From: Martin Belanger via B4 Relay <devnull+martin.nvme.dev.gmail.com@kernel.org>
To: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>, Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>,
kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev,
linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC net-next 2/5] tls: add socket options to register the traffic secrets
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2026 20:36:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261025-keyupdate-rfc-v1-2-60b7756eccbd@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261025-keyupdate-rfc-v1-0-60b7756eccbd@gmail.com>
From: Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
kTLS holds the key and IV of each direction, but not the traffic secret
they were derived from. The derivation is one-way, so the kernel cannot
compute the next generation for a KeyUpdate on its own.
Add TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET and TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET. The owner of the
socket passes the TLS 1.3 application traffic secret of a direction after
installing its key. The cipher of the installed key selects the hash, so
the option takes only the secret. A socket without a registered secret
behaves as before.
The TX secret can be registered alone. The RX secret needs the TX secret
first: a received KeyUpdate can ask for one in reply, and since the
kernel consumes the record, only the kernel can send that reply.
Installing a new key with TLS_TX or TLS_RX removes the secrets that no
longer apply. The secrets are cleared when the context is freed and
cannot be read back.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
---
Documentation/networking/tls.rst | 26 ++++++++++++
include/net/tls.h | 13 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/tls.h | 2 +
net/tls/tls_main.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tls.rst b/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
index 980c442d7161..2e011bd1ce4a 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
@@ -300,6 +300,32 @@ extra byte used by the ContentType field.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8449
+TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET and TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` registers the TLS 1.3 application traffic secret
+of the transmit direction, ``TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` that of the receive
+direction. With a registered secret, the kernel performs KeyUpdate for that
+direction itself (RFC 9846, section 4.7.3). The value is the secret itself.
+TLS 1.3 only, software path only.
+
+Install the key of the direction first, with the ``TLS_TX`` or ``TLS_RX``
+socket option described above. The cipher of that key selects the hash, and
+the secret must have the length of that hash: 32 bytes for SHA-256
+(AES-128-GCM, AES-128-CCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305) or 48 bytes for SHA-384
+(AES-256-GCM). Other ciphers return ``EOPNOTSUPP``.
+
+Each secret can be registered once. ``TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` needs
+``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` first: a received KeyUpdate can ask for one in
+reply, and only the kernel sees it. ``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` alone is
+allowed.
+
+If the application installs a new key itself with ``TLS_TX``, both secrets
+are removed. With ``TLS_RX``, the RX secret is removed. KeyUpdate for that
+direction is then left to the application again.
+
+The secrets cannot be read back.
+
Statistics
==========
diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
index e57bef58851e..aacc6d12226e 100644
--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct tls_rec;
#define TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE 13
+/* SHA-384, the longest hash of a TLS 1.3 cipher suite kTLS supports */
+#define TLS_MAX_TRAFFIC_SECRET_SIZE 48
+
#define TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE 16
#define TLS_MAX_SALT_SIZE 4
#define TLS_TAG_SIZE 16
@@ -224,6 +227,12 @@ struct tls_prot_info {
u16 tail_size;
};
+/* A TLS 1.3 application traffic secret. len is 0 if none is registered. */
+struct tls_traffic_secret {
+ u8 data[TLS_MAX_TRAFFIC_SECRET_SIZE];
+ u8 len;
+};
+
struct tls_context {
/* read-only cache line */
struct tls_prot_info prot_info;
@@ -266,6 +275,10 @@ struct tls_context {
union tls_crypto_context crypto_send;
union tls_crypto_context crypto_recv;
+ /* Registered for KeyUpdate, protected by the socket lock */
+ struct tls_traffic_secret tx_secret;
+ struct tls_traffic_secret rx_secret;
+
struct list_head list;
refcount_t refcount;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tls.h b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
index 1245ab38afc1..d1b136ecea96 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#define TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO 3 /* TX zerocopy (only sendfile now) */
#define TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD 4 /* Attempt opportunistic zero-copy */
#define TLS_TX_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN 5 /* Maximum plaintext size */
+#define TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET 6 /* TLS 1.3 TX traffic secret */
+#define TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET 7 /* TLS 1.3 RX traffic secret */
/* Supported versions */
#define TLS_VERSION_MINOR(ver) ((ver) & 0xFF)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index 8bdb78718a8d..1c6e993ec012 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
* SOFTWARE.
*/
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ void tls_ctx_free(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_send, sizeof(ctx->crypto_send));
memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_recv, sizeof(ctx->crypto_recv));
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx->tx_secret, sizeof(ctx->tx_secret));
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx->rx_secret, sizeof(ctx->rx_secret));
mutex_destroy(&ctx->tx_lock);
if (sk)
@@ -757,8 +760,16 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
ctx->rx_conf = conf;
update_sk_prot(sk, ctx);
- if (update)
+ if (update) {
+ /* The registered secret no longer matches the key. The RX
+ * secret also needs the TX one, see do_tls_setsockopt_secret().
+ */
+ if (tx)
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx->tx_secret,
+ sizeof(ctx->tx_secret));
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx->rx_secret, sizeof(ctx->rx_secret));
return 0;
+ }
if (tx) {
ctx->sk_write_space = sk->sk_write_space;
@@ -857,6 +868,72 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_tx_payload_len(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
return 0;
}
+/* Length of the TLS 1.3 traffic secret for @cipher_type, the size of
+ * its hash. 0 if KeyUpdate is not supported for the cipher.
+ */
+static int tls_traffic_secret_len(u16 cipher_type)
+{
+ switch (cipher_type) {
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128:
+ case TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+ return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256:
+ return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int do_tls_setsockopt_secret(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
+ unsigned int optlen, int tx)
+{
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
+ struct tls_traffic_secret *secret;
+ int len;
+
+ if (tx) {
+ crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
+ secret = &ctx->tx_secret;
+ } else {
+ crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
+ secret = &ctx->rx_secret;
+ }
+
+ /* The key must be installed first: its cipher selects the hash */
+ if (!TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info) ||
+ crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((tx ? ctx->tx_conf : ctx->rx_conf) != TLS_SW)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ len = tls_traffic_secret_len(crypto_info->cipher_type);
+ if (!len)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (sockptr_is_null(optval) || optlen != len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* A received KeyUpdate may ask for one in reply. The kernel
+ * consumes the record, so only the kernel can send the reply.
+ */
+ if (!tx && !ctx->tx_secret.len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secret->len)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (copy_from_sockptr(secret->data, optval, len)) {
+ memzero_explicit(secret->data, sizeof(secret->data));
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ secret->len = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, sockptr_t optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
@@ -883,6 +960,13 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, sockptr_t optval,
rc = do_tls_setsockopt_tx_payload_len(sk, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
break;
+ case TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
+ case TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ rc = do_tls_setsockopt_secret(sk, optval, optlen,
+ optname == TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ break;
default:
rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 0:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 0:36 [PATCH RFC net-next 0/5] tls: perform TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate in the kernel Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-26 0:36 ` [PATCH RFC net-next 1/5] tls: add HKDF-Expand-Label for the TLS 1.3 key schedule Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-26 7:27 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-26 11:25 ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-26 0:36 ` Martin Belanger via B4 Relay [this message]
2026-10-26 7:37 ` [PATCH RFC net-next 2/5] tls: add socket options to register the traffic secrets Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-26 11:27 ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-26 0:36 ` [PATCH RFC net-next 3/5] tls: update the RX key when a KeyUpdate is received Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-26 7:53 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-26 11:28 ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-26 0:36 ` [PATCH RFC net-next 4/5] tls: send a KeyUpdate at the record limit and on request Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-26 0:36 ` [PATCH RFC net-next 5/5] selftests/tls: add KeyUpdate tests Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
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