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* [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done()
       [not found] <20260919213637.3316595-1-benquike@gmail.com>
@ 2026-09-21  7:42 ` Hui Peng
  2026-09-21  9:08   ` David Laight
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in hwme_get_request_sync() Hui Peng
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] ieee802154: ca8210: validate data_ind length upfront in ca8210_skb_rx() Hui Peng
  2 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hui Peng @ 2026-09-21  7:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Harry Morris, Alexander Aring, Miquel Raynal, Stefan Schmidt
  Cc: linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, Hui Peng, stable

In ca8210_rx_done(), the packet length len = buf[1] + 2 is only checked
against CA8210_SPI_BUF_SIZE (256). When buf[0] & SPI_SYN is set and
priv->sync_command_response is non-NULL, memcpy() copies up to 256 bytes
into priv->sync_command_response, which points to a struct mac_message
object (sizeof(struct mac_message) = 250 bytes) on the synchronous
caller's stack, overflowing the stack buffer by up to 6 bytes:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ca8210_rx_done+0xc4/0xe0
  Write of size 256 at addr ffff888001907660 by task init/1
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0xa0
   print_report+0x153/0x4c6
   kasan_report+0xf1/0x120
   kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200
   __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
   ca8210_rx_done+0xc4/0xe0
   ca8210_spi_exchange+0x12e/0x190
  ...
  The buggy address belongs to stack of task init/1
   and is located at offset 32 in frame:
   ca8210_spi_exchange+0x0/0x190
  This frame has 1 object:
   [32, 282) 'response'

Bound the synchronous response memcpy() length to
min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(struct mac_message)).

Tested in QEMU with KASAN enabled by passing a 256-byte SPI_SYN response
into ca8210_rx_done().

Fixes: ded845a781a5 ("ieee802154: Add CA8210 IEEE 802.15.4 device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Split the ca8210 fixes into three single-issue patches (1/3..3/3).

 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
index 01af4f9..c009930 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
@@ -697,7 +697,8 @@ static void ca8210_rx_done(struct cas_control *cas_ctl)
 
 	if (buf[0] & SPI_SYN) {
 		if (priv->sync_command_response) {
-			memcpy(priv->sync_command_response, buf, len);
+			memcpy(priv->sync_command_response, buf,
+			       min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(struct mac_message)));
 			complete(&priv->sync_exchange_complete);
 		} else {
 			if (cascoda_api_upstream)
-- 
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [PATCH net v2 2/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in hwme_get_request_sync()
       [not found] <20260919213637.3316595-1-benquike@gmail.com>
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done() Hui Peng
@ 2026-09-21  7:42 ` Hui Peng
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] ieee802154: ca8210: validate data_ind length upfront in ca8210_skb_rx() Hui Peng
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hui Peng @ 2026-09-21  7:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Harry Morris, Alexander Aring, Miquel Raynal, Stefan Schmidt
  Cc: linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, Hui Peng, stable

In ca8210_get_ed(), an uninitialized u8 lenvar and a pointer to a 1-byte
stack buffer (u8 *level) are passed to hwme_get_request_sync(), which
unconditionally copies response.pdata.hwme_get_cnf.hw_attribute_length
bytes into hw_attribute_value without checking the caller's destination
buffer capacity, overflowing level on the stack when hw_attribute_length
exceeds 1:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in hwme_get_request_sync.constprop.0.isra.0+0xf3/0x170
  Write of size 16 at addr ffff888001907780 by task init/1
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0xa0
   print_report+0x153/0x4c6
   kasan_report+0xf1/0x120
   kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200
   __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
   hwme_get_request_sync.constprop.0.isra.0+0xf3/0x170
   ca8210_get_ed+0x9c/0xf0
  ...
  The buggy address belongs to stack of task init/1
   and is located at offset 48 in frame:
   ca8210_get_ed+0x0/0xf0
  This frame has 2 objects:
   [48, 49) 'level'
   [64, 65) 'lenvar'

Initialize lenvar = 1 in ca8210_get_ed() and return
IEEE802154_SYSTEM_ERROR in hwme_get_request_sync() if
response.pdata.hwme_get_cnf.hw_attribute_length exceeds
*hw_attribute_length.

Tested in QEMU with KASAN enabled by passing an oversized
hw_attribute_length response into ca8210_get_ed().

Fixes: ded845a781a5 ("ieee802154: Add CA8210 IEEE 802.15.4 device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Split out as patch 2/3.
- Replaced the temporary stack buffer in ca8210_get_ed() with lenvar = 1
  and an upper-bound check against *hw_attribute_length in
  hwme_get_request_sync() as requested by Miquel Raynal.

 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
index c009930..1de6314 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
@@ -1678,6 +1678,9 @@ static u8 hwme_get_request_sync(
 		return IEEE802154_SYSTEM_ERROR;
 
 	if (response.pdata.hwme_get_cnf.status == IEEE802154_SUCCESS) {
+		if (response.pdata.hwme_get_cnf.hw_attribute_length >
+		    *hw_attribute_length)
+			return IEEE802154_SYSTEM_ERROR;
 		*hw_attribute_length =
 			response.pdata.hwme_get_cnf.hw_attribute_length;
 		memcpy(
@@ -2028,7 +2031,7 @@ static int ca8210_xmit_async(struct ieee802154_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb)
  */
 static int ca8210_get_ed(struct ieee802154_hw *hw, u8 *level)
 {
-	u8 lenvar;
+	u8 lenvar = 1;
 	struct ca8210_priv *priv = hw->priv;
 
 	return link_to_linux_err(
-- 
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [PATCH net v2 3/3] ieee802154: ca8210: validate data_ind length upfront in ca8210_skb_rx()
       [not found] <20260919213637.3316595-1-benquike@gmail.com>
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done() Hui Peng
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in hwme_get_request_sync() Hui Peng
@ 2026-09-21  7:42 ` Hui Peng
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hui Peng @ 2026-09-21  7:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Harry Morris, Alexander Aring, Miquel Raynal, Stefan Schmidt
  Cc: linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, Hui Peng, stable

In ca8210_skb_rx(), data_ind is read at offsets 22 (msdulen), 23
(mpdulinkquality), 29 + msdulen (hdr.sec.level), 30..39 + msdulen
(security header), and 29 .. 29 + msdulen (payload) without verifying
that the received SPI frame length len covers those offsets, causing an
out-of-bounds read when msdulen exceeds len - 30:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ca8210_skb_rx.constprop.0.isra.0+0x137/0x160
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff888006453ddd by task init/1
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0xa0
   print_report+0x153/0x4c6
   kasan_report+0xf1/0x120
   kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200
   __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
   ca8210_skb_rx.constprop.0.isra.0+0x137/0x160
   ca8210_net_rx+0x96/0xc0
  ...
  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888006453dc0
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
  The buggy address is located 29 bytes inside of
   allocated 32-byte region [ffff888006453dc0, ffff888006453de0)

Consolidate all length and msdulen validations into a single upfront check
at the beginning of ca8210_skb_rx() before allocating the skb.

Tested in QEMU with KASAN enabled by passing a short data_ind buffer with
msdulen = 64 and len = 30 into ca8210_skb_rx().

Fixes: ded845a781a5 ("ieee802154: Add CA8210 IEEE 802.15.4 device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Split out as patch 3/3.
- Consolidated all length checks in ca8210_skb_rx() into a single place
  at the beginning of the function before dev_alloc_skb() and dropped the
  unrelated hdr.seq assignment as requested by Miquel Raynal.

 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
index 1de6314..2aa7d8c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
@@ -1759,19 +1759,15 @@ static int ca8210_skb_rx(
 	u8                    *data_ind
 )
 {
-	struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
+	struct ieee802154_hdr hdr = { };
 	int msdulen;
 	int hlen;
-	u8 mpdulinkquality = data_ind[23];
+	u8 mpdulinkquality;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct ca8210_priv *priv = hw->priv;
 
-	/* Allocate mtu size buffer for every rx packet */
-	skb = dev_alloc_skb(IEEE802154_MTU + sizeof(hdr));
-	if (!skb)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(hdr));
+	if (len < 30)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
 
 	msdulen = data_ind[22]; /* msdu_length */
 	if (msdulen > IEEE802154_MTU) {
@@ -1779,9 +1775,25 @@ static int ca8210_skb_rx(
 			&priv->spi->dev,
 			"received erroneously large msdu length!\n"
 		);
-		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
 	}
+
+	if (len < 30 + msdulen ||
+	    (!priv->promiscuous && data_ind[29 + msdulen] > 0 &&
+	     len < 29 + msdulen + sizeof(struct secspec))) {
+		dev_err(&priv->spi->dev,
+			"received truncated data indication!\n");
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+	}
+
+	mpdulinkquality = data_ind[23];
+
+	/* Allocate mtu size buffer for every rx packet */
+	skb = dev_alloc_skb(IEEE802154_MTU + sizeof(hdr));
+	if (!skb)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(hdr));
 	dev_dbg(&priv->spi->dev, "skb buffer length = %d\n", msdulen);
 
 	if (priv->promiscuous)
-- 
2.47.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done()
  2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done() Hui Peng
@ 2026-09-21  9:08   ` David Laight
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: David Laight @ 2026-09-21  9:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Hui Peng
  Cc: Harry Morris, Alexander Aring, Miquel Raynal, Stefan Schmidt,
	linux-wpan, netdev, linux-kernel, stable

On Mon, 21 Sep 2026 07:42:03 +0000
Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> wrote:

> In ca8210_rx_done(), the packet length len = buf[1] + 2 is only checked
> against CA8210_SPI_BUF_SIZE (256). When buf[0] & SPI_SYN is set and
> priv->sync_command_response is non-NULL, memcpy() copies up to 256 bytes
> into priv->sync_command_response, which points to a struct mac_message
> object (sizeof(struct mac_message) = 250 bytes) on the synchronous
> caller's stack, overflowing the stack buffer by up to 6 bytes:
> 
>   BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ca8210_rx_done+0xc4/0xe0
>   Write of size 256 at addr ffff888001907660 by task init/1
>   Call Trace:
>    <TASK>
>    dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0xa0
>    print_report+0x153/0x4c6
>    kasan_report+0xf1/0x120
>    kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200
>    __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
>    ca8210_rx_done+0xc4/0xe0
>    ca8210_spi_exchange+0x12e/0x190
>   ...
>   The buggy address belongs to stack of task init/1
>    and is located at offset 32 in frame:
>    ca8210_spi_exchange+0x0/0x190
>   This frame has 1 object:
>    [32, 282) 'response'
> 
> Bound the synchronous response memcpy() length to
> min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(struct mac_message)).

Why min_t() ?
len is unsigned so min() is fine.

Shouldn't there also be some kind of indication the data was truncated?

David

> 
> Tested in QEMU with KASAN enabled by passing a 256-byte SPI_SYN response
> into ca8210_rx_done().
> 
> Fixes: ded845a781a5 ("ieee802154: Add CA8210 IEEE 802.15.4 device driver")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
> - Split the ca8210 fixes into three single-issue patches (1/3..3/3).
> 
>  drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
> index 01af4f9..c009930 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c
> @@ -697,7 +697,8 @@ static void ca8210_rx_done(struct cas_control *cas_ctl)
>  
>  	if (buf[0] & SPI_SYN) {
>  		if (priv->sync_command_response) {
> -			memcpy(priv->sync_command_response, buf, len);
> +			memcpy(priv->sync_command_response, buf,
> +			       min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(struct mac_message)));
>  			complete(&priv->sync_exchange_complete);
>  		} else {
>  			if (cascoda_api_upstream)


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-21  9:09 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
     [not found] <20260919213637.3316595-1-benquike@gmail.com>
2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in ca8210_rx_done() Hui Peng
2026-09-21  9:08   ` David Laight
2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] ieee802154: ca8210: prevent stack buffer overflow in hwme_get_request_sync() Hui Peng
2026-09-21  7:42 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] ieee802154: ca8210: validate data_ind length upfront in ca8210_skb_rx() Hui Peng

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