[PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted

[PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted

[Sergei Nizovtsev]

The backing_file_alloc and backing_file_free LSM hooks get the backing
file as "struct file *backing_file", but its f_path is not populated
while they run:

 - security_backing_file_alloc() is called from init_backing_file() in
   alloc_empty_backing_file(), before vfs_open() sets f_path, so
   backing_file->f_path.dentry is NULL;
 - security_backing_file_free() can run for a backing file whose open
   failed and whose f_path was already cleared.

Neither hook is listed in untrusted_lsm_hooks, so bpf_lsm_is_trusted()
lets BPF LSM programs use the argument as a trusted pointer.  A program
attached to lsm/backing_file_alloc can pass &backing_file->f_path to the
trusted-args kfunc bpf_path_d_path(), and d_path() dereferences the NULL
dentry on the first open of a file on overlayfs:

  extern int bpf_path_d_path(const struct path *path, char *buf,
                             size_t sz) __ksym;
  char buf[256];

  SEC("lsm/backing_file_alloc")
  int BPF_PROG(poc, struct file *backing_file,
               const struct file *user_file)
  {
          bpf_path_d_path(&backing_file->f_path, buf, sizeof(buf));
          return 0;
  }

  # bpftool prog load poc.bpf.o /sys/fs/bpf/poc autoattach
  # cat <any file on an overlayfs mount>

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
  RIP: 0010:d_path+0xb4/0x810
  Call Trace:
   bpf_path_d_path+0x26/0x70
   bpf_prog_f8f2e241d4ff7217_poc+0x33/0x37
   bpf_trampoline_6442521065+0x61/0xf9
   security_backing_file_alloc+0x78/0xe0
   alloc_empty_backing_file+0xf0/0x170
   backing_file_open+0xfd/0x290
   ovl_open_realfile+0x1ed/0x270
   ovl_open+0x1a9/0x2f0
   do_dentry_open+0x404/0x1280
   vfs_open_consume+0xba/0x4b0
   path_openat+0xc4f/0x1f60

Add both hooks to untrusted_lsm_hooks, next to file_alloc_security and
file_free_security, which are listed there for the same reason.  The
program above is then rejected at load time with "R1 must be referenced
or trusted".

Fixes: 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5-2
Signed-off-by: Sergei Nizovtsev <snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>
---
Tested on bpf.git master (475a0cfd02f1) under virtme-ng with KASAN: the
reproducer oopses without the patch and fails to load with it. Only the
backing_file_alloc case was reproduced; backing_file_free is from code
reading.

 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index f58dce888ff4a..f39a3766f2245 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_alloc)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_free)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security)
-- 
2.56.0