[PATCH v1] ecryptfs: validate key payload size and session key length

[PATCH v1] ecryptfs: validate key payload size and session key length

[Svyatoslav Nikolenko]

Syzkaller reported an out-of-bounds read, which sometimes manifests as a
slab-use-after-free, in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(). This is caused by
two structural validation failures when handling malformed user keys.

First, eCryptfs blindly casts the user key payload into a
`struct ecryptfs_auth_tok` without verifying the physical size of the
allocation. If a user provides a key that is significantly smaller than
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok), accessing struct fields located deep
within the memory layout (such as `session_key_encryption_key_bytes`)
forces the kernel to read past the end of the allocated slab object. If
the adjacent slab object was recently freed, KASAN reports this as a
use-after-free.

Second, eCryptfs does not validate the internal length field
`session_key_encryption_key_bytes` before passing it to md5().
A maliciously large value causes md5() to read out of bounds.

Fix this by explicitly checking the user_key_payload `datalen` to ensure
the physical memory is large enough to hold the expected structure, and
subsequently bounding `session_key_encryption_key_bytes` to the actual
size of the `session_key_encryption_key` array.

Reported-by: syzbot+46bbbe175b7eea8036b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=46bbbe175b7eea8036b8
Tested-by: syzbot+46bbbe175b7eea8036b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0bbb838f385a ("ecryptfs: Use MD5 library instead of crypto_shash")
Signed-off-by: Svyatoslav Nikolenko <nsvatoslav515@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 51651314b7a6..b2fd238bcd97 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -621,6 +621,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
 {
 	struct ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet_silly_stack *s;
 	struct key *auth_tok_key = NULL;
+	struct user_key_payload *ukp;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	s = kzalloc_obj(*s);
@@ -738,6 +739,20 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
 		goto out_free_unlock;
 	}
 
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(auth_tok_key);
+	if (!ukp || ukp->datalen < sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Error key payload too small\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_unlock;
+	}
+
+	if (s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes >
+			sizeof(s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Error FNEK key size too large\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_unlock;
+	}
+
 	md5(s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
 	    s->auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes,
 	    s->hash);
-- 
2.47.3