* [PATCH] kobject_uevent: fix OOB read in kobject_action_type()
@ 2026-09-27 17:42 Hyeontaek Lim
2026-09-28 5:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Hyeontaek Lim @ 2026-09-27 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Rafael J . Wysocki, Danilo Krummrich
Cc: driver-core, linux-kernel, Hyeontaek Lim, syzbot+d164947c037324221043
kobject_action_type() matches a user-supplied action string against
the short "add"/"remove"/"change"/... literals in kobject_actions[]
using strncmp() with a length (count_first) derived from the size of
the user-supplied buffer (up to the first space, or the whole write).
strncmp() correctly stops comparing as soon as it hits a NUL byte in
either string, so a caller can make it report a "match" against a
short literal like "add" by embedding a NUL right after "add" in an
otherwise much longer buffer (e.g. write "add\0" followed by 391
bytes of arbitrary padding, with no space, so count_first stays at
the full write length).
The subsequent bounds check then indexes the matched literal at that
same, much larger offset:
if (kobject_actions[action][count_first] != '\0')
which reads far past the end of the 4-byte "add" literal, into
whatever object happens to follow it in .rodata (observed to land
inside uevent_helper_sysctl_table on the reporter's build).
Fix this by checking the literal's real length against count_first
before doing the strncmp()/indexing at all, instead of trusting that
a strncmp() "match" implies the lengths agree.
Reported-by: syzbot+d164947c037324221043@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d164947c037324221043
Signed-off-by: Hyeontaek Lim <jennystr233@gmail.com>
---
lib/kobject_uevent.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
index xxxxxxx..xxxxxxx 100644
--- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c
+++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
@@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ static int kobject_action_type(const char *buf, size_t count,
count_first = count;
for (action = 0; action < ARRAY_SIZE(kobject_actions); action++) {
+ if (strlen(kobject_actions[action]) != count_first)
+ continue;
if (strncmp(kobject_actions[action], buf, count_first) != 0)
continue;
- if (kobject_actions[action][count_first] != '\0')
- continue;
if (args)
*args = args_start;
*type = action;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] kobject_uevent: fix OOB read in kobject_action_type()
2026-09-27 17:42 [PATCH] kobject_uevent: fix OOB read in kobject_action_type() Hyeontaek Lim
@ 2026-09-28 5:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2026-09-28 5:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hyeontaek Lim
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki, Danilo Krummrich, driver-core, linux-kernel,
syzbot+d164947c037324221043
On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 at 02:42:41AM +0900, Hyeontaek Lim wrote:
> kobject_action_type() matches a user-supplied action string against
> the short "add"/"remove"/"change"/... literals in kobject_actions[]
> using strncmp() with a length (count_first) derived from the size of
> the user-supplied buffer (up to the first space, or the whole write).
>
> strncmp() correctly stops comparing as soon as it hits a NUL byte in
> either string, so a caller can make it report a "match" against a
> short literal like "add" by embedding a NUL right after "add" in an
> otherwise much longer buffer (e.g. write "add\0" followed by 391
> bytes of arbitrary padding, with no space, so count_first stays at
> the full write length).
>
> The subsequent bounds check then indexes the matched literal at that
> same, much larger offset:
>
> if (kobject_actions[action][count_first] != '\0')
>
> which reads far past the end of the 4-byte "add" literal, into
> whatever object happens to follow it in .rodata (observed to land
> inside uevent_helper_sysctl_table on the reporter's build).
>
> Fix this by checking the literal's real length against count_first
> before doing the strncmp()/indexing at all, instead of trusting that
> a strncmp() "match" implies the lengths agree.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+d164947c037324221043@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d164947c037324221043
> Signed-off-by: Hyeontaek Lim <jennystr233@gmail.com>
> ---
> lib/kobject_uevent.c | 5 +++--
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> index xxxxxxx..xxxxxxx 100644
> --- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> +++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c
> @@ -78,10 +78,11 @@ static int kobject_action_type(const char *buf, size_t count,
> count_first = count;
>
> for (action = 0; action < ARRAY_SIZE(kobject_actions); action++) {
> + if (strlen(kobject_actions[action]) != count_first)
> + continue;
> if (strncmp(kobject_actions[action], buf, count_first) != 0)
> continue;
> - if (kobject_actions[action][count_first] != '\0')
> - continue;
> if (args)
> *args = args_start;
> *type = action;
>
Hasn't this been resolved already?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2026-09-27 17:42 [PATCH] kobject_uevent: fix OOB read in kobject_action_type() Hyeontaek Lim
2026-09-28 5:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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