* [PATCH net v2 1/3] amt: key relay tunnel state on the (address, port) endpoint, not the address
2026-10-09 20:14 [PATCH net v2 0/3] amt: fix relay tunnel keying and unauthenticated-Request DoS Omar Ramadan
@ 2026-10-09 20:14 ` Omar Ramadan
2026-10-09 20:14 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] amt: make pre-query report drops visible Omar Ramadan
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Omar Ramadan @ 2026-10-09 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Taehee Yoo, Andrew Lunn, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Simon Horman
amt_request_handler and amt_update_handler both look a tunnel up by the
outer source address alone:
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list)
if (tunnel->ip4 == iph->saddr)
goto send;
RFC 7450 s4.2.2 defines the unit of relay tunnel state differently: "an
AMT 'tunnel' is identified by the IP address and UDP port pair used as
the destination address for sending encapsulated multicast IP datagrams
to a gateway", and "each unique combination represents a unique tunnel
endpoint".
Because the port term is missing, two distinct endpoints that share a
source address alias onto one tunnel. The second Request to arrive
reaches `send:`, overwrites tunnel->nonce and re-derives tunnel->mac, so
the first gateway's subsequent Membership Updates no longer match and
are dropped at the "Invalid MAC" arm. That arm returns rather than
continuing the walk, so there is no recovery path: the first gateway has
had its Request answered and its membership accepted, and simply never
receives data again. The failure is silent on both sides.
Two deployments reach this, and the same RFC section names both:
- NAT, which s4.2.2 calls out explicitly ("this address may differ from
that carried by the message when it exited the gateway as a result of
network address translation"). CGNAT, a single-WAN site with a
redundant gateway pair, or two subscriber devices behind one
residential NAT all present as one source address.
- A single gateway host, with no NAT anywhere, which s4.2.2 says "may
use separate ports for the IPv4/IGMP and IPv6/MLD protocols".
Add the port term to both lookups. amt_update_handler snapshots the
source port before iptunnel_pull_header() strips the encap, alongside
the existing pre-pull reads.
With the endpoint keyed correctly, a gateway that re-Requests from a new
ephemeral port no longer aliases onto its own previous tunnel: it gets a
new one addressed to the port it is listening on, and the old one ages
out on gc_wq. That is the same stale-Membership-Query symptom addressed
by refreshing tunnel->source_port at `send:`, fixed at the cause instead
-- so this change supersedes that approach rather than stacking on it.
Also count the "Invalid MAC" drop in rx_dropped. It is currently a
netdev_dbg only, and an Update dropped for failing validation is the one
delivery failure a gateway cannot observe from its own side.
Note this removes an accidental bound: while tunnels were keyed on the
address alone, one source address could never hold more than one tunnel,
whatever it did. RFC 7450 s5.3.3 asks for that bound explicitly, and it
is restored in a companion net-next patch ("amt: bound relay tunnels
admitted per source address") rather than here, since it adds UAPI and
this is a fix.
Fixes: cbc21dc1cfe9 ("amt: add data plane of amt interface")
Signed-off-by: Omar Ramadan <omar@blockcast.net>
---
drivers/net/amt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/amt.c b/drivers/net/amt.c
index b53f8ec5566..ed82f8fac3f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/amt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/amt.c
@@ -2471,6 +2471,7 @@ static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
u64 response_mac;
__be32 saddr;
__be32 nonce;
+ __be16 sport;
saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
@@ -2484,6 +2485,8 @@ static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
nonce = amtmu->nonce;
response_mac = amtmu->response_mac;
+ /* Snapshot the tunnel endpoint port before the encap is stripped. */
+ sport = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
if (iptunnel_pull_header(skb, hdr_size, skb->protocol, false))
return true;
@@ -2491,7 +2494,8 @@ static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list) {
- if (tunnel->ip4 == saddr) {
+ if (tunnel->ip4 == saddr &&
+ tunnel->source_port == sport) {
if ((nonce == tunnel->nonce &&
response_mac == tunnel->mac)) {
mod_delayed_work(amt_wq, &tunnel->gc_wq,
@@ -2499,7 +2503,13 @@ static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
* 3);
goto report;
} else {
+ /* The endpoint match is unique, so no other
+ * tunnel can validate this Update. Count the
+ * drop: an unauthenticated Update is not
+ * observable from the gateway's own side.
+ */
netdev_dbg(amt->dev, "Invalid MAC\n");
+ amt->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
return true;
}
}
@@ -2705,7 +2715,8 @@ static bool amt_request_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
return true;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list)
- if (tunnel->ip4 == iph->saddr)
+ if (tunnel->ip4 == iph->saddr &&
+ tunnel->source_port == udph->source)
goto send;
spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
@@ -2743,6 +2754,14 @@ static bool amt_request_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
send:
+ /* source_port is part of the tunnel's identity and is set once, in
+ * the allocation path above; the lookup only reaches here on an
+ * exact (address, port) match, so it is already udph->source. A
+ * gateway that re-Requests from a new ephemeral port no longer
+ * aliases onto this tunnel -- it gets its own, and this one ages
+ * out on gc_wq. Do not "refresh" the port here: that is what made
+ * a colliding Request steal an established tunnel outright.
+ */
tunnel->nonce = amtrh->nonce;
mac = siphash_3u32((__force u32)tunnel->ip4,
(__force u32)tunnel->source_port,
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH net v2 3/3] amt: do not create tunnel state for unauthenticated Requests
2026-10-09 20:14 [PATCH net v2 0/3] amt: fix relay tunnel keying and unauthenticated-Request DoS Omar Ramadan
2026-10-09 20:14 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] amt: key relay tunnel state on the (address, port) endpoint, not the address Omar Ramadan
2026-10-09 20:14 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] amt: make pre-query report drops visible Omar Ramadan
@ 2026-10-09 20:14 ` Omar Ramadan
2026-10-09 20:19 ` [PATCH net v2 0/3] amt: fix relay tunnel keying and unauthenticated-Request DoS netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-10-09 21:37 ` Omar Ramadan
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Omar Ramadan @ 2026-10-09 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Taehee Yoo, Andrew Lunn, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Simon Horman
amt_request_handler() allocated a struct amt_tunnel_list for any incoming
Relay Membership Request, keyed on the claimed source endpoint, before
anything about that source had been verified. A Request is a bare UDP
datagram with a trivially spoofable source address, so this gave a remote
attacker two primitives:
- Resource exhaustion. Each entry is held for amt_gmi() (260s with the
default qrv=2/qi=125/qri=10) and the table is bounded by
amt->max_tunnels (default AMT_MAX_TUNNELS, 128). Requests from 128
spoofed addresses fill the table, and re-sending once per interval
keeps it full, so real gateways are refused. Once full, every further
Request also emits an ICMP_DEST_UNREACH to the spoofed source, turning
the relay into an ICMP reflector.
- Session desynchronisation. The lookup hit at the top of the function
jumped to the send path, which took no lock and overwrote ->nonce and
->mac of an already-established tunnel. One spoofed packet carrying a
known gateway's source endpoint invalidates that gateway's outstanding
(nonce, response_mac), so its next Membership Update is dropped as
"Invalid MAC". This costs one packet, consumes no table slot, and is
therefore unaffected by max_tunnels tuning.
No state actually has to be created at Request time. Every input to the
keyed MAC is carried in the packet or is device state, so the MAC can be
generated on Request and recomputed on Update rather than stored:
- amt_request_handler() now allocates nothing. It computes the MAC and
replies, matching amt_send_advertisement(), which already answers
Discovery statelessly from the same context.
- amt_update_handler() recomputes the expected MAC from the packet's
source address, source port and nonce and drops the packet on
mismatch. Tunnel state is created only after that check passes, so
max_tunnels now bounds verified gateways.
- amt->key becomes a two-element array. amt_secret_work() rotates every
AMT_SECRET_TIMEOUT (60s) and an exchange may straddle a rotation, so
Update accepts the current or previous secret. Previously each tunnel
snapshotted the key at creation, which a stateless recompute cannot do.
The General Query is passed its destination by value rather than a tunnel
pointer, because at Request time no tunnel exists to point at.
Two smaller issues on the same path go away with it: the entry was
published by list_add_tail_rcu() before ->key, ->nonce and ->mac were
assigned, leaving a window in which a concurrent Update could match the
zeroed nonce/mac of a kzalloc()'d entry; and the send path read
tunnel->key into an unused local before that field was initialised.
Note for reviewers: the MAC covers the UDP source port, so a NAT
rebinding between Request and Update now changes the recomputed MAC where
the stored value would have survived it. Including the port is what
RFC 7450 5.1.4.6 describes, and the exposed window is a single round trip
rather than the tunnel lifetime, but it is a behaviour change.
Fixes: cbc21dc1cfe9 ("amt: add data plane of amt interface")
Signed-off-by: Omar Ramadan <omar@blockcast.net>
---
Note for whoever merges this with the pending net-next per-source cap
("amt: bound relay tunnels admitted per source address"): that patch
counts the tunnels a source already holds on the tunnel_list walk in
amt_request_handler(), which this patch removes. The count belongs in
the re-check walk in amt_tunnel_get_or_create(), which already visits
every tunnel and runs under amt->lock. Pasting the bound back without
moving the count leaves it at zero, so it enforces nothing, and no
merge conflict will point that out.
drivers/net/amt.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
include/net/amt.h | 11 +-
2 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/amt.c b/drivers/net/amt.c
index 492d450fdb5..bc8e552a9ba 100644
--- a/drivers/net/amt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/amt.c
@@ -784,11 +784,16 @@ static void amt_send_request(struct amt_dev *amt, bool v6)
static bool amt_send_membership_query(struct amt_dev *amt,
struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel,
+ __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
+ __be32 nonce, u64 mac,
bool v6);
-static void amt_send_igmp_gq(struct amt_dev *amt,
- struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel)
+/* The destination is passed by value rather than as a tunnel: the requesting
+ * source is not authenticated yet and no tunnel state exists for it - see
+ * amt_request_handler().
+ */
+static void amt_send_igmp_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
+ __be32 nonce, u64 mac)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -797,7 +802,8 @@ static void amt_send_igmp_gq(struct amt_dev *amt,
return;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ethhdr));
- if (amt_send_membership_query(amt, skb, tunnel, false)) {
+ if (amt_send_membership_query(amt, skb, daddr, dport, nonce, mac,
+ false)) {
amt->dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
@@ -876,7 +882,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *amt_build_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt)
return skb;
}
-static void amt_send_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel)
+static void amt_send_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
+ __be32 nonce, u64 mac)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -885,13 +892,15 @@ static void amt_send_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel)
return;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ethhdr));
- if (amt_send_membership_query(amt, skb, tunnel, true)) {
+ if (amt_send_membership_query(amt, skb, daddr, dport, nonce, mac,
+ true)) {
amt->dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
#else
-static void amt_send_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel)
+static void amt_send_mld_gq(struct amt_dev *amt, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
+ __be32 nonce, u64 mac)
{
}
#endif
@@ -925,7 +934,8 @@ static void amt_secret_work(struct work_struct *work)
secret_wq);
spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
- get_random_bytes(&amt->key, sizeof(siphash_key_t));
+ amt->key[1] = amt->key[0];
+ get_random_bytes(&amt->key[0], sizeof(siphash_key_t));
spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
mod_delayed_work(amt_wq, &amt->secret_wq,
msecs_to_jiffies(AMT_SECRET_TIMEOUT));
@@ -1115,9 +1125,16 @@ static void amt_send_multicast_data(struct amt_dev *amt,
0);
}
+/* Send a Membership Query to a source that has not been authenticated yet.
+ *
+ * No per-source state exists at this point and none is created: the nonce and
+ * the keyed MAC are carried in the Query and recomputed from the Membership
+ * Update when it comes back, so everything this needs is passed by value.
+ */
static bool amt_send_membership_query(struct amt_dev *amt,
struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel,
+ __be32 daddr, __be16 dport,
+ __be32 nonce, u64 mac,
bool v6)
{
struct amt_header_membership_query *amtmq;
@@ -1138,13 +1155,13 @@ static bool amt_send_membership_query(struct amt_dev *amt,
skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
memset(&fl4, 0, sizeof(struct flowi4));
fl4.flowi4_oif = amt->stream_dev->ifindex;
- fl4.daddr = tunnel->ip4;
+ fl4.daddr = daddr;
fl4.saddr = amt->local_ip;
fl4.flowi4_dscp = inet_dsfield_to_dscp(AMT_TOS);
fl4.flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_UDP;
rt = ip_route_output_key(amt->net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
- netdev_dbg(amt->dev, "no route to %pI4\n", &tunnel->ip4);
+ netdev_dbg(amt->dev, "no route to %pI4\n", &daddr);
return true;
}
@@ -1154,8 +1171,8 @@ static bool amt_send_membership_query(struct amt_dev *amt,
amtmq->reserved = 0;
amtmq->l = 0;
amtmq->g = 0;
- amtmq->nonce = tunnel->nonce;
- amtmq->response_mac = tunnel->mac;
+ amtmq->nonce = nonce;
+ amtmq->response_mac = mac;
if (!v6)
skb_set_inner_protocol(skb, htons(ETH_P_IP));
@@ -1168,11 +1185,10 @@ static bool amt_send_membership_query(struct amt_dev *amt,
ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst),
0,
amt->relay_port,
- tunnel->source_port,
+ dport,
false,
false,
0);
- amt_update_relay_status(tunnel, AMT_STATUS_SENT_QUERY, true);
return false;
}
@@ -2469,14 +2485,75 @@ static bool amt_membership_query_handler(struct amt_dev *amt,
return false;
}
+/* Look up the tunnel for a source whose Membership Update has already been
+ * authenticated, creating it on first contact.
+ *
+ * This is now the only place tunnel state is allocated, so amt->max_tunnels
+ * bounds the number of *verified* gateways rather than the number of
+ * unverified Requests anyone can send.
+ */
+static struct amt_tunnel_list *amt_tunnel_get_or_create(struct amt_dev *amt,
+ __be32 saddr,
+ __be16 sport)
+{
+ struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel;
+ int i;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list)
+ if (tunnel->ip4 == saddr && tunnel->source_port == sport)
+ return tunnel;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
+
+ /* Re-check under the lock; a concurrent Update may have won the race. */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list) {
+ if (tunnel->ip4 == saddr && tunnel->source_port == sport) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ return tunnel;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (amt->nr_tunnels >= amt->max_tunnels) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tunnel = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunnel) +
+ (sizeof(struct hlist_head) * amt->hash_buckets),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!tunnel) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tunnel->source_port = sport;
+ tunnel->ip4 = saddr;
+ tunnel->amt = amt;
+ spin_lock_init(&tunnel->lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < amt->hash_buckets; i++)
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&tunnel->groups[i]);
+
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tunnel->gc_wq, amt_tunnel_expire);
+ __amt_update_relay_status(tunnel, AMT_STATUS_RECEIVED_UPDATE, false);
+
+ /* Publish only once the entry is fully initialised. */
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&tunnel->list, &amt->tunnel_list);
+ amt->nr_tunnels++;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
+
+ return tunnel;
+}
+
static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct amt_header_membership_update *amtmu;
struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel;
+ bool verified = false;
+ siphash_key_t key[2];
+ int len, hdr_size, i;
+ u64 response_mac;
struct ethhdr *eth;
struct iphdr *iph;
- int len, hdr_size;
- u64 response_mac;
__be32 saddr;
__be32 nonce;
__be16 sport;
@@ -2496,36 +2573,58 @@ static bool amt_update_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* Snapshot the tunnel endpoint port before the encap is stripped. */
sport = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
- if (iptunnel_pull_header(skb, hdr_size, skb->protocol, false))
- return true;
+ /* Recompute the MAC handed out in the Membership Query rather than
+ * comparing against a stored copy. Both the current and the previous
+ * secret are accepted so that an exchange straddling a rotation by
+ * amt_secret_work() is not spuriously rejected.
+ *
+ * This runs before the packet is decapsulated so that an unverified
+ * source is rejected without any further work being done on it.
+ */
+ spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ key[0] = amt->key[0];
+ key[1] = amt->key[1];
+ spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
- skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key); i++) {
+ u64 mac = siphash_3u32((__force u32)saddr,
+ (__force u32)sport,
+ (__force u32)nonce,
+ &key[i]) >> 16;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list) {
- if (tunnel->ip4 == saddr &&
- tunnel->source_port == sport) {
- if ((nonce == tunnel->nonce &&
- response_mac == tunnel->mac)) {
- mod_delayed_work(amt_wq, &tunnel->gc_wq,
- msecs_to_jiffies(amt_gmi(amt))
- * 3);
- goto report;
- } else {
- /* The endpoint match is unique, so no other
- * tunnel can validate this Update. Count the
- * drop: an unauthenticated Update is not
- * observable from the gateway's own side.
- */
- netdev_dbg(amt->dev, "Invalid MAC\n");
- amt->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
- return true;
- }
+ if (response_mac == mac) {
+ verified = true;
+ break;
}
}
- return true;
+ if (!verified) {
+ /* Count the drop: an unauthenticated Update is not observable
+ * from the gateway's own side.
+ */
+ netdev_dbg(amt->dev, "Invalid MAC\n");
+ amt->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ tunnel = amt_tunnel_get_or_create(amt, saddr, sport);
+ if (!tunnel) {
+ /* Out of tunnel slots. Unlike the Request path this reply
+ * only ever goes to a source that has proved it received our
+ * Query, so it cannot be used to reflect at a third party.
+ */
+ icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ mod_delayed_work(amt_wq, &tunnel->gc_wq,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(amt_gmi(amt)) * 3);
+
+ if (iptunnel_pull_header(skb, hdr_size, skb->protocol, false))
+ return true;
+
+ skb_reset_network_header(skb);
-report:
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph)))
return true;
@@ -2702,15 +2801,27 @@ static bool amt_discovery_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
return false;
}
+/* Handle an AMT Relay Membership Request.
+ *
+ * The source address of a Request is unauthenticated: it is a bare UDP
+ * datagram and can be trivially spoofed. Allocating tunnel state here let an
+ * attacker fill the tunnel table (amt->max_tunnels entries, each held for
+ * amt_gmi()) from spoofed addresses, and let a single spoofed packet overwrite
+ * the nonce/MAC of an already-established tunnel and cut that gateway off.
+ *
+ * Nothing needs to be remembered at this point. Every input to the keyed MAC
+ * is either carried in the packet or is device state, so the MAC is generated
+ * here, echoed back by the gateway in its Membership Update, and recomputed
+ * and verified there - see amt_update_handler(). Tunnel state is created only
+ * once that verification succeeds.
+ */
static bool amt_request_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct amt_header_request *amtrh;
- struct amt_tunnel_list *tunnel;
- unsigned long long key;
struct udphdr *udph;
struct iphdr *iph;
+ siphash_key_t key;
u64 mac;
- int i;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*udph) + sizeof(*amtrh)))
return true;
@@ -2722,68 +2833,24 @@ static bool amt_request_handler(struct amt_dev *amt, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (amtrh->reserved1 || amtrh->reserved2 || amtrh->version)
return true;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &amt->tunnel_list, list)
- if (tunnel->ip4 == iph->saddr &&
- tunnel->source_port == udph->source)
- goto send;
-
- spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
- if (amt->nr_tunnels >= amt->max_tunnels) {
- spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
- icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0);
- return true;
- }
-
- tunnel = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunnel) +
- (sizeof(struct hlist_head) * amt->hash_buckets),
- GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!tunnel) {
- spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ if (!netif_running(amt->dev) || !netif_running(amt->stream_dev))
return true;
- }
-
- tunnel->source_port = udph->source;
- tunnel->ip4 = iph->saddr;
-
- memcpy(&key, &tunnel->key, sizeof(unsigned long long));
- tunnel->amt = amt;
- spin_lock_init(&tunnel->lock);
- for (i = 0; i < amt->hash_buckets; i++)
- INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&tunnel->groups[i]);
- INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tunnel->gc_wq, amt_tunnel_expire);
-
- list_add_tail_rcu(&tunnel->list, &amt->tunnel_list);
- tunnel->key = amt->key;
- __amt_update_relay_status(tunnel, AMT_STATUS_RECEIVED_REQUEST, true);
- amt->nr_tunnels++;
- mod_delayed_work(amt_wq, &tunnel->gc_wq,
- msecs_to_jiffies(amt_gmi(amt)));
+ spin_lock_bh(&amt->lock);
+ key = amt->key[0];
spin_unlock_bh(&amt->lock);
-send:
- /* source_port is part of the tunnel's identity and is set once, in
- * the allocation path above; the lookup only reaches here on an
- * exact (address, port) match, so it is already udph->source. A
- * gateway that re-Requests from a new ephemeral port no longer
- * aliases onto this tunnel -- it gets its own, and this one ages
- * out on gc_wq. Do not "refresh" the port here: that is what made
- * a colliding Request steal an established tunnel outright.
- */
- tunnel->nonce = amtrh->nonce;
- mac = siphash_3u32((__force u32)tunnel->ip4,
- (__force u32)tunnel->source_port,
- (__force u32)tunnel->nonce,
- &tunnel->key);
- tunnel->mac = mac >> 16;
-
- if (!netif_running(amt->dev) || !netif_running(amt->stream_dev))
- return true;
+ mac = siphash_3u32((__force u32)iph->saddr,
+ (__force u32)udph->source,
+ (__force u32)amtrh->nonce,
+ &key) >> 16;
if (!amtrh->p)
- amt_send_igmp_gq(amt, tunnel);
+ amt_send_igmp_gq(amt, iph->saddr, udph->source, amtrh->nonce,
+ mac);
else
- amt_send_mld_gq(amt, tunnel);
+ amt_send_mld_gq(amt, iph->saddr, udph->source, amtrh->nonce,
+ mac);
return false;
}
@@ -3061,7 +3128,7 @@ static int amt_dev_open(struct net_device *dev)
amt->req_cnt = 0;
WRITE_ONCE(amt->remote_ip, 0);
amt->nonce = 0;
- get_random_bytes(&amt->key, sizeof(siphash_key_t));
+ get_random_bytes(&amt->key, sizeof(amt->key));
amt->status = AMT_STATUS_INIT;
if (amt->mode == AMT_MODE_GATEWAY) {
diff --git a/include/net/amt.h b/include/net/amt.h
index 2846dde0cad..297cbc91c1d 100644
--- a/include/net/amt.h
+++ b/include/net/amt.h
@@ -242,10 +242,6 @@ struct amt_tunnel_list {
struct delayed_work gc_wq;
__be16 source_port;
__be32 ip4;
- __be32 nonce;
- siphash_key_t key;
- u64 mac:48,
- reserved:16;
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct hlist_head groups[];
};
@@ -325,8 +321,11 @@ struct amt_dev {
struct work_struct event_wq;
/* AMT status */
enum amt_status status;
- /* Generated key */
- siphash_key_t key;
+ /* Generated keys. key[0] is current, key[1] is the previous
+ * generation, kept so that a Request/Update exchange straddling a
+ * secret rotation still verifies.
+ */
+ siphash_key_t key[2];
struct sock __rcu *sk;
u32 max_groups;
u32 max_sources;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread