* [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
[not found] <20261027100242.2886699-1-lee@kernel.org>
@ 2026-10-27 10:02 ` Lee Jones
2026-10-27 10:02 ` [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn Lee Jones
1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Lee Jones @ 2026-10-27 10:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: lee, Marcel Holtmann, Johan Hedberg, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Gustavo F. Padovan, Maxim Krasnyansky, Marco Elver,
linux-bluetooth, netdev, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, Pauli Virtanen, syzbot+b106284c2a0b7bc80cf9,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
From: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
[ Upstream commit ca2c4c26498643f421d35ffe258fafbd3ed461c3 ]
Since commit b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
l2cap_chan::conn has held reference and remains non-NULL also after the
corresponding hci_conn is deleted. In this state accessing various
fields eg. hci_conn::hdev is invalid, which leads to KASAN crash in
l2cap_sock_setsockopt() access of conn->hcon->hdev.
Check l2cap_chan::conn.hcon corresponds to an alive hci_conn before
trying to use it in l2cap_sock.c. Hold l2cap_chan_lock() in
getsockopt/setsockopt to ensure it stays alive, and to avoid data races
in l2cap_chan fields.
Fixes: b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
Reported-by: syzbot+b106284c2a0b7bc80cf9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b106284c2a0b7bc80cf9
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
[Lee: Omit sockopt_t conversion from commit bf01627cc04b ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: convert to getsockopt_iter")]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index 9b8bddefeb84..b11558b0dfec 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -437,11 +437,26 @@ static int l2cap_get_mode(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
return -EINVAL;
}
+static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_chan_conn(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&chan->lock);
+
+ /* l2cap_conn_del() sets FLAG_DEL while holding chan->lock before
+ * conn->hcon is deleted. If not set and conn is non-NULL, conn->hcon
+ * remains alive during this chan->lock critical section.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return chan->conn;
+}
+
static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn;
struct l2cap_options opts;
struct l2cap_conninfo cinfo;
int err = 0;
@@ -453,6 +468,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
@@ -538,9 +554,15 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
break;
}
+ conn = l2cap_chan_conn(chan);
+ if (!conn) {
+ err = -ENOTCONN;
+ break;
+ }
+
memset(&cinfo, 0, sizeof(cinfo));
- cinfo.hci_handle = chan->conn->hcon->handle;
- memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, chan->conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);
+ cinfo.hci_handle = conn->hcon->handle;
+ memcpy(cinfo.dev_class, conn->hcon->dev_class, 3);
len = min(len, sizeof(cinfo));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &cinfo, len))
@@ -554,6 +576,8 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
}
release_sock(sk);
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+
return err;
}
@@ -562,6 +586,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn;
struct bt_security sec;
struct bt_power pwr;
u32 phys;
@@ -578,6 +603,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
@@ -589,12 +615,14 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
}
+ conn = l2cap_chan_conn(chan);
+
memset(&sec, 0, sizeof(sec));
- if (chan->conn) {
- sec.level = chan->conn->hcon->sec_level;
+ if (conn) {
+ sec.level = conn->hcon->sec_level;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED)
- sec.key_size = chan->conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
+ sec.key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
} else {
sec.level = chan->sec_level;
}
@@ -670,12 +698,14 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case BT_PHY:
- if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
+ conn = l2cap_chan_conn(chan);
+
+ if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED || !conn) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
- phys = hci_conn_get_phy(chan->conn->hcon);
+ phys = hci_conn_get_phy(conn->hcon);
if (put_user(phys, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -708,6 +738,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
}
release_sock(sk);
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
return err;
}
@@ -738,6 +769,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
@@ -838,6 +870,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(struct socket *sock, int optname,
}
release_sock(sk);
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
return err;
}
@@ -901,6 +934,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
@@ -926,11 +960,10 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
chan->sec_level = sec.level;
- if (!chan->conn)
+ conn = l2cap_chan_conn(chan);
+ if (!conn)
break;
- conn = chan->conn;
-
/* change security for LE channels */
if (chan->scid == L2CAP_CID_ATT) {
if (smp_conn_security(conn->hcon, sec.level)) {
@@ -985,7 +1018,8 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
}
if (opt == BT_FLUSHABLE_OFF) {
- conn = chan->conn;
+ conn = l2cap_chan_conn(chan);
+
/* proceed further only when we have l2cap_conn and
No Flush support in the LM */
if (!conn || !lmp_no_flush_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) {
@@ -1108,6 +1142,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
}
release_sock(sk);
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
return err;
}
--
2.56.0.307.g5fe7bd680c-goog
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
[not found] <20261027100242.2886699-1-lee@kernel.org>
2026-10-27 10:02 ` [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt Lee Jones
@ 2026-10-27 10:02 ` Lee Jones
1 sibling, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Lee Jones @ 2026-10-27 10:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: lee, Marcel Holtmann, Johan Hedberg, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Sasha Levin, Gustavo F. Padovan, Maxim Krasnyansky, Marco Elver,
linux-bluetooth, netdev, linux-kernel
Cc: stable, Pauli Virtanen, Luiz Augusto von Dentz
From: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
[ Upstream commit 86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a ]
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in
several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind
l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock
l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN)
chan->state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
lock_sock <------------------ release_sock
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state
is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second
__l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with
WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is
l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on
chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so
there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
Fixes: b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
Assisted-by: deepseek-4-flash # finding the race condition
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
[Lee: Resolve context conflict around mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock) prior to commit 56c2b5831d39 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect")]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 7 ++++++-
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 88ddd8eabae9..445a43c721f6 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -630,6 +630,10 @@ void __l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan)
BT_DBG("conn %p, psm 0x%2.2x, dcid 0x%4.4x", conn,
__le16_to_cpu(chan->psm), chan->dcid);
+ /* Caller must ensure l2cap_chan is linked to l2cap_conn only once */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(chan->conn || test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)))
+ return;
+
conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM;
chan->conn = l2cap_conn_get(conn);
@@ -7431,7 +7435,8 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
- if (cid && __l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, cid)) {
+ if ((cid && __l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(conn, cid)) || chan->conn ||
+ test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) {
hci_conn_drop(hcon);
err = -EBUSY;
goto chan_unlock;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index b11558b0dfec..655922aa82f1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int alen)
done:
release_sock(sk);
+ l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
return err;
}
--
2.56.0.307.g5fe7bd680c-goog
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[not found] <20261027100242.2886699-1-lee@kernel.org>
2026-10-27 10:02 ` [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt Lee Jones
2026-10-27 10:02 ` [STABLE v6.1-v5.10 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn Lee Jones
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