From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: [PATCH v2 14/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 09:33:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-14-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-0-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com>
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Device addresses can change between boots, while userspace arrives too
late to choose policy for built-in drivers.
Add driver-wide boot rules beneath explicit device policy and existing
authorization. Refuse full-only manual attachment when pending driver
rules could change policy outside subsystem locks; an explicit device
boot entry excludes those rules. Check unregistered USB claims against
policy without admitting the device before registration.
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust | 7 +-
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 25 +++++--
drivers/base/base.h | 5 ++
drivers/base/trust.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/usb/core/driver.c | 4 +
drivers/usb/core/message.c | 2 +
include/linux/device/trust.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
index fd523bbe7bdc6..2d4bc96ed0d0f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ Description:
value may be selected by the bus before the device is
registered; otherwise it is "default". The policy is resolved
to an active trust level before the device is probed.
- A matching device_trust= kernel command-line entry overrides
- the initial requested policy before registration.
+ A non-default device_trust.default= kernel command-line value
+ replaces the bus policy before registration. A matching
+ device_trust= entry takes precedence over both, regardless
+ of command-line order. Boot policy also applies to new devices
+ discovered after boot.
The values are "default", "disabled", "adversary", and
"full". "default" lets the bus select the active trust level.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index fbc0cd21bf09f..6d8b427c69914 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1265,17 +1265,28 @@ Kernel parameters
Format: <bus>:<device>=<policy>[,...]
Names match exactly as in /sys/bus/<bus>/devices/<device>.
Policies are default, disabled, adversary, and full.
- Entries override bus policy and device_trust.default.
+ Entries override bus policy, device_trust.default, and
+ device_trust.driver.
See Documentation/driver-api/driver-model/device-trust.rst.
device_trust.default=
- [KNL] Set the initial trust policy for all devices.
+ [KNL] Set initial trust policy for devices without a
+ matching device_trust= entry, including hotplugged devices.
+ A matching device_trust.driver= rule can replace this
+ initial policy at the first binding attempt.
Format: { default | disabled | adversary | full }
- If omitted or set to default, preserve bus policy.
- Other values replace bus policy. The last valid value wins.
- Full-only manual driver attachment requires full; other
- global policies reject it before the probe callback.
- With full, runtime trust policy changes are unavailable.
+ default preserves bus-initialized policy (the default).
+ Other values override bus-initialized policy before
+ probing, including for built-in drivers.
+ See Documentation/driver-api/driver-model/device-trust.rst.
+
+ device_trust.driver=
+ [KNL] Set initial device trust policy by driver name,
+ including for drivers built into the kernel.
+ Format: <bus>:<driver>=<policy>[,...]
+ Names match exactly as in /sys/bus/<bus>/drivers/<driver>.
+ Policies are default, disabled, adversary, and full.
+ Rules remain available for hotplug and modules.
dfltcc= [HW,S390]
Format: { on | off | def_only | inf_only | always }
diff --git a/drivers/base/base.h b/drivers/base/base.h
index 59da537462a57..f82403d0438f2 100644
--- a/drivers/base/base.h
+++ b/drivers/base/base.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum device_trust_state {
* @device: pointer back to the struct device that this structure is
* associated with.
* @trust_state: policy admission state
+ * @trust_policy_override: explicit policy prevents deferred driver boot policy
* @dead: This device is currently either in the process of or has been
* removed from the system. Any asynchronous events scheduled for this
* device should exit without taking any action.
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ struct device_private {
char *deferred_probe_reason;
struct device *device;
enum device_trust_state trust_state;
+ u8 trust_policy_override:1;
u8 dead:1;
};
#define to_device_private_parent(obj) \
@@ -181,6 +183,9 @@ extern const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
int device_trust_parse_cmdline(const char *options, const struct device *dev,
enum device_trust_policy *policy);
+void device_trust_apply_driver_policy(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_driver *drv,
+ const char *options);
void device_trust_apply_boot_policy(struct device *dev,
enum device_trust_policy policy,
const char *options);
diff --git a/drivers/base/trust.c b/drivers/base/trust.c
index f581857642493..2bec6825ef31e 100644
--- a/drivers/base/trust.c
+++ b/drivers/base/trust.c
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
static enum device_trust_policy device_trust_default_policy __ro_after_init;
+static bool device_trust_full_allowed(const struct device *dev);
+
+static void device_trust_init_driver_policy(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_driver *drv);
+
void device_trust_init_state(struct device *dev)
{
dev->p->trust_state = dev->trust_policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ?
@@ -26,8 +31,8 @@ static int __device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev,
enum device_trust_level level;
int ret;
+ device_trust_init_driver_policy(dev, drv);
policy = dev->trust_policy;
-
if (policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED)
return -EPERM;
if (dev->bus && dev->bus->trust_resolve) {
@@ -60,7 +65,7 @@ int device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv)
int device_trust_prepare_full(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv)
{
- if (device_trust_default_policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL)
+ if (!device_trust_full_allowed(dev))
return -EPERM;
return __device_trust_prepare(dev, drv, true);
@@ -137,7 +142,7 @@ static ssize_t trust_policy_show(struct device *dev,
* A bus can use this to translate its own authorization interface into
* device trust. Takes the device lock except when the global full policy
* makes runtime policy changes unavailable. In that mode, writing the current
- * policy is a no-op.
+ * policy is a no-op and does not override a pending driver boot rule.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -EBUSY if the policy can no longer change, -ENODEV
* if the device is being removed outside global full mode.
@@ -155,7 +160,7 @@ int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev, enum device_trust_policy policy)
goto unlock;
}
if (policy == dev->trust_policy)
- goto unlock;
+ goto set_policy;
/* A driver that claimed the device before registration was not admitted. */
if (READ_ONCE(dev->driver)) {
@@ -180,7 +185,9 @@ int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev, enum device_trust_policy policy)
ret = -EBUSY;
goto unlock;
}
+set_policy:
WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_policy, policy);
+ dev->p->trust_policy_override = true;
unlock:
device_unlock(dev);
return ret;
@@ -214,10 +221,11 @@ const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group = {
};
static const char *device_trust_cmdline __ro_after_init;
+static const char *device_trust_driver_cmdline __ro_after_init;
-VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int device_trust_parse_cmdline(const char *options,
- const struct device *dev,
- enum device_trust_policy *policy)
+static int device_trust_parse_policy(const char *options, const char *target_bus,
+ const char *target_name,
+ enum device_trust_policy *policy)
{
enum device_trust_policy selected = DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DEFAULT;
const char *entry = options;
@@ -252,11 +260,11 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int device_trust_parse_cmdline(const char *options,
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(device_trust_policy_names))
return -EINVAL;
- if (dev && dev->bus && dev_name(dev) &&
- strlen(dev->bus->name) == bus_end - entry &&
- !strncmp(dev->bus->name, entry, bus_end - entry) &&
- strlen(dev_name(dev)) == level - name &&
- !strncmp(dev_name(dev), name, level - name)) {
+ if (target_bus && target_name &&
+ strlen(target_bus) == bus_end - entry &&
+ !strncmp(target_bus, entry, bus_end - entry) &&
+ strlen(target_name) == level - name &&
+ !strncmp(target_name, name, level - name)) {
selected = i;
matched = true;
}
@@ -266,12 +274,59 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int device_trust_parse_cmdline(const char *options,
entry = end + 1;
}
- if (matched)
+ if (matched && policy)
*policy = selected;
return matched;
}
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int device_trust_parse_cmdline(const char *options,
+ const struct device *dev,
+ enum device_trust_policy *policy)
+{
+ return device_trust_parse_policy(options, dev && dev->bus ? dev->bus->name : NULL,
+ dev ? dev_name(dev) : NULL, policy);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(device_trust_parse_cmdline);
+static bool device_trust_full_allowed(const struct device *dev)
+{
+ if (device_trust_default_policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Driver rules can otherwise change policy outside subsystem locks. */
+ return !device_trust_driver_cmdline ||
+ (device_trust_cmdline &&
+ device_trust_parse_cmdline(device_trust_cmdline, dev, NULL) > 0);
+}
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT void device_trust_apply_driver_policy(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_driver *drv,
+ const char *options)
+{
+ enum device_trust_policy policy;
+
+ if (!options || dev->p->trust_policy_override ||
+ (dev->p->trust_state != DEVICE_TRUST_SELECTABLE &&
+ dev->p->trust_state != DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING))
+ return;
+
+ if (device_trust_parse_policy(options, drv->bus->name,
+ drv->name, &policy) <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_policy, policy);
+ dev->p->trust_state = policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ?
+ DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING : DEVICE_TRUST_SELECTABLE;
+ dev->p->trust_policy_override = true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(device_trust_apply_driver_policy);
+
+static void device_trust_init_driver_policy(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_driver *drv)
+{
+ device_trust_apply_driver_policy(dev, drv, device_trust_driver_cmdline);
+}
+
static int __init device_trust_setup(char *str)
{
if (device_trust_parse_cmdline(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
@@ -285,6 +340,18 @@ static int __init device_trust_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("device_trust=", device_trust_setup);
+static int __init device_trust_driver_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (device_trust_parse_policy(str, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ pr_warn("device_trust: ignoring invalid driver policy list '%s'\n", str);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ device_trust_driver_cmdline = str;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("device_trust.driver=", device_trust_driver_setup);
+
static int __init device_trust_default_setup(char *str)
{
int policy = match_string(device_trust_policy_names,
@@ -306,8 +373,10 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT void device_trust_apply_boot_policy(struct device *dev,
{
if (policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DEFAULT)
dev->trust_policy = policy;
- if (options)
- device_trust_parse_cmdline(options, dev, &dev->trust_policy);
+ if (options &&
+ device_trust_parse_cmdline(options, dev, &dev->trust_policy) > 0 &&
+ dev->p)
+ dev->p->trust_policy_override = true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(device_trust_apply_boot_policy);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c
index ee36eae34bdcc..04b77691fbd7d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c
@@ -563,6 +563,10 @@ int usb_driver_claim_interface(struct usb_driver *driver,
if (!iface->authorized)
return -ENODEV;
+ if (!device_is_registered(dev) &&
+ dev->trust_policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED)
+ return -EPERM;
+
dev->driver = &driver->driver;
usb_set_intfdata(iface, data);
iface->needs_binding = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/message.c b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
index d35a7710c8ef4..2d75b85b2d139 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/message.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/message.c
@@ -2209,6 +2209,8 @@ int usb_set_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int configuration)
pm_runtime_no_callbacks(&intf->dev);
dev_set_name(&intf->dev, "%d-%s:%d.%d", dev->bus->busnum,
dev->devpath, configuration, ifnum);
+ /* A sibling may claim the interface before it is registered */
+ device_trust_init(&intf->dev);
/*
* Make sure the interface does not outlive its parent (e.g.
* as needed for usb_queue_reset_device() and
diff --git a/include/linux/device/trust.h b/include/linux/device/trust.h
index eb36970289e84..9d6d387d01203 100644
--- a/include/linux/device/trust.h
+++ b/include/linux/device/trust.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
struct device;
+struct device_driver;
/**
* enum device_trust_level - active trust level for a device
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-09 7:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 7:33 [PATCH v2 00/19] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] USB: Release interface claims refused during registration Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] driver core: Report deferred probes through sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] driver core: Add a compatibility API for manual driver attachment Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] Input: serio - use the compatibility driver attachment API Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] net: phy: Use " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] driver core: Expose device trust authorization interfaces Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] driver core: Expose committed device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-09 7:33 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] USB: Authorize devices and interfaces through " Leon Romanovsky
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