Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: reject overflowing vm_map_ram page counts

[Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>]

On Thu, 22 Oct 2026 23:43:47 -0700 "Shubhang Kaushik (Ampere)" <sh@gentwo.org> wrote:

> vm_map_ram() accepts a page count and must either map that many pages or
> fail. It currently converts the count to a byte size with:
> 
>         (unsigned long)count << PAGE_SHIFT
> 
> On 32-bit kernels, this conversion overflows when count is greater than
> ULONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT. vm_map_ram() then allocates and maps only the
> wrapped byte size, but returns a non-NULL address to its caller.
> 
> For example, with 4 KiB pages, a count of 1048577 wraps to PAGE_SIZE.
> vm_map_ram() therefore returns a mapping containing one page instead of
> the requested 1048577 pages.
> 
> If a caller uses the successful result as a mapping of all requested
> pages, it can access beyond the allocated mapping. Such an access can
> fault. If the accessed virtual address is occupied by another vmalloc
> mapping, it can instead access and corrupt unrelated kernel memory. In a
> userspace-reachable call path, this can result in a failed operation, a
> kernel oops or panic, or the effects of corrupted kernel data.
> 
> Return NULL before allocating or mapping anything when count * PAGE_SIZE
> cannot be represented in an unsigned long.

Thanks.

Is there a case where userspace can actually hit this, or is it a
theoretical case which can't actually be encountered, or something else?

> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -3083,10 +3083,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_unmap_ram);
>   */
>  void *vm_map_ram(struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int node)
>  {
> -	unsigned long size = (unsigned long)count << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	unsigned long size;
>  	unsigned long addr;
>  	void *mem;
>  
> +	if (check_mul_overflow((unsigned long)count, PAGE_SIZE, &size))
> +		return NULL;
> +
>  	if (likely(count <= VMAP_MAX_ALLOC)) {
>  		mem = vb_alloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
>  		if (IS_ERR(mem))
>