From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/19] driver core: Expose device trust authorization interfaces
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 09:33:42 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-12-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-0-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com>
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
An initrd must authorize a disabled device after attestation even if a
built-in driver already attempted to probe it. Buses with their own
authorization interface need to apply the same policy rules.
Expose requested policy and active trust through sysfs, and export
device_trust_set_policy() for bus authorization. Fix explicit authorization
or commitment for the device lifetime and serialize writes with probing.
Under the global full policy, reject changes and leave same-value writes
as no-ops so manual attachment needs no additional lock. Include the
attributes in device ownership changes.
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust | 28 +++++++
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 +
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
drivers/base/base.h | 2 +
drivers/base/core.c | 15 +++-
drivers/base/trust.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/device.h | 5 ++
include/linux/device/trust.h | 1 +
8 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..d68113b0d6b08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+What: /sys/devices/.../trust
+Date: September 2026
+Contact: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
+Description:
+ (RO) The active trust level for the device. The values are
+ "disabled", "adversary", and "full". Driver core resolves
+ the level before probe, and retains it through whole lifetime.
+
+What: /sys/devices/.../trust_policy
+Date: September 2026
+Contact: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
+Description:
+ (RW) The requested trust policy for the device. The initial
+ value may be selected by the bus before the device is
+ registered; otherwise it is "default". The policy is resolved
+ to an active trust level before the device is probed.
+
+ The values are "default", "disabled", "adversary", and
+ "full". "default" lets the bus select the active trust level.
+ "disabled" prevents a driver from binding and informs the kernel
+ to provide containtment of the device. For example a PCIe device
+ should be unable to DMA to the memory. "adversary" informs the
+ kernel that the userspace wants to opt into any security
+ defences the kernel may have to restrict and further validate
+ interactions with the device. This may have a performance or
+ functional cost compared to "full". As an example the DMA API
+ and IOMMU layers will avoid exposing unrelated nearby memory
+ to the device during DMA. "full" requests normal operation.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 81a936dca9476..2d046c79becd9 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1266,6 +1266,7 @@ Kernel parameters
Other values replace bus policy. The last valid value wins.
Full-only manual driver attachment requires full; other
global policies reject it before the probe callback.
+ With full, runtime trust policy changes are unavailable.
dfltcc= [HW,S390]
Format: { on | off | def_only | inf_only | always }
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index b726344362b41..a145aaaca2ef3 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8150,6 +8150,7 @@ L: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/driver-core/driver-core.git
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-drivers-probe
+F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
F: Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst
F: Documentation/driver-api/driver-model/
F: drivers/base/
diff --git a/drivers/base/base.h b/drivers/base/base.h
index ba8b5b3c51a65..623444c7a3be8 100644
--- a/drivers/base/base.h
+++ b/drivers/base/base.h
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ void bus_remove_driver(struct device_driver *drv);
void device_release_driver_internal(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv,
struct device *parent);
+extern const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group;
+
/* Full-only manual attachment uses the caller's subsystem serialization. */
void device_trust_init_state(struct device *dev);
int device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv);
diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c
index 6b94a163cda8d..bd96d84c2ac2c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/core.c
+++ b/drivers/base/core.c
@@ -2989,10 +2989,14 @@ static int device_add_attrs(struct device *dev)
if (error)
goto err_remove_type_groups;
+ error = device_add_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
+ if (error)
+ goto err_remove_dev_groups;
+
if (device_supports_offline(dev) && !dev_offline_disabled(dev)) {
error = device_create_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
if (error)
- goto err_remove_dev_groups;
+ goto err_remove_dev_trust_group;
}
if (fw_devlink_flags && !fw_devlink_is_permissive() && dev->fwnode) {
@@ -3022,6 +3026,8 @@ static int device_add_attrs(struct device *dev)
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_waiting_for_supplier);
err_remove_dev_online:
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
+ err_remove_dev_trust_group:
+ device_remove_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
err_remove_dev_groups:
device_remove_groups(dev, dev->groups);
err_remove_type_groups:
@@ -3047,6 +3053,7 @@ static void device_remove_attrs(struct device *dev)
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_removable);
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_waiting_for_supplier);
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
+ device_remove_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
device_remove_groups(dev, dev->groups);
if (type)
@@ -4791,6 +4798,12 @@ static int device_attrs_change_owner(struct device *dev, kuid_t kuid,
if (error)
return error;
+ /* Change the trust attributes of @dev to @kuid/@kgid. */
+ error = sysfs_group_change_owner(kobj, &device_trust_attr_group, kuid,
+ kgid);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
if (device_supports_offline(dev) && !dev_offline_disabled(dev)) {
/* Change online device attributes of @dev to @kuid/@kgid. */
error = sysfs_file_change_owner(kobj, dev_attr_online.attr.name,
diff --git a/drivers/base/trust.c b/drivers/base/trust.c
index 6a71abf10b3bb..86ce2751f30a3 100644
--- a/drivers/base/trust.c
+++ b/drivers/base/trust.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <kunit/visibility.h>
#include "base.h"
@@ -105,6 +106,111 @@ static const char * const device_trust_policy_names[] = {
[DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL] = "full",
};
+static const char * const device_trust_level_names[] = {
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED] = "disabled",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY] = "adversary",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_FULL] = "full",
+};
+
+static ssize_t trust_show(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ device_trust_level_names[device_get_trust_level(dev)]);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(trust);
+
+static ssize_t trust_policy_show(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ device_trust_policy_names[READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy)]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * device_trust_set_policy - Request a trust policy for a device
+ * @dev: registered device
+ * @policy: requested policy
+ *
+ * Apply the same rules as a write to the device's trust_policy attribute.
+ * A bus can use this to translate its own authorization interface into
+ * device trust. Takes the device lock except when the global full policy
+ * makes runtime policy changes unavailable. In that mode, writing the current
+ * policy is a no-op.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EBUSY if the policy can no longer change, -ENODEV
+ * if the device is being removed outside global full mode.
+ */
+int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev, enum device_trust_policy policy)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (device_trust_default_policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL)
+ return policy == READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
+
+ device_lock(dev);
+ if (dev->p->dead) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ if (policy == dev->trust_policy)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ /* A driver that claimed the device before registration was not admitted. */
+ if (READ_ONCE(dev->driver)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ switch (dev->p->trust_state) {
+ case DEVICE_TRUST_SELECTABLE:
+ if (policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED)
+ dev->p->trust_state = DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING;
+ break;
+ case DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING:
+ if (policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY &&
+ policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ dev->p->trust_state = DEVICE_TRUST_AUTHORIZED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_policy, policy);
+unlock:
+ device_unlock(dev);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(device_trust_set_policy);
+
+static ssize_t trust_policy_store(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int policy, ret;
+
+ policy = sysfs_match_string(device_trust_policy_names, buf);
+ if (policy < 0)
+ return policy;
+
+ ret = device_trust_set_policy(dev, policy);
+
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(trust_policy);
+
+static struct attribute *device_trust_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_trust.attr,
+ &dev_attr_trust_policy.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = device_trust_attrs,
+};
static int __init device_trust_default_setup(char *str)
{
int policy = match_string(device_trust_policy_names,
diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h
index 57d2e1b0d98ad..e3e7457cd50f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/device.h
+++ b/include/linux/device.h
@@ -933,6 +933,11 @@ static inline bool device_iommu_mapped(struct device *dev)
return (dev->iommu_group != NULL);
}
+static inline bool device_policy_is_disabled(const struct device *dev)
+{
+ return READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy) == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED;
+}
+
/* Get the wakeup routines, which depend on struct device */
#include <linux/pm_wakeup.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/device/trust.h b/include/linux/device/trust.h
index b8f5514cacec3..eb36970289e84 100644
--- a/include/linux/device/trust.h
+++ b/include/linux/device/trust.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ enum device_trust_policy {
};
void device_trust_init(struct device *dev);
+int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev, enum device_trust_policy policy);
enum device_trust_level device_get_trust_level(const struct device *dev);
bool device_is_adversarial(const struct device *dev);
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-09 7:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 7:33 [PATCH v2 00/19] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] USB: Release interface claims refused during registration Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] driver core: Report deferred probes through sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] driver core: Add a compatibility API for manual driver attachment Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] Input: serio - use the compatibility driver attachment API Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] net: phy: Use " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] driver core: Expose committed device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] USB: Authorize devices and interfaces through " Leon Romanovsky
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