From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/10] KVM: Destroy memslots immediately after mmu_notifiers are unregistered
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2026 13:22:29 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261001202234.3794060-6-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261001202234.3794060-1-seanjc@google.com>
Instally dummy, empty memslots immediately after unregistering KVM's
mmu_notifier during VM destruction to harden against accessing memory from
the wrong address space when tearing down a VM. Because kvm_destroy_vm()
often runs when the associated VM's file is being released, current->mm is
often no longer kvm->mm, i.e. using the memslots to access userspace memory
is inherently broken/dangerous.
While KVM's APIs to read/write guest memory explicitly reject accesses if
current->mm != kvm->mm, taking away the memslots adds another layer of
defense and helps guard against rogue accesses that don't go through KVM's
standard API, or that do GUP+kmap().
Note, simply hoisting memslot destruction above kvm_arch_destroy_vm()
without installing dummy slots is not a viable alternative. Doing so would
require auditing all the paths of kvm_arch_destroy_vm(), which is nearly
infeasible, and missing even one case would result in a NULL pointer
dereference and/or use-after-free, neither of which is a substantially
better outcome than the status quo.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index f368240aa1cd..770a2c3bd445 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -955,23 +955,42 @@ static void kvm_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
kfree(slot);
}
-static void kvm_free_memslots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memslots *slots)
+static const struct kvm_memslots kvm_empty_memslots = {
+ .generation = -1ull,
+ .hva_tree = RB_ROOT_CACHED,
+ .gfn_tree = RB_ROOT,
+ .id_hash[0 ... (ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_empty_memslots.id_hash) - 1)] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT,
+ .node_idx = 0,
+};
+
+static void kvm_destroy_memslots(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct hlist_node *idnode;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
- int bkt;
+ int bkt, i;
+
+ /*
+ * Install empty memslots to guard against memslot lookups while the VM
+ * is being destroyed. Consuming memslots at this stage is a KVM bug,
+ * but "gracefully do nothing" is a much better outcome than "crash the
+ * host" or "corrupt random memory" when there inevitably is a bug.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++)
+ rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots[i], &kvm_empty_memslots);
+
+ synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
/*
* The same memslot objects live in both active and inactive sets,
- * arbitrarily free using index '1' so the second invocation of this
- * function isn't operating over a structure with dangling pointers
- * (even though this function isn't actually touching them).
+ * arbitrarily free using index '1'.
*/
- if (!slots->node_idx)
- return;
-
- hash_for_each_safe(slots->id_hash, bkt, idnode, memslot, id_node[1])
- kvm_free_memslot(kvm, memslot);
+ for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++) {
+ hash_for_each_safe(kvm->__memslots[i][1].id_hash, bkt, idnode,
+ memslot, id_node[1])
+ kvm_free_memslot(kvm, memslot);
+ }
}
static umode_t kvm_stats_debugfs_mode(const struct kvm_stats_desc *desc)
@@ -1302,12 +1321,10 @@ static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm->mn_active_invalidate_count = 0;
else
WARN_ON(kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress);
+ kvm_destroy_memslots(kvm);
+
kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
kvm_destroy_devices(kvm);
- for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++) {
- kvm_free_memslots(kvm, &kvm->__memslots[i][0]);
- kvm_free_memslots(kvm, &kvm->__memslots[i][1]);
- }
cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->irq_srcu);
srcu_barrier(&kvm->srcu);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->srcu);
--
2.56.0.rc1.315.gc6ed9934b7-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-01 20:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-01 20:22 [PATCH v2 00/10] KVM: Fix+harden against bad uaccess using dying VM Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] KVM: Reject user accesses to guest memory if current->mm != kvm->mm Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 21:08 ` James Houghton
2026-10-01 21:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 21:28 ` James Houghton
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] KVM: PPC: Flush/zap all memslots on kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all() Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] KVM: x86: Unmap VMAs for KVM-internal memslots when the memslot is freed Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 21:26 ` James Houghton
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] KVM: Disallow setting memslots when the VM is being destroyed Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] KVM: WARN if KVM attempts to do guest-related uaccess with "wrong" process Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] KVM: WARN and reject guest-based uaccess if VM is dying Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] KVM: nVMX: Don't flush shadow VMCS12 to guest memory during vCPU teardown Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] KVM: nVMX: Don't try to load eVMCS12 page when the VM is dying Sean Christopherson
2026-10-01 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] KVM: Pre-check uaccesses in KVM's APIs to read/write guest memory Sean Christopherson
2026-10-02 20:30 ` [syzbot ci] Re: KVM: Fix+harden against bad uaccess using dying VM syzbot ci
2026-10-02 20:39 ` Sean Christopherson
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