x180 net/socket.c:3160
>  x64_sys_call+0x19c7/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300
>  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>  do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
> read to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2620 on cpu 0:
>  tcp_recv_should_stop include/net/tcp.h:3086 [inline]
>  mptcp_recvmsg+0x54d/0xd50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2466
>  inet_recvmsg+0x204/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:894
>  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1151 [inline]
>  sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x140 net/socket.c:1173
>  ____sys_recvmsg+0x14b/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2933
>  ___sys_recvmsg+0x116/0x160 net/socket.c:2975
>  __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3008 [inline]
>  __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
>  __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3011 [inline]
>  __x64_sys_recvmsg+0xeb/0x160 net/socket.c:3011
>  x64_sys_call+0x1319/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:48
>  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>  do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
> value changed: 0x0000006b -> 0x00000000
> 
> Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2620 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 7.2.0-g39d4f32c5d53 #76 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 26.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
> 
> do_recvmmsg() and getsockopt(SO_ERROR) call sock_error() without the
> socket lock. sock_error() clears sk_err with xchg(), which races with
> unmarked loads of the same field.
> 
> KCSAN reported the unmarked peek in tcp_recv_should_stop(). The same
> lockless writer races with the other plain sk_err reads on the
> TCP/MPTCP send, recv and splice paths.
> 
> Annotate those peeks with READ_ONCE(). No extra ordering is needed:
> the value is only used to decide whether I/O should stop. This does
> not consume sk_err; the check-then-sock_error() TOCTOU on the no-data
> paths is a separate issue.
> 
> Suggested-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8bbee583-6f21-4817-bfeb-2d60057380a3@linux.dev/
> Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/632
> Signed-off-by: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>
> ---
> Changes in v3:
> - drop the Fixes tag and retarget to net-next
> - annotate the remaining unmarked sk_err peeks on the TCP/MPTCP
>   send, recv and splice paths
> - Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20260909-mptcp-sk-err-net-v2-1-5044abecac90@proton.me
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - add Reported-by and Closes for the MPTCP syzkaller report
> - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908-mptcp-sk-err-net-v1-1-da71aaec9afd@proton.me

Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err
  2026-09-12 15:43 [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err Quanye Yang via B4 Relay
  2026-09-17  8:16 ` Simon Horman
@ 2026-09-17 10:04 ` Jiayuan Chen
  2026-09-17 11:44 ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Jiayuan Chen @ 2026-09-17 10:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: quanyeyang, Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima,
	David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
	Matthieu Baerts (NGI0),
	Geliang Tang, Mat Martineau
  Cc: netdev, linux-kernel


On 9/12/26 11:43 PM, Quanye Yang via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>
>
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_recvmmsg / mptcp_recvmsg
>
> read-write (marked) to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2619 on cpu 1:
>   instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:113 [inline]
>   sock_error include/net/sock.h:2565 [inline]
>   do_recvmmsg+0x50c/0x580 net/socket.c:3049
>   __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3144 [inline]
>   __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3167 [inline]
>   __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3160 [inline]
>   __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x161/0x180 net/socket.c:3160
>   x64_sys_call+0x19c7/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300
>   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>   do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> read to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2620 on cpu 0:
>   tcp_recv_should_stop include/net/tcp.h:3086 [inline]
>   mptcp_recvmsg+0x54d/0xd50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2466
>   inet_recvmsg+0x204/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:894
>   sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1151 [inline]
>   sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x140 net/socket.c:1173
>   ____sys_recvmsg+0x14b/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2933
>   ___sys_recvmsg+0x116/0x160 net/socket.c:2975
>   __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3008 [inline]
>   __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
>   __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3011 [inline]
>   __x64_sys_recvmsg+0xeb/0x160 net/socket.c:3011
>   x64_sys_call+0x1319/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:48
>   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>   do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> value changed: 0x0000006b -> 0x00000000
>
> Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2620 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 7.2.0-g39d4f32c5d53 #76 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 26.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
>
> do_recvmmsg() and getsockopt(SO_ERROR) call sock_error() without the
> socket lock. sock_error() clears sk_err with xchg(), which races with
> unmarked loads of the same field.
>
> KCSAN reported the unmarked peek in tcp_recv_should_stop(). The same
> lockless writer races with the other plain sk_err reads on the
> TCP/MPTCP send, recv and splice paths.
>
> Annotate those peeks with READ_ONCE(). No extra ordering is needed:
> the value is only used to decide whether I/O should stop. This does
> not consume sk_err; the check-then-sock_error() TOCTOU on the no-data
> paths is a separate issue.
>
> Suggested-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8bbee583-6f21-4817-bfeb-2d60057380a3@linux.dev/
> Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/632
> Signed-off-by: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>


Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>

There are a lot of pre-existing issues, though.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err
  2026-09-12 15:43 [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err Quanye Yang via B4 Relay
  2026-09-17  8:16 ` Simon Horman
  2026-09-17 10:04 ` Jiayuan Chen
@ 2026-09-17 11:44 ` Paolo Abeni
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Abeni @ 2026-09-17 11:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Quanye Yang, Eric Dumazet, Neal Cardwell, Kuniyuki Iwashima,
	David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Simon Horman,
	Matthieu Baerts (NGI0),
	Geliang Tang, Mat Martineau, Jiayuan Chen
  Cc: netdev, linux-kernel

On 9/12/26 17:43, Quanye Yang wrote:
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_recvmmsg / mptcp_recvmsg
> 
> read-write (marked) to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2619 on cpu 1:
>   instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:113 [inline]
>   sock_error include/net/sock.h:2565 [inline]
>   do_recvmmsg+0x50c/0x580 net/socket.c:3049
>   __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3144 [inline]
>   __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3167 [inline]
>   __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3160 [inline]
>   __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x161/0x180 net/socket.c:3160
>   x64_sys_call+0x19c7/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:300
>   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>   do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
> read to 0xffff8880134d391c of 4 bytes by task 2620 on cpu 0:
>   tcp_recv_should_stop include/net/tcp.h:3086 [inline]
>   mptcp_recvmsg+0x54d/0xd50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2466
>   inet_recvmsg+0x204/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:894
>   sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1151 [inline]
>   sock_recvmsg+0x11a/0x140 net/socket.c:1173
>   ____sys_recvmsg+0x14b/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2933
>   ___sys_recvmsg+0x116/0x160 net/socket.c:2975
>   __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3008 [inline]
>   __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
>   __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:3011 [inline]
>   __x64_sys_recvmsg+0xeb/0x160 net/socket.c:3011
>   x64_sys_call+0x1319/0x1ca0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:48
>   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
>   do_syscall_64+0xde/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
> value changed: 0x0000006b -> 0x00000000
> 
> Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2620 Comm: syz.2.33 Not tainted 7.2.0-g39d4f32c5d53 #76 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 26.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
> 
> do_recvmmsg() and getsockopt(SO_ERROR) call sock_error() without the
> socket lock. sock_error() clears sk_err with xchg(), which races with
> unmarked loads of the same field.
> 
> KCSAN reported the unmarked peek in tcp_recv_should_stop(). The same
> lockless writer races with the other plain sk_err reads on the
> TCP/MPTCP send, recv and splice paths.
> 
> Annotate those peeks with READ_ONCE(). No extra ordering is needed:
> the value is only used to decide whether I/O should stop. This does
> not consume sk_err; the check-then-sock_error() TOCTOU on the no-data
> paths is a separate issue.
> 
> Suggested-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8bbee583-6f21-4817-bfeb-2d60057380a3@linux.dev/
> Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/632
> Signed-off-by: Quanye Yang <quanyeyang@proton.me>
> ---
> Changes in v3:
> - drop the Fixes tag and retarget to net-next
> - annotate the remaining unmarked sk_err peeks on the TCP/MPTCP
>    send, recv and splice paths
> - Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20260909-mptcp-sk-err-net-v2-1-5044abecac90@proton.me
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - add Reported-by and Closes for the MPTCP syzkaller report
> - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908-mptcp-sk-err-net-v1-1-da71aaec9afd@proton.me
> ---
>   include/net/tcp.h    | 3 ++-
>   net/core/stream.c    | 2 +-
>   net/ipv4/tcp.c       | 6 +++---
>   net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c   | 7 +++----
>   net/mptcp/protocol.c | 6 +++---

IMHO you should split the tcp and mptcp changes in separate patches. 
Also the mptcp side has at least one more missing sk->sk_err annotation 
missing, as reported by sashiko.

/P


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-17 11:44 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-09-12 15:43 [PATCH net-next v3] tcp: annotate lockless access to sk->sk_err Quanye Yang via B4 Relay
2026-09-17  8:16 ` Simon Horman
2026-09-17 10:04 ` Jiayuan Chen
2026-09-17 11:44 ` Paolo Abeni

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